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Parmenides’ philosophical poem is preserved to us today only in fragments consisting of what 
ancient writers chose to quote from the poem. Modern interpreters who aim at uncovering the 
meaning of Parmenides’ poem are limited by what these writers quoted from the poem and how 
they preserved these quotations. In general, these writers did not set out to preserve the poem for 
posterity. They, rather, often made use of the text of the poem for their own purposes. However, in 
light of the sparse set of evidence the extant fragments can present, these purposes, as a part of the 
context in which the fragments of the poem are preserved, are themselves potentially a valuable 
resource that can be made use of by modern interpreters of the poem. Two such writers are Plutarch 
and Proclus who both quoted from and presented interpretations of Parmenides’ poem.  
 
In this master’s thesis I consider how and to what extent reading Parmenides’ poem through the 
perspectives of Plutarch and Proclus can be helpful or harmful for interpreters who seek to uncover 
the meaning of the poem. I do this by looking how Plutarch and Proclus presented two aspects of 
what the information we today possess about Parmenides and his poem. Plutarch is one of our 
ancient sources to the claim that Parmenides was a lawgiver to his native city Elea, and he relates 
this biographical fact to his interpretation of Parmenides. Proclus is our sole source to fragment B5, a 
short and problematic fragment. By looking at the context in which Plutarch and Proclus present 
these pieces of information I here attempt to evaluate whether the perspectives on Parmenides that 










Parmenides filosofiske dikt er bevart til oss i dag bare gjennom fragmenter bestående av hva 
forfattere i antikken valgte å sitere fra diktet. Moderne fortolkere som ønsker å avdekke mening til 
diktet til Parmenides er begrenset av hva disse forfatterne siterte fra diktet og hvordan de bevarte 
disse sitatene. Disse forfatterne tok generelt ikke sikte på å bevare diktet for ettertiden. Isteden tok 
de i bruk diktets tekst for til sine egne formål. Sett i lys av at fragmentene imidlertid er et begrenset 
sett med kildemateriale, disse formålene, som en del av konteksten fragmentene er bevart i, er i seg 
selv muligens en verdifull kilde som moderne fortolkere av diktet kan ta i bruk. To slike forfattere er 
Plutark og Proklos, som begge siterte fra og la fram fortolkninger av diktet til Parmenides.  
 
Jeg vurderer i denne masteroppgaven hvordan og i hvilken grad det å lese diktet til Parmenides 
gjennom perspektivene til Plutark og Proklos kan være til hjelp eller hindring for fortolkere som 
ønsker å avdekke meningen med diktet. Jeg gjøre dette ved å se på hvordan Plutark og Proklos 
presenterte to deler av informasjonen vi besitter om diktet til Parmenides i dag. Plutark er en av 
kildene våre fra antikken til påstanden om at Parmenides var en lovgiver til Elea, hjembyen hans, og 
Plutark relaterte dette biografiske faktum til innholdet i hans fortolkning av Parmenides. Proklos er 
vår eneste kilde til fragment B5, som er et kort og problematisk fragment. Ved å se på konteksten 
hvor Plutark og Proklos presentere denne informasjonen forsøker jeg her å evaluere om 
perspektivene på Parmenides som disse forfatterne presenterer kan også være gunstig å ta i bruk 





























My interest in Parmenides stems from initially wanting to understand him in order to gain a better 
perspective on what I saw as peculiar and interesting about Plato and Aristotle. The following can be 
understood as an account of the problems I was faced with when I tried to use Parmenides to make 
sense of those later thinkers. What I found out was that Parmenides did not just influence later 
thought, thinkers in the tradition that was influenced by Parmenides also arguably substantially 
influence how we can understand Parmenides today.  
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Parmenides. I am very grateful for the help she has given me. In addition, I also want to thank the 
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Everything must be studied from the point of view of itself, as near as we can 
get to this, and the point of view of its relations, as near as we can get to 
them.  
  Samuel Butler, The Note-books of Samuel Butler XIX 
 
Why do they that are reputed to be of distinguished lineage wear crescents 
on their shoes? […] was it a lesson in obedience to authority, not to be 
discontent at being governed by a king, but—just as the moon is willing to 
attend her superior and to hold second place, “ever gazing towards the rays 
of the sun,” as Parmenides puts it—thus to be content with their second 
rank, having a ruler and enjoying the power and honor derived from him? 1 
Plutarch, Roman questions 76, 281A1-282B11.  
 
 
In this master’s thesis, I attempt to lay out how Plutarch and Proclus, respectively, presented two 
aspects of the information we possess today about Parmenides’ philosophical poem. In doing so, my 
aim is to consider how and to what extent reading Parmenides’ poem through Plutarchian and 
Proclean lenses can be helpful or harmful for interpreters who seek to uncover the meaning of the 
poem.  
 




In 1966, excavators at Velia in Italy discovered a marble head that fit a headless herm with an 
inscription indicating that the head was meant to represent Parmenides that was found a few years 
earlier with. Parmenides was a citizen of Elea (ancient Velia) who was born in the middle to late 6th 
century BCE2 and is known as the author of one written work – a partially preserved philosophical 
poem. As the archeologist Hans Jucker noted, two years after the discovery was made, the bust was 
not a good source as to what Parmenides himself looked like or any early account of his physical 
features. According to Jucker, the bust of Parmenides appears to be modeled after the well-known 
portrait of Meterodorus, the Epicurean philosopher who lived roughly 200 years after Parmenides.3 
The bust itself is from the first century CE.4 Exactly why the sculptor chose to use the portrait of 
Meterodorus to depict Parmenides is not clear, but it is possible that there was no earlier tradition of 
portraits of Parmenides that the so-called Velia Parmenides could have been modeled after. The bust 
found in Velia is the only ancient portrait known today that purports to depict Parmenides’ likeness. 
After the bust was made, it was inscribed with the name of Parmenides. However, while the citizens 
 
2 These dates correspond to two different sources that suggest when Parmenides was born, in either 
approximately 540 BCE or 515 BCE. Diogenes Laertius in the Lives of Eminent Philosophers 1.16, referring to a 
text by Apollodorus from the second century BCE that we do not possess, claims that Parmenides was born in 
540 BCE. Line127b of the dialogue Parmenides, Plato, on the other hand, maintains that Parmenides was 
roughly 65 years old when the events mentioned in that dialogue supposedly took place, making it necessary 
for Parmenides to have been born around 515 BCE. Neither of these suggestions are entirely historically 
convincing. On the one hand, Apollodorus’s knowledge of a figure who lived three centuries earlier can be 
questioned without any further knowledge of the sources he himself was using, which we have no knowledge 
of. Also, as Burnet’s (1897) 127 observation that Parmenides was born in 540 BCE, which was the supposed 
year of the foundation of Elea and the year of Xenophanes ‘flourishing’, makes the claim suspect because the 
coincidence of these events can seem suspicious. On the other hand, Plato had ample literary reason to make 
his fictional Parmenides young enough to be able to meet Socrates; if Parmenides had been any older than 65, 
the supposed journey he had undertaken to Athens from Elea could have seemed unlikely. Guthrie (1979) 2, in 
contrast, ignoring the possible liberties that Plato could have taken because of his wish to present the dramatic 
encounter between Socrates and Parmenides and Zeno, claims that Plato “had no reason to give such exact 
information about their ages unless he knew it to be correct.” A similar claim is made in Kirk and Raven (1957) 
263. While there is some reason not to give an exact date in response to when Parmenides was born due to 
this uncertain set of evidence, to claim that he was born roughly between the two suggested dates is not 
obviously unreasonable. Beyond dating the poem, however, the argument against the date inferred from what 
Plato says about Parmenides is noteworthy. Because it is possible that Socrates’ meeting with Parmenides was 
merely a fiction, it might not be acceptable to take for granted that Plato or the historical Socrates had any 
knowledge of Parmenides that went beyond what other ancient authors could have known about him. 
3 Jucker (1968) 183. 
4 Coxon (2009) 41.  
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of Elea in the first century CE might have thought they were looking at a marble portrait of 
Parmenides, they were in fact looking at a bust sculptured after a model depicting Meterodorus. It is 
interesting, as Sheila Dillon comments regarding the bust, that “the choice was made to inscribe 
falsely an on-hand Meterodorus and pass it off as Parmenides, rather than to invent a new fictional 
portrait of the local philosopher […].”5 Dillon points out that whoever was responsible for selling the 
bust refrained from choosing to freely create a new portrait of Parmenides, but rather chose to 
appropriate an image of Meterodorus and present it as Parmenides. Because it presents an 
appropriated image, the Velia Parmenides is only a misleading source of what Parmenides looked 
like. Instead, as we now can tell, it is a source of the tradition of depicting the physical appearance of 
Meterodorus.  
 
The appropriation of the image of Meterodorus to Parmenides can itself be seen as an image 
resulting from the transmission of the limited information we possess today about Parmenides’ 
poem. This poem is currently preserved only in fragments that were quoted by later authors like 
Proclus and Plutarch. However, unlike the case with the Velia Parmenides, the preserved fragments 
of Parmenides’ poem do seem to be quotations from the poem (although they may have been 
quoted from memory) rather than writings written by someone other than Parmenides himself,6 as 
would be the case if there was a perfect analogy between the situation surrounding how the poem is 
preserved and the bust found in Velia. The fragments and other pieces of information preserved by 
ancient authors about Parmenides are not primarily appropriated images that falsely depict 
Parmenides and his work. Instead, what authors such as Proclus and Plutarch convey about 
Parmenides exhibit their own appropriation of Parmenides by way of the ‘lenses’ through which they 
transmit the poem. How they present the fragments of the poem, which pieces of information they 
 
5 Dillon (2006) 28.  
6 In chapter 3 section 2 below I discuss the possibility of fragment B5 of the poem being an inauthentic part of 
Parmenides’ poem.  
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transmit, and which pieces of information they leave out are the results of them viewing Parmenides 
through what I refer to by using this metaphor of lenses.  
 
It is by having knowledge of several other busts depicting Meterodorus that Jucker could claim that 
the Velia Parmenides presents an appropriated image. Similarly, here it is my intention to present the 
background against which Plutarch relates that Parmenides was a lawgiver to Elea and Proclus’ 
citation of what is called fragment B5 of Parmenides’ poem. In the case of Plutarch, which is what I 
will look at in chapter 2, his interpretation of the poem arguably reflects the extended context in 
which he understood Parmenides to have been a lawgiver to Elea. As the different lives Plutarch 
wrote of the legendary lawgivers of Greece can indicate, in saying that Parmenides was a lawgiver, 
Plutarch arguably understood both Parmenides’ written work and life to have corresponded to a set 
of biographical commonplaces that characterized the written lives of legendary lawgivers. Like how 
Jucker looked at the Velia Parmenides with knowledge of the Meterodorus portraits, pointing out 
how this set of biographical commonplaces might correspond to how Plutarch interpreted the poem 
shows the contingency of Plutarch’s interpretation, depending on the validity of Plutarch’s seemingly 
questionable conception of how the lives of lawgivers were structured.   
 
Regarding Proclus’ citation of fragment B5, which is addressed in chapter 3, the presentation of that 
fragment shows that how the fragment is preserved to us is influenced by Proclus’ Neoplatonic 
background. His citation of B5 happens in a context that cannot be straightforwardly understood 
without knowledge of that background. Furthermore, Proclus himself understood Parmenides’ poem 
to have been an incomplete account that was only completed by Plato’s writings. B5 is presented by 
him not in order to transmit the meaning of the fragment, but instead to support that his 
understanding of the relationship between Parmenides and Plato is correct. However, the context in 
which Proclus preserves B5 has mainly influenced interpreters through it being difficult and 
13 
 
convoluting. It is through misinterpretations of Proclus that B5 has often been approached by 
interpreters.   
 
A common theme of the two chapters is that how Plutarch and Proclus both preserves information 
about the poem can motivate reading the poem as it if it was not written by Parmenides himself in 
answer to a question or problem. Plutarch understands Parmenides’ poem as an expression of 
Parmenides’ life as he was engaged politically with his native city as a lawgiver. Consequently, there 
was no philosophical problem or question that led Parmenides to write his poem in the eyes of 
Plutarch. Parmenides’ motivation behind writing his poem was, rather, to supposedly give an 
expression of the life he led engaged philosophically with his work as a lawgiver, which could lead 
others to follow him. Similarly, Proclus does present fragment B5, “It is common for me \ from where 
I begin, for I will return there again,” in a way that has made interpreters less likely to inquire into 
where that point of beginning could have been, which is unclear from the text we possess.  
 
This theme is also the reason why I chose to focus on Plutarch and Proclus in my master’s thesis. By 
approaching and laying out these two aspects of how the two later thinkers understood Parmenides, 
I aim to consider whether the question of what Parmenides’ poem might have been written in 
answer to is a problem that should be further addressed by interpreters of Parmenides. Alternatively, 
it is possible to metaphorically wear crescents on one’s shoes – following what Plutarch suggests 
might have been the meaning behind that practice amongst distinguished Romans – and show 
obedience to the authority of Proclus and Plutarch as interpreters of Parmenides. Such obedience is 
understandable because of the problematic interpretive position of modern interpreters of 
Parmenides’ poem. However, blind obedience to an authority is clearly misguided. Whether Proclus 
and Plutarch should have any authority over how Parmenides’ poem is to be read should be 
established by closely considering how they preserved and interpreted Parmenides, which coincides 




With the purpose of establishing a background for these two chapters dealing with Proclus and 
Plutarch, I will in the two following sections present accounts of the ancient tradition that preserved 




0.1. The Ancient Tradition that Preserved Parmenides’ Poem 
 
Parmenides’ philosophical poem likely dates from the late 6th or early 5th century BCE,7 while the 
preserved fragments of the poem were quoted by ancient authors who lived as late as the 6th 
century CE.8 That the poem is preserved in such a manner does not distinguish it from the work of 
the thinkers who are referred to as Presocratic philosophers. In fact, with a few possible exceptions,9 
none of the original writings of any of the Presocratic philosophers are preserved today. These 
philosophers are approached by modern interpreters, again with those few possible exceptions, only 
through what later ancient authors chose to quote from their works. As is the case regarding these 
other thinkers, the tradition that preserved Parmenides’ poem is an unavoidable resource for any 
interpreter of Parmenides because it is only through it that we can access the fragments we possess 
of his written work. 
 
The ancient authors who presented quotations from the works of the Presocratics are a resource to 
us today in so far as we want to get the clearest picture possible of the complete works of the 
 
7 These dates correspond to the suggested dates of Parmenides’ birth that are mentioned in note 2 above.  
8 Simplicius, who died in 560 CE, is responsible for preserving at least nine different fragments of the poem: 
B1.28–32; B2.3–8; B6; B71–2; B8; B9; B11; B12; B13; B20. Cf. Coxon (2009) 2. Fragment 20 might not be a 
genuine fragment of the poem; cf. note 11 below.   
9 Two possible exceptions are the Derveni Papyrus, a philosophical commentary on an Orphic poem, and the 




Presocratics and attempt to understand the meaning of those works. Problematically, however, the 
authors in the tradition that preserved fragments of the works of the Presocratics did not as a 
general rule set out to assist us in our attempt to interpret the meaning of the works they quoted 
from. According to Jaap Mansfeld, speaking about the later tradition, “The ideas of earlier 
philosophers were used and interpreted in many ways, and, more often than not, served merely as 
springboards.”10 That history should be practiced for the sake of giving an objective account of the 
past is not a notion that we should expect to find in these authors. While the authors who preserved 
the works of the Presocratics are our only access to these works, they also present their own 
prejudices and preconceptions through what they preserved the earlier works as a lens, following the 
same metaphor I applied to Plutarch and Proclus, through which modern interpreters necessarily 
have to view the Presocratics. These prejudices and preconceptions might, of course, not necessarily 
have limited how they viewed the earlier works, but it is problematic for modern interpreters to 
know whether they did or not.  
 
What is today the most prominent account of the tradition that preserved and interpreted the works 
of the Presocratics is the one presented by Hermann Diels. In the case of Parmenides’ poem, the 
commonly accepted arrangement of the 19 preserved fragments11 of Parmenides’ poem was 
presented by Diels in his Parmenides Lehrgedicht and revised in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. 
Later, the second work and the arrangement Diels presented was edited by Walter Kranz. Thus, Die 
Fragmente der Vorsokratiker and the ordering of fragments it presents are referred to as simply 
Diels-Kranz or DK. Diels had gathered both testimonia dealing with the authors in question as well as 
 
10 Mansfeld (1999) 22.  
11 The so-called Cornford fragment was suggested by Francis Cornford (1935) as the 20th fragment of the poem. 
One of Mourelatos’ (2009) 185 suggested translation of the fragment is: “Such, immobile, is that for which as a 
whole the name is: “to be.” The fragment is quoted by Plato in the Theaetetus 180e1 and twice by Simplicius 
his commentary on the Physics at 29.18 and 143.10. Because of its apparent similarity, it is possible that the 
fragment is a misquote of B8.38. Barnes (1979) 14-16 argues in favor of it not being a genuine fragment of the 
poem, while Mourelatos (2009) 187 is more reserved and notes that it is “wrong-headed to press interpretive 
conclusions from Cornford’s fragment.”  
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the fragments he understood to be direct citations of their original texts, where the former are called 
A-fragments and the latter are called B-fragments. The 19 fragments of Parmenides’ poem are B-
fragments and are referred to as B1 to B19.12  
 
According to David Runia, it was Diels’ work that enshrined the concept of the Presocratics.13 
Because the term Presocratics defines a tradition by what came after it, it can appear to be an elusive 
concept. Furthermore, as Runia notes, one seemingly troubling aspect of referring to the thinkers 
Diels mentions in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker as Presocratics is that some of them lived after 
Socrates.14 In response to these issues, instead of being understood as having a temporal meaning, 
the term can perhaps be understood as referring to thinkers who were not influenced by Socrates.15 
That there was an ancient distinction between philosophy as Socrates conceived of it and that of 
earlier thinkers is suggested by Aristotle in book 1 of the Metaphysics, where he says that Socrates, in 
contrast to earlier thinkers, “disregarded the physical universe and confined his study to moral 
questions.”16 While the Presocratics certainly did not refer to themselves as Presocratics, or even 
under any other common term, applying the concept today to Parmenides and the other thinkers 
Diels mentions in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker can be justified in light of the influence Socrates 
had on later thought.  
 
Moreover, in grouping the thinkers who we refer to as the Presocratics, Diels was echoing an ancient 
tradition that preserved collections of doxai, which can be translated as the ‘views’ or ‘tenets,’ of 
 
12 Diels’ ordering also includes numbers assigned to each of the thinkers whose work he presented in Die 
Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, where Parmenides is number 28. The first fragment of the poem can, thus, be 
referred to as DK28 B1. Furthermore, Diels also collected what he believed to be fragments that are imitations 
of the authors in question. These, which I do not mention any examples of in this thesis, are called C-fragments. 
I will always refer to the fragments by the order given to them by Diels, and I will refer to them by the letter 
indicating what type of fragment it is and the number assigned to it. Unless I specify otherwise, I will always be 
referring to fragments of Parmenides’ poem.  
13 Runia (2008) 28.  
14 Runia (2008) 28. Most notably, Democritus is thought to have died 30 years after Socrates.  
15 Kranz makes this suggestion in the introduction to the 6th edition of Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (1954) 
viii.  
16 Aristotle, Metaphysics 987b. Trans. Tredennick (1933).  
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these thinkers. In his earlier work Doxographi graeci, Diels had attempted to reconstruct parts of the 
ancient tradition that preserved fragments of the works of the Presocratics. In this work, Diels coined 
the term doxography, which he used to describe the tradition that, starting with the work of 
Aristotle’s pupil Theophrastus, we also only possess fragments of – presented by the doxai of earlier 
thinkers in a form that categorized them by the topics each of the doxai were seen as dealing with. As 
noted by Mansfeld, “This reconstruction of the secondary tradition forms the backbone of […] the 
Fragmente der Vorsokratiker.”17 What Diels attempted to achieve by this reconstruction was to show 
that the works of ancient doxography that we do possess – for instance, Pseudo-Plutarch’s Placita 
Philosophorum and Diogenes Laertius’ work of biographies of philosophers – was influenced by 
Theophrastus, who can appear to be a more trustworthy source than the later authors, which gives 
the later authors increased credibility as historical sources to the Presocratics. Therefore, Mansfeld 
cautions those who make use of Diels’ work by claiming, “All other editions of the so-called 
Presocratics or of individual Presocratics […] are entirely indebted to DK and so to the hypothesis 
concerning the genealogy of the secondary sources that underlie this work.”18 It is noteworthy that 
the hypothesized genealogy in question does not start with the works of the Presocratics themselves, 
but rather with Theophrastus’ work of doxography. Diels also assumes that Theophrastus’ knowledge 
of the work of the Presocratics itself is trustworthy. 
    
In addition to the doxographic tradition, a further set of sources to Parmenides’ poem that Diels 
makes use of are authors who appear to have been in possession of the complete poem and not just 
one of the works that was indebted to Theophrastus’ doxography. Some of these sources are 
commentators who comment on philosophical works, notably Simplicius in his commentary on 
Aristotle’s Physics and Proclus in his commentary on Plato’s dialogue Parmenides. There are also 
sources such as Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, and Clement of Alexandria, who quoted from 
 
17 Mansfeld (1999) 24. According to Mansfeld, the title of Theophrastus’ work was likely to have been Physikai 
doxai. 
18 Mansfeld (1999) 25. 
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Parmenides’ poem in their own independent works of philosophy or theology. However, as I will 
discuss the Proclus’ quotation of fragment B5 in the commentary on the Parmenides,19 it can be 
difficult to ascertain if these thinkers were in fact in possession of the text of Parmenides’ poem, or if 




0.1.1– Plutarch and Proclus and how they preserved Parmenides’ Poem  
 
Both Plutarch and Proclus fit into the broad category of Platonist philosophers. The interest they 
show in Parmenides can, thus, possibly be explained by the reverential and significant role 
Parmenides arguably plays in some of Plato’s dialogues. In Plato’s dialogue the Sophist, Plato has an 
unnamed follower of Parmenides, also from Elea, take on a role similar to what Socrates more 
regularly does in Plato’s dialogues by being the questioner in a dialogue with his interlocutor. 
Notably, the dialogue Parmenides gives an account of a supposed meeting between an aged 
Parmenides and a young Socrates. There, Parmenides both challenges Socrates’ ideas and engages in 
complicated discussions dealing with what Plato presents as Parmenides’ own thinking. Furthermore, 
at 183e of the Theaetetus, Parmenides is referred to by Socrates as “venerable and awesome,” which 
is perhaps indicative of Plato’s attitude toward Parmenides. Plato, however, as John Palmer says, 
“nowhere simply sets out his view of Parmenides.”20 It can, therefore, be problematic to refer to 
Plato when giving an account of Plutarch’s and Proclus’ Platonist interpretations of Parmenides, even 
though they were clearly influenced by Plato. Nevertheless, in light of how Plato describes 
 
19 See chapter 3.2 below.   
20 Palmer (1999) 13.  
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Parmenides, it is not unreasonable to argue that Proclus’ and Plutarch’s motivation behind their 
interest in Parmenides is owed to Plato.  
 
While Plutarch can be referred to as a Middle Platonist, Proclus can be called a Neoplatonist. In 
giving an account of the two terms’ historical background, Leo Catana argues against making a 
distinction between what is, through the two terms, referred to as two separate philosophical 
movements. Because he rejects the characterization of Neoplatonism as a distinct tradition opposed 
to earlier Platonism, “the division,” Catana says, “is untenable and we ought to remove it.”21 A point 
of continuity between the two supposedly distinct traditions is, as Julia Annas argues, the ideal of 
divine likeness that Plato mentions at 176A-B of the Theaetetus.22 A further point of similarity 
specifically between Plutarch and Proclus is their common emphasis on Plato’s Timaeus. One 
difference between Plutarch’s and Proclus’ Platonism is that Proclus – as someone writing in the 
tradition following Plotinus – put emphasis on the dialogue the Parmenides and Plato’s concept of 
the One.23 
 
Plutarch, who lived from roughly 45 to 120 CE, is arguably best known as the author of his 
biographical ‘parallel lives’ of famous Greeks and Romans. He also wrote dialogues like De genio 
Socratis, which were modeled after the platonic dialogues. We know Plutarch to have quoted a total 
of 6 lines from Parmenides’ poem in his written work, of which two lines, fragments B14 and B15, are 
not quoted by any other authors.24 The main work in which Plutarch interprets Parmenides’ poem is 
Adversus Colotem, which I will discuss in chapter 2 below.  
 
21 Catana (2013) 1.  
22 Annas (1999) 52-69.  
23 According to George Karamanolis (2010), “It is not an exaggeration to say that Plutarch's interpretation of 
the Timaeus shapes his entire philosophy.” Cf. Plutarch’s On the Generation of Soul in the Timaeus. Meanwhile, 
Proclus notes in his commentary on the Timaeus I 12–13, the different subject matters of the Timaeus and the 
Parmenides together cover the whole cosmos; the first dialogue dealing with the sensible and the second the 
intelligible.  




Proclus served as the head of the Platonic Academy in Athens in the 5th century CE, living from 
approximately 412 to 485 CE. Among his extensive work, Proclus notably wrote substantial 
commentaries on 12 of Plato’s dialogues. Throughout his work, Proclus quoted 21 lines of 
Parmenides’ poem. In these quotations, A. H. Coxon finds five instances where he sees it as likely 
that Proclus presented variants of what other authors quoted from the poem that are likely caused 
by Proclus misquoting the text of the poem.25 Unlike Plutarch, who more likely was in possession of 
the text of the poem as he was writing, it is not obvious whether Proclus quoted from the original 
text of the poem, if he quoted from memory, or if he quoted from a doxographical work. 
Furthermore, unlike Plutarch, who sets out to present what he views as Parmenides’ philosophical 





0.2. Remarks on the Content and Form of Parmenides’ poem 
 
 In this section, I give a cursory overview of the content and form of Parmenides’ poem with the aim 
of contextualizing my later comments about the poem.  
 
As I have pointed out, what we today see as Parmenides’ poem is a reconstruction based on what 
ancient authors chose to quote from the poem. The 19 fragments of the poem vary to a large degree 
in length, while the form of the fragments mostly conform to one another. Fragment B8 is 61 lines 
long, while fragment B15A is only a single word, hydatorizon (“rooted in water”), referring to the 
 
25 Coxon (2009) 5. 
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Earth. All but one fragment (fragment B18, which is preserved in a Latin translation) is preserved in 
Greek. In general, the common division of the poem into two parts, aletheia and doxa, correlates 
with how well preserved the fragments are. The fragments commonly thought to be in the aletheia-
section, fragments B1 to B8, are generally longer and provide a better picture of how that section of 
the poem might have been structured, compared with fragments B9 to B19.26 Without any apparent 
clear evidence in favor of his suggestion, Diels estimated that we possess 90 percent of the aletheia, 
while we only possess 10 percent of the doxa.27 Nevertheless, Diels’ claim reflects that what we view 
as the aletheia was given more attention than the doxa by the ancient authors who quoted from the 
poem.  
 
Instead of the normal two-part division of the poem, Gallop helpfully suggests that the fragments can 
be seen as falling into four main sections.28 Gallop’s first section consists of only the proem, which is 
the second longest of the fragments. It describes an unnamed young man’s (a kouros) journey to 
meet a goddess. The proem distinguishes itself from the rest of the poem in that it is the only 
fragment that is not narrated by the goddess in full. There is no indication in the text we possess that 
any other fragment is not a part of the goddess’ subsequent address to the young man. In what 
follows, I will alternately refer to the goddess as the narrator-goddess. At the end of the proem, the 
goddess introduces her narration of the rest of the poem by telling the young man, in a statement 
that can seem to support the two-part structure of the poem, “You must be informed of everything, 
both the unmoved heart of persuasive reality and the beliefs of mortals, which comprise no genuine 
conviction […].”29 While there appears to be a clear distinction in value between these two different 
 
26 The account of the poem I give here is an account of the orthodox view of the poem rather than the 
unorthodox view suggested by Cordero (2011).  
27 Diels (1897) 25-26.  
28 Gallop (1984) 5. As Gallop (1984) 30n11 also mentions, “The modern collocations, ‘Way of Truth’ and ‘Way of 
Seeming,’ have no textual basis either in the poem or in other ancient sources.” Another set of collocations 
that also have no textual basis as labels to sections of the poem are the ‘aletheia’ and the ‘doxa.’ Like Gallop, I 
nevertheless follow the practice of using these terms to refer to the first and second part of the poem 
respectively, with the aletheia ending at either B8.51 or at the end of B8.  
29 B1.28-31. Unless I specify otherwise, I use Coxon’s translation of the fragments.  
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parts of what the young man is told he must learn, it is notable that the narrator-goddess tells him 
that learning both is necessary.  
 
Gallop’s second section of fragments consists of the shorter fragments B2 to B7. In fragments B2, B4, 
B6, and B7, the narrator-goddess presents what she in B2.2 calls the different conceivable “ways of 
inquiry.” How many ways she actually presents is a topic for debate in the secondary literature on 
the poem.30 She presents at least two ways, corresponding to, respectively, “the unmoved heart of 
persuasive reality” and “the beliefs of mortals.”31 “The more enigmatic and short fragments B3 and 
B5; however, do not clearly fit into Gallop’s second group of fragments. Where B5 should be placed 
in the poem is a topic for discussion in chapter 2.  
 
Fragment B8.1-50 is Gallop’s third section. In B8, the goddess presents the way of inquiry 
corresponding to “the unmoved heart of persuasive reality,” which is in B2.3 referred to as the 
“journey of persuasion.” The subject of this journey in B6 is referred to as to eon, which can be 
translated as ‘Being’ or ‘what-is.’32 Even though fragments B2-B8 (or B1-B8) are commonly referred 
to as the aletheia, the goddess’ “journey of persuasion”’ itself is only presented in B8. B8 lays out 
what the narrator-goddess in B8.2 calls the “signs” along the “way of persuasion,” a way which is in 
B8.1 alternatively called “that a thing is” or, in my literal translation, “that is” (hōs estin). These signs 
appear to be the attributes the goddess assigns to to eon. In his account of the arguments and the 
argumentative structure of B8, Richard McKirahan groups the different attributes of to eon in B8 in 
 
30 See note 62 below.  
31 The first way is in B2.3 said to be “that a thing is” – or literally, “that is” (hopōs estin) – “and that it is not for 
not being.” The other way is in B2.5 referred to as “that a thing is not” – or “that is not” (hōs ouk estin) – “and 
that it must needs not be.”     
32 Which of these two translations are favored by commentators can depend on how the meaning of the 
subjectless esti in B2 is understood. In this master’s thesis I choose to translate to eon as Being or to leave the 
term untranslated. In chapter one I give an account of the discussion surrounding the meaning of esti in B2. 
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six groups. Examples from each of these groups are: “ungenerated;” “whole;” “never was, will not 
be, is now;” “changeless;” “steadfast;” and “one.”33 
 
Gallop’s final section consists of fragments B8.51-61 and B9 to B19. This section coincides with what 
is commonly called the doxa. The narrator-goddess introduces the doxa in B8.51-52 by saying, “from 
this point learn human beliefs, hearing the deceptive composition of my verse.” In the fragments that 
are preserved from this section of the poem, the goddess appears to give an account of the world 
that a learned human being potentially could give in opposition to the seemingly more divine ‘way of 
persuasion’. Unlike what she presents in the ‘way of persuasion’, in the doxa the narrator-goddess 
gives an account of creation and birth, and also presents a cosmology.  
 
Regarding the form of the fragments, a significant aspect of Parmenides’ poem is that it was written 
in dactylic hexameter. What characterizes the form of the dactylic hexameter is a poetic metrical 
structure based on long and short syllables, as well as norms, such as the so-called Hermann’s bridge, 
which govern how each line should be broken up by caesura. Dactylic hexameter is typically a meter 
of epic poetry and is found in the works of Homer, Hesiod, and the Homeric hymns, and later in the 
Latin epics of Virgil and Ovid. One reason why the dactylic hexameter of the poem is noteworthy is 
that it does not appear to be an obvious choice for Parmenides to make use of it. Anaximander, 
Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Pherecydes, and Acusilaus all authored prose works earlier than or at 
roughly the same time as Parmenides wrote his poem.34 A further significant aspect of Parmenides’ 
use of a hexameter poem as a way of expression is the juxtaposition between the poetic form and 
the philosophical content of the poem.  
 
 
33 McKirahan (2008) 191.  
34 Cherniss (1977) 19n32 and n33.  
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Parmenides’ poetic style has sometimes been criticized. According to Proclus, Parmenides “embraced 
the unadorned, sparse and clear form of narrative,”35 while Plutarch maintained that Parmenides’ 
poetry is more like prose.36 After having criticized him for his unclarity and “almost impenetrable 
obscurity,” Jonathan Barnes claims about Parmenides’ poetry, “the case presents no adjunct to the 
Muse’s diadem.”37 In particular, the proem, which is not where Parmenides directly presents what 
we can call his philosophizing, can be seen as stuttering poetically. Interestingly, however, the very 
first phrase in the poem that is explicitly philosophical is also better poetry than the preceding poetic 
account. The proem concludes with a claim that is both interesting and philosophical and poetically. 
Coxon’s translation shows the intricate complexity of the phrase: “how it was necessary that the 
things that are believed to be should have their being in general acceptance, ranging through all 
things from end to end.”38 Concerning the phrase’s poetic accomplishments, the alliteration and the 
rhythm in the Greek text can be striking, especially the last three words: “hōs ta dokeunta \ chrēn 
dokimōs einai dia pantos panta perōnta.” This is at the beginning of the narrator–goddess’ account, 
which fits well with the presentation of a more poetically accomplished phrase than what has 
preceded it. Thus, while Parmenides’ style can be criticized, there are also examples of skillful poetry 
in the poem.  
 
35 Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides 665. Trans. Coxon.  
36 Plutarch, How a Young Man Should Listen to Poetry 2, 16. Trans. Gallop.  
37 Barnes (1982) 155.  
38 In Tor’s (2017) 209 suggested translation of the passage he translates ta dokeunta as “things that seem and 
are accepted,” which includes two possible translations of the word. Mourelatos (2008) 209 is an example of an 
interpreter who would only translate ‘things that are accepted,’ taking this phrase to refer to a third kind of 
object of inquiry, in addition to the attributes of to eon and the opinions of mortals. Mourelatos wants some of 
the objects of the doxa to have some share in reality. Owen (1960) 85 – in arguing against the notion that 
Parmenides “meant to claim an independent validity for his cosmology, a reality of some kind of degree for the 









I will in this chapter present an account of the modern interpretive situation surrounding 
Parmenides’ poem that I position myself within.  
 
Recently, interpreters of Parmenides’ poem, such as Shaul Tor and Chaira Robbiano, have come to 
see aspects of the study of the poem as being at an impasse, or as increasingly ambiguous and 
complex. Against this backdrop of the increasingly problematic problems concerning the poem, Tor 
and Robbiano both turn to ancient authors and the ancient tradition that preserved Parmenides’ 
poem as authorities to the meaning of the poem. Viewing these authors as authorities is, thus, a way 
of coping with an increasingly difficult interpretive situation surrounding Parmenides’ poem. In this 
section I will present two classic problems interpreters of Parmenides’ poem have been faced with 
and show how these problems – rather than being solved – have increasingly been viewed as 
problematic. By taking recourse to the conceptual framework of authors in the tradition that 
preserved and first interpreted Parmenides’ poem, Tor and Robbiano both subscribe to a reading of 
Parmenides that de-emphasizes the importance of the classic problems surrounding Parmenides’ 
poem. One such problem is the problem of what Parmenides might have reacted to in writing his 
poem. Following Catherine Osborne, my approach to Parmenides’ poem is to give an account of how 
parts of the information we possess about Parmenides are embedded in the context of how Plutarch 
and Proclus transmitted those pieces of information. Unlike Osborne, I do this in order to consider 
whether there is reason to think that how Plutarch and Proclus view Parmenides’ poem exemplify a 
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fruitful way of approaching the poem, and consequently, whether it is advisable for interpreters like 
Tor and Robbiano to view the poem through a Plutarchian and Proclean lens.  
 
One example of an apparent interpretive impasse can be found in a discussion centered on the 
question of the meaning of the word esti and its derivatives in the poem, especially in light of how it 
is used in fragment B2. In B2, the narrator-goddess presents a young man with two possible paths of 
inquiry. Regarding the two paths she says in B2.3-5, translated literally from the Greek by 
Robbiano,39  
 ē men hopōs estin te kai hōs ouk esti mē einai 
the one that is and that is not possible that is not  
pethous esti keleuthos (alētheiē gar spēdei) 
 it is the course of persuasion, for truth will follow  
 hē d‘ hōs ouk estin te kai hōs chreōn esti mē einai 
 the other that is not and that should not be 
The word esti (the third person singular of the word meaning ‘to be’) presents a problem of 
interpretation because here it is presented without a subject, as verbs often are in Greek, but it is 
also not easily discernible what that subject is from the context. At least three separate ways of 
interpreting the function of the esti have been presented in the literature on the poem. One 
suggestion, presented prominently by G. E. L. Owen, is that esti should be understood existentially, in 
that the paths of inquiry the goddess is speaking about things that can be said to exist and things that 
can be said not to exist.40 Another way of interpreting the function of the esti is that it is itself a 
subject missing a predicate, and that the poem lays out what it is for a thing to be, that is, what the 
predicates are of the kind of things along the first path the goddess speaks about in B2. One 
 
39 Robbiano (2006) 79.  
40 In addition to Owen (1960), examples of other interpreters who subscribe to the existential reading are Tarán 
(1965) and Gallop (1979). What characterizes Owen’s position among others who also understand esti 
existentially is that he maintains that, for Parmenides, what exists is what can be spoken of.  
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prominent interpreter who understands B2’s esti predicatively is Alexander Mourelatos.41 A third 
way of understanding the esti, presented by Charles H. Kahn, is to see its meaning as veridical, in that 
one of the two paths deals with what is the case, while the other path deals with what is not the 
case.42  
 
However, Kahn later moderates his earlier claims about the function of the esti as veridical. Rather 
than claiming that the function of esti should be seen as the same throughout the poem, Kahn 
suggests that the word can be seen to have more than one function in the poem. Referring to the 
infinitive form of esti, Kahn claims that “Parmenides’ new conception of Being must be seen as a 
complex assemblage and unification of a half dozen different functions of the verb einai in Greek.”43 
For my present purposes, the key word in this quotation is ‘complex’. Rather than what the earlier 
inquiry into Parmenides’ poem had as its target, that is, seemingly one answer that would make 
sense of the whole poem,44 Kahn expresses that he now sees the potential answer that will make 
sense of the question he is asking as a complex and intricate answer.45  
 
Similarly, other classic problems in the tradition of Parmenides-research have more recently been 
seen as having complex rather than simple answers. One such problem is the problem of the course 
of the journey of the young man as he travels to meet the goddess in the proem. The journey of the 
young man has often been seen as having either a downward or an upward trajectory, as a katabasis 
or an anabasis.46 The interpreters who see the journey as a katabasis have focused on the motifs in 
 
41 Mourelatos (1970). Other interpreters who support Mourelatos’ position are Austin (1986), Curd (2004), and 
Graham (2006). Calogero (1932) also expressed the same position earlier than Mourelatos. 
42 Kahn (1969). 
43 Kahn (2002) 86.   
44 Even in his earlier article, Kahn had noticed that his veridical reading was not applicable to all of the poem. 
Nevertheless, about the three different interpretations dealing with the function of the esti, Kahn (1969) 713 
maintained, “Parmenides himself does not distinguish these three notions, but I think that we must do so […].”  
45 Brown (1986) 54; Long (1996) 144; Waterfield (2000) 50; Robbiano (2006) 80; and Tor (2017) 295, all make 
similar claims to Kahn (2002) about the complex and ambiguous meaning of esti.  
46 A third option is to see the course of the journey as following the journey of the sun across the sky. For an 
account of different interpretations that see the young man’s journey as corresponding to the course of the 
sun, see Krauss (2013) 453, cf. Tor (2017) 347-348n1, 356-358.  
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the proem that resemble Hesiod’s underworld Tartarus in the Theogony 721-819. Similar to how 
Hesiod describes Tartarus, Parmenides describes the young man traveling to a distant and 
otherworldly place. Like Parmenides does at B1.11, Hesiod consistently speaks of the underworld as 
a distant place by using the word entha or ‘there’ when referring to it. Another resemblance to 
Parmenides’ proem is that Hesiod describes Tartarus seen from above as a “great chasm.”47 In the 
proem, the young man reaches the goddess by passing through gates that open as a “gaping chasm,” 
(B1.18.) possibly implying that his destination on the other side of the gate is the underworld. 
However, in favor of the view that the journey is an anabasis, these gates are labeled as “aethereal” 
by Parmenides, even though they also have a stone threshold, as is recounted at B1.12-13. 
Furthermore, depending on how the phrase is read, B1.10 can appear to express that the trajectory 
of the maidens that escort the young man is toward the light from the “House of Night,”48 perhaps 
implying that the course they are traveling is toward the heavens rather than the dark underworld. 
Alternatively, the passage can be read as expressing that the maidens traveled from the House of 
Night and toward the light in order to pick up the young man, and then traveled back with him to 
where they came from.49 
 
In considering different aspects of the young man’s journey, Alexander Mourelatos concludes that 
“The honest conclusion from all this is that the topography of the journey is blurred beyond 
recognition.”50 In the eyes of Mourelatos, the interpretive problem presented to us by the poem is 
apparently insurmountable. He continues, “So we are not in a position to specify a particular story of 
a journey (“theme”) as the archetype of Parmenides’ narration.”51 There is still, for Mourelatos, 
 
47 Hesiod, Theogony 741. For descriptions of the many other points of resemblance between Hesiod’s Tartarus 
and Parmenides’ proem, see Morrison (1955) 59-60; Schwabl (1963); Dolin (1962) 96; Burkert (1969); Furley 
(1973); Pellikaan-Engel (1978) 8-10; Songe-Møller (2002) 34; Miller (2006) 7-8; and Palmer (2009) 54-55. 
Palmer is an example of a modern proponent of the view that the young man’s journey is a katabasis.   
48 Kahn (2009) 213. Notable proponents of the anabasis view are Diels (1897) 7-8; Jaeger (1947) 93; Cornford 
(1952) 118; and Kahn himself.  
49 Miller (2006) 20.  
50 Mourelatos (2008) 15.  
51 Mourelatos (2008) 15-16.  
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much that can be said about the journey of the young man throughout the poem, but there is not a 
common theme than we can point out as the simple explaining factor that lets us make sense of the 
proem or even the poem as a whole. Mourelatos’ approach is one of looking at common motifs and 
attempting to understand how the separate literary allusions might influence the meaning of the 
poem. He points to the motific similarities between Odysseus’ journey in the Odyssey and the young 
man’s journey throughout the poem but refrains from claiming that the young man’s journey is an 
allegory to Odysseus’ journey.52 Instead, Mourelatos suggests that Parmenides used the older motifs 
“to think new thoughts in and through them.”53 The upshot of his approach is that, like Kahn’s 
approach to the problem of the esti, it attempts to seek out a complex and multi-faceted answer, 
which will not be a clear and unambiguous solution to the problem it set out to deal with.  
According to Mourelatos, regarding how the journey of the young man is presented by Parmenides, 
“the blur is intentional.”54 For Mourelatos, the intentional aspect of the “blur” consists in that the 
literary motifs of the journey are Parmenides’ way of expressing his own thought rather than directly 
linking what he is expressing with the works his motifs are alluding to.  
 
Furthermore, Mitchell Miller understands both the proem and the poem as a whole as being 
intentionally ambiguous. A particularly interesting example Miller presents regarding the ambiguity 
of the proem is the phrase used to describe the gates that open for the young man; a ‘gaping chasm’. 
With the similar phrase used for Tartarus in the Theogony, the phrase can allude to an opening below 
us into the underworld. However, the word translated as ‘gaping,’ achanes, has the connotation of 
an opening above, like that over a roofless temple.55 In answer to whether we should understand the 
opening as one below or above us, Miller replies, “It would be a mistake, I think, to choose: 
Parmenides interweaves pointed cues for each reading, and in chasm’ achanes he brings the two 
 
52 Mourelatos (2008) 32.  
53 Mourelatos (2008) 39. 
54 Mourelatos (2008) 16. 
55 Miller (2006) 22.  
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together into a balanced conjunction of opposites.”56 In a nuanced criticism of Mourelatos, Miller 
argues that there is a difference between seeing the proem as intentionally blurred and intentionally 
ambiguous. In Miller’s view, Parmenides “elicits a clear, and clearly contradictory, double sense” of 
the journey of the young man.57  
 
In the context of the increased reluctance toward finding unambiguous and clear answers to the 
problems Parmenides’ poem presents, exemplified by the responses given to these problems by 
interpreters such as Kahn, Mourelatos, and Miller, Robbiano and Tor attempt to approach the poem 
in a way that is seemingly more clear and secure. In the case of Tor’s interpretation of Parmenides, 
he directly makes reference to Plutarch’s reading of Parmenides in Adversus Colotem as a resource 
we can make use of when interpreting Parmenides. “There is much interpretive insight and 
potential,” Tor says, “in the basic interpretation of the ontological question which Plutarch adopts in 
his response to Colotes.”58 Similarly, by looking at what is “conceptually possible” for Plato, who Tor 
appears to understand as expressing the same view as Plutarch, Tor can “lend further, extrinsic 
support” to the interpretation he is advancing of the “earlier and more obscure text of 
Parmenides.”59 Appealing to these later authors is one way for Tor to approach this perceived 
obscurity of the poem. In looking at what is conceptually possible for these thinkers, Tor is suggesting 
that Parmenides shared with them a conceptual framework that we can access through the texts of 
the later ancient authors.  
 
Robbiano explicitly presents her interpretation of Parmenides as a contrast to those who are focused 
on the problems the poem has presented in the past. In addition to the two problems I have laid out 
above, Robbiano mentions the questions of why Parmenides uses the hexameter as a poetic form, 
 
56 Miller (2006) 23. 
57 Miller (2006) 23n39.  
58 Tor (2017) 302.  
59 Tor (2017) 302. 
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how many ‘ways’ of inquiry there are in the poem (a question that is often centered on whether the 
word eirgō should be placed in the lacuna in fragment B6.360), the question of what kind of monist 
Parmenides was, and the question of what Parmenides means by ‘what is not’.61 Robbiano’s 
alternative approach is, rather than approaching Parmenides’ poem through the problems or puzzles 
the poem seems to present, to understand the poem as an attempt to make its readers achieve 
spiritual progress. In support of this approach, she refers to a claim that Pierre Hadot makes about an 
aspect of Hellenistic philosophy that is applied to ancient philosophy in general. In a context where 
he is speaking about Hellenistic philosophy but making a generalization regarding all of ancient 
philosophy, Hadot says, “Above all, the work, even if it is apparently theoretical and systematic, is 
written not so much to inform the reader of a doctrinal content but to form him, to make him 
traverse a certain itinerary in the course of which he will make spiritual progress […]. One must 
always approach a philosophical work of antiquity with this idea of spiritual progress in mind.”62  
 
What Hadot expresses is a methodological view about how to approach ancient thinkers that both 
Robbiano and Tor subscribe to. Robbiano and Tor argue that Parmenides attempts to transform his 
readers toward what is expressed in the poem via the processes of “becoming being”63 and 
“homoiosis theoi”,64 respectively. In reading Parmenides’ poem with an eye for how it can appear to 
encourage spiritual progress amongst its readers, both Robbiano and Tor maintain that what 
Parmenides sets out to do in his poem is to appeal to his readers to transform their lives in a way 
 
60 Cf. Nehamas (1981).  
61 Robbiano (2006) 12-13.  
62 Hadot (1995) 266. That Hadot applies that aspect of Hellenistic philosophy to all of ancient philosophy is 
criticized by Christoph Horn. Horn maintains that the approach to ancient philosophy that Hadot advocates for 
should not be applied to the Presocratics. He agrees with Hadot in that viewing philosophy as being about 
‘spiritual progress’ is helpful when we are talking about the Hellenistic period, but he does not extend that 
presumption back in time to the Presocratics. According to Horn (1999) 18, “Im fall der Vorsokratiker läßt sich 
Hadots These kaum bestätigen.“ One of the arguments Horn presents in favor of his view is that he does not 
see the Presocratics as occupied with the moral and practical questions that later thinkers were focused on, 
following what I have mentioned that Aristotle expressed about Socrates’ pivotal role in the history of ancient 
Greek philosophy. 
63 Robbiano (2006) 9-34.  
64 Tor (2017) 252-284.  
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that corresponds to what is expressed in the poem. Tor takes his lead from Socrates’ suggestion in 
Plato’s Theaetetus 176b that we should strive to escape from Earth and become like gods through 
contemplation, which is seen by Plutarch as perfectly coinciding with human virtue.65 Meanwhile, 
Robbiano suggests that what Parmenides wanted to achieve by being an advocate for ‘becoming 
being’ was to make his readers take part in “peacefulness, steadfastness and constancy”66 – what can 
appear to closely resemble stoic virtues.  
 
By appealing to the later ancient authors’ notion of spiritual progress as an alternative lens through 
which the poem can be approached, Robbiano and Tor shift the focus of interpretation from the 
classic problems interpreters of Parmenides have faced to the problem of how Parmenides 
influenced the lives of his readers. In particular, Tor, by linking his interpretation to Plutarch, comes 
to this approach by viewing parts of the tradition that first preserved and interpreted Parmenides as 
authorities to how the poem should be understood today. Tor is himself conscious that his approach 
to Parmenides might be questioned by others. “Nowadays,” Tor says, “one runs the risk of being 
diagnosed with ‘Platonitis’ by offering an interpretation of Parmenides which is deemed excessively 
close to later Platonic attitudes.”67 However, there are many examples of interpreters of Parmenides 
who adopt an approach similar to Tor’s. Like Tor, Kurfess cautions readers of the poem from grasping 
interpretations that stand in opposition to, for instance, the one presented by Proclus.    
Flattering though it may be to think that we have better insight into Parmenides’ thought 
than did Simplicius, Theophrastus, Proclus, or other figures in the ancient tradition, we would 
do well to remember that, even for the worst readers and thinkers among them, their access 
to the poem was superior to our own. When their text or interpretation appears to conflict 
 
65 Plutarch, De sera numinis vindicta 550d1-e5. Cf. Torri (2019) 246. 
66 Robbiano (2006) 145.   
67 Tor (2017) 302. Cf. Cordero (2011) 100.  
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with ours, we ought to reconsider the bases for our own reading before dismissing theirs as 
mistaken.68  
The same sentiment is expressed by Kahn, who says, “Plato was in a better position than we are to 
understand what Parmenides had in mind.”69 Hans Georg Gadamer’s position regarding how to 
approach interpreting the Presocratics is similar to Kahn’s. “[…] I insist on the fact,” Gadamer 
maintains, “that our sole access to the topic of ‘the Presocratics’ is Plato and Aristotle.”70 Unlike the 
works of the Presocratics, the works of Plato and Aristotle have, Gadamer notes, “been handed down 
to us authentically and completely,” and can open new and better interpretive options for readers 
who attempt to read the Presocratics through an Aristotelian and Platonic lens.71 What Tor, Kurfess, 
Kahn, and Gadamer all have in common is the view that ancient readers such as Plato were in a 
better position than we are to understand Parmenides’ poem.   
 
A notable interpreter of the Presocratics, who has expressed a position akin to those who argue in 
favor of the preeminence of the ancient sources is Catherine Osborne in Rethinking Early Greek 
Philosophy. Osborne frames her discussion partially around a claim made by Jonathan Barnes. “Our 
knowledge of the Presocratics,” Osborne notes that Barnes has claimed, “must rest upon their 
ipsissima verba. Few verba survive. Hence, our knowledge of the Presocratics is exiguous.” 72 Barnes’ 
claim about how much we actually know about the Presocratics, despite all the work of everyone 
 
68 Kurfess (2016) 9.  
69 Kahn (1988) 237: “Since Plato has given us a much fuller and more explicit statement of his conception of 
Being, this conception, if used with care, may help us interpret the more lapidary and puzzling utterances of 
Parmenides himself.” 
70 Gadamer (2000) 31-32.  
71 Gadamer (2000) 33. Gadamer’s view of tradition, prejudices, and authority, which is reflected in his views 
about how the Presocratics should be approached, has been the topic of a debate between him and Jürgen 
Habermas. In his review of Gadamer’s Truth and Method, reprinted in Habermas (1988), Habermas argued that 
Gadamer’s positive view of appealing to authorities as a part of interpretation is problematic. Gadamer’s 
approach, according to Habermas, is limited by not instead making use of reflection when it is applied to 
spheres of understanding where an interpretation is restricted by social forces, such as “systems of 
domination” (174). Gadamer (1975) 248, however, had maintained, “authority has nothing to do with 
obedience; it rests on recognition.” As the debate between them can highlight, Gadamer’s view of the role of 
authorities in interpretation is that authorities are established through recognition of that there is reason for it 
to be seen as an authority, and that Gadamer does not see blind obedience itself as valuable.   
72 Osborne (1987) 2; Barnes (1979) 10. 
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who studies them, is akin to Robbiano’s and Tor’s view that Parmenides’ poem is increasingly seen as 
problematic rather than made clear. Like Tor and Robbiano, Osborne is an advocate for approaching 
the Presocratics from a new angle instead of accepting the problematic situation of studying these 
thinkers. In the case of Barnes’ claim about the primacy of ipsissima verba, she would accept Barnes’ 
conclusion if she thought the premise were true, which she does not. Instead, she challenges Barnes’ 
view by emphasizing the need for a contextualistic approach to the writings of the Presocratics.  
 
Osborne criticizes those who in effect only study the Presocratics through Diels’ B-fragments by 
claiming, “it is […] the traditional use of the ‘fragments’ without their accompanying context which 
represents an uncritical approach based on potentially misleading evidence.”73 What Osborne argues 
in favor of is reading the fragments in the context they were quoted, with the aim of presenting a full 
account of an ancient interpretation, and only then moving on to do the same with other ancient 
readings. In Osbornes’ view, the fragments we possess from the works of the Presocratics need to be 
contextualized to the fullest extent possible in order to assist our interpretations. Consequentially, 
ignoring that context or not giving an extensive enough account of it is seen by her as to our 
detriment as interpreters. Three influential reviewers of Osborne’s book, Mourelatos, Malcolm 
Schofield, and even Barnes himself, all seem to agree with the sentiment that Osborne’s call for an 
increased awareness of the context in which fragments are preserved is a good thing.74  
 
Further than merely advocating for reading the fragments in context; however, Osborne also sees 
modern readers of the fragments as substantially limited as compared with the ancient authors who 
quoted them. Both she and Tor appear to understand themselves to be in an epistemic situation that 
is parallel to Parmenides’ image of the moon in fragment B15 – the fragment Plutarch quotes in the 
context of the question of why Romans wear crescents on their shoes – which is said to only shine so 
 
73 Osborne (1987) 9.  
74 Barnes (1988) 331; Schofield (1988) 538; Mourelatos (1989) 116.  
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far as it reflects the light of the sun. Going beyond Kurfess’ encouragement to reconsider the basis 
for our own readings when we disagree with an ancient interpreter, in speaking about Hippolytus’ 
interpretation of Heraclitus, Osborne claims, “Presocratics scholars have no justification for asserting 
that what Hippolytus saw in the text was not there or was incorrect as a reading of that text.”75 
Rather than challenging the ancient readings, modern scholars must, in the eyes of Osborne, be 
content with laying out all ancient readings as the basis of an “exploration of the range of meaning 
brought out by the creative use of the text.”76 The creative use of the text she refers to is how 
ancient authors interpreted the work of the earlier thinker, and the modern interpreter is not to go 
beyond the compound range of meaning established by all the ancient authors who commented on a 
text or a certain passage.  
 
Harold Cherniss notably criticized those who uncritically made use of Aristotle as a source of the 
Presocratics. In contrast to what Osborne says about what the modern interpreter is justified in 
asserting, Cherniss saw his task as an interpreter as consisting of “stripping off the Aristotelian form” 
of what Aristotle expressed about the Presocratics, or as reversing “Aristotle’s process of 
interpretation.”77 Cherniss is an explicit target for Osborne’s criticism because she understands him 
as believing that “objective truth” should be what the interpreter should try attain about their object 
of interpretation, a notion she rejects.78 “We are explorers,” Barnes emphatically proclaims regarding 
Osborne’s approach, “mapping out readings. We are trappers, setting out gins for creative insight. 
And the truth? The correct interpretation? How naïve – how very Anglo-Saxon – to think that there is 
any such beast.”79 As appealing as Barnes’ ironic criticism might be to some – as it is to me – it is 
important to remember that Osborne, as well as Tor and Robbiano, are not primarily making a 
general hermeneutical point about the limits of our understanding. Instead, they are responding to 
 
75 Osborne (1987) 22. 
76 Osborne (1987) 10. 
77 Cherniss (1944) xiii, 347.  
78 Osborne (1987) 22.  
79 Barnes (1988) 332.  
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the constraints of scholarship into the works of the Presocratics, which is illustrated by the very 
fragmented evidence we possess.  
 
However, as Palmer and Schofield point out, Osborne herself also talks about recognizing and 
assessing the biases of ancient authors who interpreted the Presocratics.80 “Reading an embedded 
text,” Osborne says regarding the type of reading she is an advocate for, “instead of a fragmented 
text we read it as a functioning and meaningful system, governed by the preoccupations of an 
interpreter we can assess […].”81 By talking about assessing the preoccupations of an ancient 
interpreter, Osborne seems to Schofield and Palmer, as Schofield says, to never quite decide on “how 
much or how little a relativist about meaning and interpretation she is.”82 While Osborne is critical of 
Cherniss for attempting to get behind what Aristotle says about the Presocratics, she herself here 
purports to not only ‘map out’ what the ancient interpreters said, but also assess the biases they 
bring to their readings of the texts. By being open to recognizing the biases and assessing the 
preoccupations of ancient interpreters of the Presocratics, Osborne suggests that there is some truth 
that can be uncovered by examining those biases. “Osborne’s basic mistake,” Palmer says, “consists 
in failing to keep distinct the two types of historical project,” referring, respectively, to recognizing 
biases and exploring the range of possible meanings. The exploration of what the ancient 
interpreters said about the Presocratics, Palmer continues, “should not be mistaken for a guide to a 
better understanding of the Presocratics in their own right.”83 Palmer suggests that when we use an 
ancient interpreter as a guide to how a Presocratic thinker might be understood, that guide might be 
leading us astray. Nevertheless, the ancient interpreters do act like guides to modern interpreters 
both tacitly and consciously. In the case of Palmer’s interpretation of Parmenides, he considers – in 
opposition to Cherniss – Aristotle to be a good guide to the meaning of Parmenides’ poem.84 Thus, 
 
80 Schofield (1988) 538; Palmer (1999) 14n13.  
81 Osborne (1987) 10.  
82 Schofield (1988) 538.  
83 Palmer (1999) 14n13. 
84 Palmer (2009) 44.  
37 
 
he himself is open to the possibility of judging the merits of ancient interpreters as guides to the 
meaning of the works of the Presocratics.  
 
My approach in this master’s thesis is to, like Osborne, explore the contexts in which B5 and the 
claim that Parmenides was a lawgiver are embedded. I am also motivated by the problematic results 
of inquiries into Parmenides’ poem – and that so “few verba survive” – to look at the context in 
which the evidence we have is presented. Unlike Osborne, I do not want to only present the context 
in which Proclus and Plutarch lays out parts of information about Parmenides’ poem for a future 
repository of the context of all we know about Parmenides. Furthermore, my goal is not primarily to 
see if the interpretations Plutarch and Proclus present are correct, or – like Cherniss – to 
decontextualize what they say about Parmenides so that their claims are stripped of their 
interpretations, supposedly leaving only what Parmenides meant. Rather, my primary aim is to 
attempt to consider, by giving accounts of how they understood Parmenides, whether we have 
reason to believe that further readings of Parmenides through a Plutarchian and Proclean lens are 
fruitful, or whether the interpretive lens they present is – like the Velia Parmenides – appropriated 
from somewhere else so that it does not accurately represent Parmenides. The point I will specifically 
focus on is that Proclus and Plutarch arguably discourage further inquiries into what Parmenides 
might have been responding to when he wrote his poem. What that point of beginning might have 
been is not a question I will attempt here to give an in-depth answer to, but by looking at Proclus and 
Plutarch, I attempt to see if they were justified in thus arguably excluding that method of inquiry 
from future inquiries into Parmenides’ poem.  
 
In light of Parmenides’ own concern with what the right method of inquiry is, I think my approach 
here bears a slight resemblance to what Parmenides did in his poem. More than what the results of 
an interpretation might be, different interpretations can present future paths that we can choose to 
follow or abandon, regardless of whether they follow a method that has been made explicit. Tor and 
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Robbiano exemplify how reading Parmenides through those who interpreted him can lead readers 
down a path because they both inquire into how Parmenides, through his poem, supposedly set out 
to transform its readers’ way of life. Furthermore, a path is a limit in the sense that one is 
constrained by where it is heading when following it. That, of course, does not mean that by leaving a 
path of interpretation, there is complete freedom to do whatever one wants. In the specific case of if 
Proclus’ and Plutarch’s approach were rejected, an alternative path is to attempt to understand 
Parmenides as responding to the thinkers who came before him, on the basis of what we know about 
thinkers such as Anaximander and Hesiod. In contrast, because of how Plutarch views Parmenides as 
a lawgiver and that Proclus deemphasizes the role of what B5 refers to as a point of beginning, 
reading Parmenides through Plutarch and Proclus can arguably lead interpreters away from inquiring 













85 Barnes (1979) 163; Songe-Møller (2002) 23; Curd (2004) 77; and Miller (2006) 24 all expressed different 
opinions about what the poem might have been written in answer to. Barnes thought Parmenides was 
responding to a problem that arises in everyday language when we make what is apparently true statements 
about non-existent objects, such as a Pegasus. Songe-Møller suggests Parmenides might have responded to 
Hesiod’s problematic concept of chaos. Curd instead presents Anaximander’s to apeiron as a possible 
problematic concept Parmenides was reacting against. Miller, arguing in favor of intentional ambiguity, 








Plutarch is one of our sources to the claim that Parmenides, in addition to being a philosopher, was a 
lawgiver to his native Elea. In this chapter it is my intention to present the background against which 
Plutarch makes that remark about Parmenides’ biography, with the aim of considering how and to 
what extent Plutarch’s interpretation can be a valuable source to the meaning of Parmenides’ poem. 
Plutarch’s belief that Parmenides was a lawgiver arguably influenced how he understood 
Parmenides’ poem. For Plutarch, that Parmenides was a lawgiver also implied that Parmenides fit 
into an interpretive framework through which Plutarch understood lawgivers. Because that 
interpretive framework is seemingly applied indiscriminately by Plutarch to any of his stories about 
lawgivers, his interpretation of Parmenides is questionable to the extent that it corresponds to what I 
refer to as a set of biographical commonplaces. Plutarch, I will ultimately suggest, is not a good 
source to the meaning of Parmenides’ poem when his interpretation corresponds to his questionable 
assumptions about lawgivers. Therefore, viewing Parmenides through a Plutarchian lens might be 
problematic if what is established about Parmenides can seem to correspond to those questionable 
assumptions. In order to present a contrast to Plutarch’s view of lawgivers, I will at the end of this 
chapter present an alternative historical conception of how the codification of Greek law took place. 
This alternative conception, I suggest, might present a way of viewing the codification of law that can 







2.1 – Colotes’ attack on Parmenides  
 
Adversus Colotem is the primary work in which Plutarch lays out an account of Parmenides’ poem. As 
the name of the work implies, Adversus Colotem was presented as a response to a book written in 
the third century BCE by the Epicurean Colotes of Lampsacus, entitled On the fact that according to 
the doctrines of the other philosophers it is impossible even to live. What Plutarch says about 
Parmenides in the Adversus Colotem, including that he mentions that Parmenides was a lawgiver, is a 
part of that response. Thus, it can be helpful – in order to give an account of the claim that 
Parmenides was a lawgiver – to first present how Colotes can appear to have viewed Parmenides as 
well as how Plutarch responded to Colotes. 
 
Colotes’ book is itself only preserved in Plutarch’s quotations of it in Adversus Colotem. In her study 
of Plutarch’s response to Colotes, Eleni Kechagia says about the style of Colotes’ book, “it seems to 
have been formulated in everyday language that could be understood by any reader of average 
education.”86 A common way for Colotes to substantiate the claims he made against other 
philosophers seems to have been, Kechagia notes, to “employ snapshots of everyday life, usually in 
vivid and slightly comic language.”87 An illustrative example is an image Colotes appears to have 
presented about Socrates. Seemingly, as is indirectly referred to by Plutarch in 1117F of the Adversus 
Colotem, Colotes had maintained that Socrates was led by his philosophizing to eat grass rather than 
food and put his cloak around a pillar rather than around his body.88 In contrast to the lofty figure of 
Socrates who Plato portrayed in his dialogues, Colotes suggests that Socrates’ philosophizing led him 
to live what appears to be a humorously bad life where even trifling things like getting dressed could 
be a problem.  
 
 
86 Kechagia (2011) 115. 
87 Kechagia (2011) 115. 
88 Mansfeld (1994) 184 suggests Socrates was presented by Colotes as a “proto sceptic.”  
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Thinkers in the tradition of Hellenistic philosophy, according to A. A. Long and Hadot, understood 
philosophy as aiming at securing a good life for those who practiced it. 89 Similarly, according to 
Kechagia, Colotes argumentation “presupposes that philosophy ought to have a positive impact on 
human life.”90 The general point that Colotes argued in favor of, as the title of his book shows, was 
that following the doctrines of other philosophers made life unlivable. In maintaining that 
philosophers like Socrates and Parmenides made life unlivable, Colotes presupposed that what he 
viewed as the doctrines of past thinkers were supposed to be guides to how human life should be 
lived. He did not think they were good guides to how life should be lived, but he did judge them as 
guides. Regarding Socrates, in what is seemingly a direct quotation presented by Plutarch, Colotes 
says, “but you, Socrates, practiced pretentious arguments; for you said one thing to those with 
whom you happened to converse, but you did another.”91 With this claim, Colotes is saying that 
Socrates’ philosophizing failed to influence his life. His words themselves, Colotes suggests, were not 
the problem. The problem was rather that these words did supposedly not assist those who followed 
them in living a good life. In criticizing Socrates for not being able to live according to his words, 
Colotes seems to give an expression of the ideal that one should live according to one’s teaching. 
That Socrates’ philosophy supposedly fails as a guide for human life corresponds to him supposedly 
failing to live up to that ideal.  
 
Kechagia finds in total four passages that she believes can be quotations of what Colotes said about 
Parmenides. Frequently, in what is quoted from the earlier text in Adversus Colotem, Colotes seems 
to have claimed that the other philosophers had abolished (anairein) either certain aspects of life or 
all of life itself, so that it is no longer livable.92 In response to Colotes, Plutarch argued that 
Parmenides “had abolished neither fire nor water nor precipices nor inhabited cities in Europe and 
 
89 Hadot (2002); Long (2006).  
90 Kechagia (2011) 129.  
91 Plutarch, Adversus Colotem 1117D. Trans. Kechagia (2011). All quotations of Plutarch’s own supposed 
quotations of Colotes are here presented in Kechagia’ translations.  
92 Plutarch, Adversus Colotem 1113B, 1114B, 1114D, 1116A, 1116E, 1119D, 1120B, 1124D.  
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Asia, as Colotes claims.” (1114B) Who is responsible for the seemingly arbitrary nature of the 
grouping of entities in this quotation is difficult to tell. These could have been the exact entities 
Colotes claimed Parmenides had abolished, or Plutarch might have mentioned some, but not all, of 
the entities originally mentioned by Colotes. A further possibility is that all these different entities 
might have been mentioned in a part of Parmenides’ poem that we do not possess, likely in the doxa. 
Both fire and water, in fact, are spoken of by Parmenides in that section of the poem. Fire is explicitly 
mentioned at B8.56 and B12.1, but also alluded to elsewhere in the doxa with references such as to 
the ‘pure torch’ of the sun at B10.2. Water is indirectly spoken of in B15A, the one-word fragment 
“water-rooted.”93  
 
According to Plutarch, in a seemingly more direct quotation of Colotes, “Colotes says that 
Parmenides plainly abolished everything by postulating one being.” (1114D) In light of how Plato 
makes use of the term in the Parmenides, the sense of this quotation is not that Parmenides only 
postulated one being, but rather that Parmenides postulated the concept of the one being. In the 
previous quotation we were given no reason for why Parmenides supposedly had abolished all those 
entities, but here we get an explanation that might also explain why those specific entities were 
abolished. We do know that Parmenides said that Being, to eon, was ‘one’ in B8.6. That to eon is 
‘one’ is one of many of the attributes assigned to to eon in B8. It is, therefore, possible that Colotes 
had an opinion of the relationship between the aletheia and the doxa of Parmenides’ poem. What 
this view of the relationship consisted in was seemingly that what was postulated in on section led 
Parmenides to abolish what was spoken of in the second section. In another quotation at 1113F, 
Plutarch quotes Colotes as referring to the “shameful sophistries” of Parmenides. At 1113F-1114A, 
 
93 In contrast, Hershbell (1972) 203 says, “The examples are probably from Colotes’ work; whether they 
correspond to anything in Parmneides is less clear.” He does suggest that the cities in Europe and Asia might 
refer to what is now sometimes seen as a misreading of B1: “all cities,” translating pant’ astē. However, as J. H. 
Lesher (1994) mentions, astē is an emendation and the best manuscript only has the word atē, which makes 
the phrase unintelligible. Coxon (2009) 271 suggests that the word alternatively could be read as antēn (“face 
to face”). While Lesher ultimately argues in favor of reading astē, it is not certain what the text of Parmenides’ 
poem said when Colotes might have read it.  
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Plutarch probably makes another indirect quotation of Colotes. Plutarch says, “by saying that all 
there is is one, he has prevented us from living,” talking about Parmenides. Maybe either this 
quotation or 1114D is a paraphrase of the other. ‘Prevent from living’ and ‘abolish’ seems to have 
had a similar meaning for Colotes. While these four quotations do not give anywhere close to a full 
account of how Colotes viewed Parmenides, they do show that Colotes might have had an opinion of 
the relationship between the two sections of the poem. It is also clear that Colotes expressed a 





2.2 – Plutarch’s Interpretation of Parmenides in response to Colotes 
 
Even as it is somewhat unclear whether Colotes had any opinion about how the poem’s aletheia and 
doxa related to one another on the basis of what Plutarch appears to quote from his book, the 
relationship between the two sections of Parmeides’ poem appears to have been central to how 
Plutarch responded to Colotes. In response to Colotes’ interpretation of Parmenides’ poem, Plutarch 
maintains that Parmenides did not ‘abolish everything’ because when he said that everything was 
‘one’ he was making a distinction between what is sensible and what is intelligible. Parmenides, 
Plutarch says, “saw that reality includes something opinable and includes something intelligible as 
well, and that what is opinable is uncertain and subject to variation over a wide range of attributes 
and changes […].94 The significant point Plutarch is making is that, according to him, Parmenides 
understood both the uncertain and opinable, on the one hand, and the intelligible, on the other, as a 
part reality. The distinction Plutarch presents between what is opinable (doxaston) and what is 
 
94 Plutarch, Adversus Colotem 1114C. Trans. Coxon (2009). 
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intelligible (noēton) corresponds, in how he presents them, to the two sections of Parmenides’ poem. 
Parmenides himself does not use these terms as headings to the sections of his poem. As I have also 
quoted above, however, Parmenides does have the narrator-goddess tell the young man at the end 
of the proem, here in Plutarch’s quotation of these passages, that it is necessary that the young man 
should learn “’both the precise heart of persuasive reality,’ [B1.29] which has to do with the 
intelligible and invariably the same, ‘and of the beliefs of mortals, which comprises no genuine 
conviction’ [B1.30].”95 The word ‘reality’ is here Coxon’s translation of aletheia, which Plutarch links 
with the ‘intelligible and invariably the same.’ In opposition to this intelligible and motionless 
aletheia, for Plutarch, is the changeable doxa; the word ‘beliefs’ is a translation of doxas.  
 
Considering what the narrator-goddess says in B1.29-30, that the poem can be divided up into two 
sections called aletheia and doxa has some textual support. Plutarch’s further characterization of 
these two sections is noteworthy. Plutarch is not of the opinion that the doxa is the same as the 
second way of inquiry presented by the goddess, namely what she says in fragment B2.6: “that is not, 
and that must needs not be.” Because for Parmenides, according to Plutarch, “reality includes 
something opinable,” the way of inquiry presented in B2.6 has to be different from what the goddess 
does in the doxa. It, thus, fits with neither of the two ways presented by the goddess in B2, 
respectively the way “that is,” or the way of Being, and the way “that is not,” or the way of non-
Being. What Plutarch more specifically means by the opinable is “uncertain and subject to variation,” 
or what is subject to ‘becoming’ rather than subject to the motionless Being, but also not what has 
no part in being at all.   
 
Against Colotes, Plutarch’s claim is that Parmenides does not ‘abolish’ everything we encounter in 
our everyday lives; rather, he merely expressed the belief that these things have lesser ontological 
priority than what is unchanging and one.  According to Plutarch, Parmenides does not  
 
95 Plutarch, Adversus Colotem 1114D-E. Trans. Coxon (2009).  
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[…] abolish those of our affections that belong to the world of becoming and of appearances, 
but points out to those who follow that there are other things more stable than these and 
more enduring in so far as their being is concerned because they are not generated nor are 
destroyed nor suffer anything. (1116A)     
That Parmenides supposedly emphasized the ontological superiority of what is stable and ‘one’ does 
not mean, Plutarch maintains, that he claims that what the goddess is speaking of in the doxa does 
not exist. Rather than making a clear distinction between what is and what is not – Being and non-
Being – Plutarch understands Parmenides as having found a new way of speaking of entities that 
have a share in Being to varying degrees.  
 
A problem for the connection Plutarch arguably makes between the alēthēia and the doxa is how the 
narrator-goddess concludes the aletheia, as well as that she in in B1.30 says there is no “genuine 
[alēthēs] conviction” in doxa. “Therewith I put a stop for you,” she says in B8.51-52, concluding the 
aletheia-section of the poem, “to my reliable discourse and thought about reality [amfis alētheiēs]; 
from this point learn human beliefs, hearing the deceptive composition of my verse.” The doxa, thus, 
is viewed by her as with a ‘deceptive composition’ and lacking ‘genuine [alēthēs] conviction.’ These 
phrases can appear to present alēthēia as standing in opposition to doxa, rather than claiming that 
what is a matter of doxa has a lesser share in what the poem’s alēthēia deals with. Plutarch’ 
response to B1.30 is that the claim made there concerning the doxa shows that Parmenides 
“required a different label from that used for the other, that which always is.” Thus, the seeming 
exclusion of what is spoken of in the doxa from the subject of the alēthēia is only a question of labels, 
according to Plutarch; what the doxa deals with is labeled differently, but it is not excluded from the 
alēthēia. Parmenides “account concerning what-is, that it is one,” rather, “does not amount to an 
elimination of the many sensibles, but an indication of their difference from the intelligible.” The 
text, however, does not unambiguously support Plutarch’s reading. If Colotes did use the text of 
Parmenides’ poem to support his criticisms of Parmenides, he could potentially have pointed to 
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fragments such as B1.30 and B8.51-52 in order to make the claim that what Parmenides maintained 
was spoken of in the doxa should viewed as not having a share in Being, and thus be ‘abolished.’ 
Through his interpretation, Plutarch is responding to what a tension between what is spoken of in 
the doxa and the earlier characterizations of the ways of inquiry in the poem. His solution, which may 
or may not be correct, is to suggests that Parmenides is not abolishing what he is speaking of in the 
doxa, but rather that Parmenides presents it under a new label. Thus, Parmenides, in Plutarch’s view, 




2.3 – Interpretation and Biography 
 
Plutarch’s claim that Parmenides was a lawgiver occurs in the context of his interpretation of 
Parmenides’ poem, which was centered on giving an account of the poem’s doxa. On the one hand, 
that Plutarch connects the claims about Parmenides’ poem with such a claim about the life of 
Parmenides can be seen as a response to Colotes, who precisely argued that the problem with 
Parmenides and the other philosophers was that their writings were failed guides for human life. 
However, on the other hand, Plutarch can at the same time also appear to be relying on biographical 
claims about Parmenides in order to support the content of his interpretation, as a tool that could 
shape how he understood Parmenides’ poem. The second point is supported by how Cicero presents 
what he viewed as an interpretive tool that interpreters could make use of when dealing with 
difficult texts.  
 
In his study of ancient prolegomena, or the questions that were to be settled before one could begin 
the study of a text, Jaap Mansfeld claims that one such preliminary interpretive question, first 
explicitly presented by Cicero in the first century BC, was to present a biography of the author and to 
47 
 
attempt to understand how the text in question agreed with the biography.96 In a context where he 
is speaking about the interpretation of texts, Cicero notes a number of interpretive tools an 
interpreter can make use of when dealing with ambiguity and other problems that might hinder 
interpretation. In presenting one of these tools, Cicero says,  
In the next place, one ought to estimate what the writer meant from the rest of his writings 
and from his acts, words, character and life and to examine the whole document which 
contains the ambiguity in question in all its parts, to see if anything agrees with our 
interpretation or is opposed to the sense in which our opponent interprets it.97 
Supporting Cicero, Mansfeld notes that the four elements that the interpreter ought to consider is 
also mentioned in similar ways elsewhere. There is a parallel in a claim made by Galen,  about “the 
indispensability of a thorough acquaintance with his own bios, erga and tropos tēs psyches for those 
who want to study his works” without studying his On Proof.98 Similarly, Mansfeld notes that 
“Porphyry dwells at appropriate length on what we certainly may call the facta, dicta, animus and 
vita” in his Vita Plotini.99 Other notable examples of writers who introduced their interpretations 
with a bios, a life or biography, of the author they were interpreting are Thrasyllus, Epicetus, as well 
as Diogenes Laertius, whose biographies of philosophers Mansfeld suggests may have been copied 
from the biographical introduction of exegetical works that Diogenes was in possession of.100 Insofar 
as these examples show that biography was seen as an interpretive tool also elsewhere at roughly 
the same time as Plutarch was writing, there is some reason to consider if Plutarch might have 
viewed looking at a biography as a way to make sense of a text, especially considering that the 
content of Plutarch’s interpretation of Parmenides is linked to biographical claims.  
 
 
96Mansfeld (1994) 178. As Mansfeld notes, it was Schäubin (1977) who first pointed out that Cicero makes the 
earliest explicit reference to the rule for interpretation in question.  
97 Cicero, De inventione II 116. Trans. Hubbell (1949) and Mansfeld (1994).  
98 Mansfeld (1994) 178-179; Galen on the Order of My Own Books 83.7.  
99 Mansfeld (1994) 179. 






2.4 – Lawgiver and philosopher – the best human Life 
 
It is towards the end of Adversus Colotem that Plutarch stresses the biographical point that 
Parmenides was a lawgiver, a nomothet𝑒𝑒s, to his polis, and was supposedly still celebrated as a 
lawgiver in his native Elea 500 years after his death.101 “Parmenides,” Plutarch claimed, “adorned his 
native city with the best laws, and as a result every year the citizens administer an oath to the 
magister to abide by the laws of Parmenides.”102 Plutarch is here not reluctant in his praise of 
Parmenides. Parmenides supposedly equipped Elea nomois aristois, with the “best laws,” and all the 
citizens of Elea supposedly were a part in the process of honoring these laws. Plutarch presented this 
claim about Parmenides’ biography in the context of presenting the political accomplishments of the 
philosophers Colotes had criticized for not making life livable. While Plutarch also praises these other 
philosophers, arguably no one else is praised as highly as Parmenides.  
 
 
101 In addition to this claim made by Plutarch, there is an ancient tradition that maintained that Parmenides 
was a lawgiver, even though this tradition does not provide any clear historical evidence in favor of the veracity 
of the claim. With the exception of Spesuippius, but only as referred to in Diogenes Laertius, the sources who 
claim Parmenides was a lawgiver or involved in the government of Elea are from the Hellenistic period or later. 
“Parmenides too,” Diogenes Leartius mentions, “is said to have given laws to his fellow citizens, as Speusippus 
declares in his book On Philosophers.” (449, 5. Trans. Hicks) This book has been lost, so we have no way to 
know what exactly Speusippus might have said. Furthermore, Spesuippius himself lived in the 4th century BCE, 
so he could not have had first-hand knowledge of Parmenides’ life. The other sources are Strabo in his 
Geography i, 346, 17–22, who claimed, “I believe that [Elea] was well governed both through the efforts of 
these men [including Parmenides] and in still earlier times,” (Trans. Coxon [2009]), and Themistius, Oration 
xxxiv, 10 who said, “Nor did Parmenides descend [from philosophy] in giving laws to the Italians, for he filled 
what is called Great Greece with law and order.” (Trans. Coxon [2009]) R. Westman (1955) 242 suggests that 
Plutarch’s own claim about Parmenides being a lawgiver could have been one of the many pieces of 
information about philosophers Plutarch referred to from his notebooks, which he sometimes mentions 
making use of. One example of Plutarch referring to these notebooks is in De Tranquillitate Animi 464E-F. Cf. 
Martin (1969) 69-70. 
102 Plutarch Adversus Colotem 1126A-B. Trans. Coxon (2009).  
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In regard to Plato, while Plutarch is rightly called a Platonist and strongly sympathized with Plato, he 
viewed Sparta as it was established by its lawgiver Lycurgus as superior to the city in speech in Plato’s 
Republic, because Sparta was a virtuous city in deed.103 Still, Lycurgus’ Sparta is not viewed more 
favorably than Plato’s city in speech because Plutarch saw philosophers as of lesser value than 
lawgivers. What Lycurgus achieved was seen as superior because his life was in accord with his laws 
and could, therefore, be a paradigm others could follow.  
 
Plutarch himself sets out to influence others to become more virtuous through his written 
biographies, where his intention was to present virtuous paradigms that his readers would be drawn 
to follow. “[V]irtuous action,” which is what he sets out to present through his Lives, Plutarch says in 
the second chapter of the Life of Pericles, “straightway so disposes a man that he no sooner admires 
the works of virtue than he strives to emulate those who wrought them.”104 A further explanation of 
this phenomenon is given by Plutarch with reference to the Platonic form of the Good: “The Good 
creates a stir of activity towards itself, and implants at once in the spectator an active impulse.”105 In 
order for this stir to be created, virtue itself must be exhibited, rather than taught without reference 
to a paradigmatic figure to look up to. Plutarch is, however, not describing, by referring to “an active 
impulse,” something akin to a ‘virtuous reflex’ that is triggered by seeing others perform virtuous 
acts. The previous quotation continues: “it does not form his character by ideal representation alone, 
but through the investigation of its work it furnishes him with a dominant purpose.” Using the phrase 
historia tou ergou, Plutarch emphasizes that both the virtuous acts and the reflective inquiry into 
those acts is necessary, in his view, for his readers to become virtuous through reading his Lives.  
 
The legendary lawgivers of Greek cities were frequent subjects of Plutarch’s Lives and he appears to 
have viewed them with great admiration. In a study of Plutarch’s Life of Lycurgus and Life of Solon, 
 
103 Life of Lycurgus 31.2. 
104 Plutarch Life of Pericles 2.2. Trans. Perrin (1916).  
105 Plutarch Life of Pericles 2.3. Trans. Perrin (1916). 
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Lukas de Blois argues that one ‘commonplace,’ or topos, of how Plutarch generally referred to 
lawgivers was that they fulfilled the ideal of the ‘good statesman.’106 In keeping with the intended 
function of Plutarch’s Lives, these men presented themselves in those Lives as paradigms for future 
action, while the law codes they supposedly wrote were themselves important only in light of their 
virtuous character. In the case of the Life of Lycurgus, which illustrates this point, Lycurgus was said 
to have put no laws into writing, even supposedly going as far as to forbid the writing down of laws. 
(13.1) While the practice of not putting laws into writing went against a historical increase in the use 
of written laws, as Gagarin argues,107 not writing down laws and instead exhibiting them through 
ones actions does illustrate Plutarch’s ideal of law. 
 
Considering the admiration that Plutarch seemingly shows towards these men, there is reason to see 
his characterization of Parmenides as a lawgiver as an important piece of what formed the 
background for his reading of Parmenides. In fact, a part of Plutarch’s conceptual framework was 
that lawgivers were similar to philosophers, in that individuals from the two separate groups of 
people were increasingly good the more they could be characterized as also having the 
characteristics of someone who belonged to the other group. Plutarch saw praiseworthy 
philosophical activity, on the one hand, and the codification of praiseworthy law, on the other, as 
similar, both in how these activities structured the life of those who engaged in them, and in the 
conditions for their success – which for a philosopher was to engage with law and society, while for a 
lawgiver was to be surrounded by philosophers. Plutarch’s reading of Parmenides’ poem is, thus, 
closely related to Plutarch’s idea of how the codification of Greek law took place.  
 
 
106 De Blois (2008) 146-147. 
107 Gagarin (1986) 57.  
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In On Stoic Self-Contradictions, in regard to the ideal that one’s actions should live up to one’s words, 
Plutarch expresses the view that philosophers should be held to an even higher moral standard than 
others regarding how their actions corresponds to their doctrines.  
In the first place I require that the consistency of the doctrines be visible in their lives, for it is 
even more necessary that the philosopher’s life be in accord with his theory than that the 
orator’s language, as Aeschines says, be identical with that of the law. The reason is that the 
philosopher’s theory is law freely chosen for his own […].108  
Plutarch here shows his own similarities to Colotes. Not only does he argue that the philosophers 
theory should be exhibited through his actions, he also subsequently goes on to criticize 
philosophers, such as Zeno of Citium (not of Elea), for distancing themselves from the world and their 
native cities rather than engaging in them politically. Zeno of Citium, Plutarch notes at 1034F, not 
only moved from his native city to Athens, but once he was in Athens he also did not want to become 
an Athenian citizen.  
 
In Adversus Colotem, Plutarch similarly criticizes Colotes, as well as Epicurus and Metrodorus, for not 
having taken part in public service, claiming that they “dissuade their followers from public service 
and quarrel with those engaged with it.”109 These remarks, as well as the positive characterizations of 
the public life of the philosophers Colotes criticizes, come in response to a claim, seemingly quoted 
verbatim by Plutarch, that Colotes made in praise of “the men who drew up laws and customs and 
established the government of cities by kings and archons.” These men, Plutarch quotes Colotes as 
saying, “brought about great security and peace and freed us from turmoil. But if one abolished 
these institutions, we shall live the life of beasts and anyone who encounters another will nearly 
 
108 Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contradictions 1033A-B. Trans. Cherniss and Mansfeld (1994). Cf. Mansfeld (1994) 
190n342. 
109 Plutarch, Adversus Colotem 1127E. Trans Einaros and De Lacy (1967). In light of these remarks and the 
contrast Plutarch draws between these thinkers and Parmenides, it is thinkable that Plutarch would himself not 
have chosen a marble portrait of Metrodorus as an image that was supposed to represent Parmenides.     
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devour him.”110 Colotes’ view appears to be that the philosophers who are his targets interfere with 
established society in a way that is harmful to it by only negatively breaking down what the others 
who were responsible for establishing the government had built up. Plutarch’s response is that if it 
did happen that the laws were taken away, the philosophers own teachings could serve the function 
of what the laws had done in the past: “For if someone takes away the laws, but leaves us with the 
teachings of Parmenides, Socrates, Heraclitus and Plato, we shall be very far from devouring one 
another and living the life of wild beasts […].”111 Plutarch is here only pointing to a hypothetical 
situation. Parmenides, however, supposedly actually did what the other philosophers only potentially 
could do. Parmenides did not abolish the institutions that holds a city together, he instead is the only 
example Plutarch presents of someone who did the opposite by having been the one who was 
supposedly responsible for having brought about everything Colotes praises.   
 
The other legendary lawgivers who establish the laws of Greek cities, in contrast to the orators 
mentioned by Plutarch in chapter 1 of On Stoic Self-Contradictions, were themselves also freely 
laying out laws, like the philosophers were for their own lives. Because men such as Lycurgus were to 
be viewed by others as paradigmatic figures, they needed to present themselves as such by living up 
to the laws they had laid down and, thus, had as much responsibility to adhere to the ideal of 
correspondence between one’s thinking and actions as the philosophers. Furthermore, it was 
through acquaintance with philosophers, as well as the lawgivers’ own ability to practice philosophy, 
that made sure these men were and remained good. Plutarch, De Blois argues regarding the lives of 
Lycurgus and Solon, “brings forward that philosophy, as a law implanted in the ruler by a good 
education, neutralizes the moral risks involved in the exercise of power.” Furthermore, these 
statesmen are moral, in the eyes of Plutarch, only with the help of philosophy, saying in To an 
 
110 Plutarch, Adversus Colotem 1124D. Trans. Kechagia (2011).  
111 Plutarch, Adversus Colotem 1124D-E. Trans. Einaros and Lacy (1967). 
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Uneducated Ruler, “nothing imparts this disposition [the light of justice] in men except the teachings 




2.5 – Stories about Legendary Lawgivers and Parmenides’ Poem 
 
Plutarch was prone to use commonplaces in his biographies of historical people. As is the case 
regarding that Plutarch presented his lawgivers as fulfilling the moral ideal of the ‘good statesman,’ 
there are also several other commonplaces in his lives of lawgivers. Significantly for my present 
purpose of giving an account of the background against which Plutarch presented his claim that 
Parmenides was a lawgiver, the shared commonplaces regarding how the lives of lawgivers are 
structured by Plutarch are mirrored in the structure of Parmenides’ poem.  
 
Referring to a suggestion made by R. H. Barrow that intends to explain how Plutarch wrote his Lives, 
Gerard Lavery says, “Plutarch was a child of an age hardly conscious of change […].”113 Furthermore, 
according to Lavery, Plutarch was “fundamentally lacking in imagination.” These characteristics, 
Lavery goes on to suggest, “may be the very factor which enabled the author to become the greatest 
synthesizer in antiquity.” Regarding Plutarch not being conscious of change, Lavery continues, “this 
adds another element to the sameness of his biographical verdicts, however entertaining they may 
be. In a sense, then, if it is not too harshly phrased a judgement,” he says, presenting a strong 
opinion, “Plutarch was unable, in imagination, to project himself into the past or future. In a sense he 
could not even project himself into the present, the changing world of the early Empire.”114 Lavery is 
making these claims in a context where he is giving an account of Plutarch’s lives of Lycurgus, Solon 
 
112 Plutarch, To an Uneducated Ruler 782A. Trans. Fowler (1936).  
113 Barrow (1967) 146-149.  
114 Lavery (1974) 380-381. 
54 
 
and Cato the Elder. His stern remarks about Plutarch’s imagination are motivated by the fact that 
these three men from different cultures all are presented basically similarly by Plutarch. Therefore, 
using Plutarch as an historical source to the lives of any of these men is questionable when the lives 
have been seen together and one loses the impression that the three are presented as individuals. 
 
In opposition to the impression Plutarch might give, the legendary lawgivers of the 7th and 6th (as well 
as, including Parmenides, the early 5th) centuries do not appear to have been subject of much 
attention before well into the 4th century BC, at the same time as it became increasingly common to 
claim that they were associated with philosophers.115 In the case of Solon, there are only 4 citations 
of his laws in the 75 preserved speeches by Attic orators dated prior to 356 BC, while in the 64 
speeches of a later date he is cited 32 times.116 When Plutarch wrote his lives of lawgivers in the first 
and second century AD, based on the evidence we possess, it is unlikely that he would have had any 
sources dating before the 4th century BCE.  
 
In addition to there being limited historical information about the lawgivers that did not date from 
later than the 4th century, there is preserved – with the notable exception of the laws attributed to 
them as well as Solon’s poetry – no texts written by the legendary lawgivers. These limited sources 
did not play a substantial role in the construction of the written lives of the lawgivers. Instead, it 
coincides with the lack of sources that the lives of lawgivers bear a remarkable resemblance to each 
 
115 In book two of the Politics, Aristotle labels a supposed chain of teacher-pupil relationships between 
philosophers and lawgivers as “heedless of chronology.” (2.1274a) This supposed chain of influence went from 
Thales of Melietus, to Zaleucus, to Charondas. Zaleucus and Charondas were the legendary lawgivers of 
respectively Epizephyrian Locri and Catania. While others followed Aristotle in his criticism of this story, (Cicero 
[De Legibus 2.6.15] refers to Timaeus of Sicily as believing that Zaleucus was only a fictional figure), in general, 
it became more and more common to claim that legendary lawgivers spent time with or were students of 
philosophers. Zalecus and Charondas were said to have studied under Pythagoras in addition to Thales, and 
both Lycurgus and Solon supposedly also met philosophers as a part of their education. Lycurgus supposedly 
traveled to Ionia and India where he met with philosophers (Plutarch, Life of Lycurgus 4), and Solon supposedly 
also met with Thales, as well as other philosophers. (Szegedy-Maszak [1978] 203n17; 202n13; 203n16), 
116 Ruschenbusch (1958). Cf. Fantuzzi, (2010) 20n5. 
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other by making use of the same set of biographical commonplaces, which were generally how the 
lives of these legendary figures were understood.  
 
Andrew Szegedy-Maszak, in his study of the topoi of legendary lawgivers, groups these 
commonplaces into the following three common biographical stages. First, one man – who, because 
of his excellent education from philosophers and others, is “uniquely suited for the task of 
legislation” – arises to a position of prominence in response to a crisis between two factions or forces 
in the city. As an example, Lycurgus, according to Plutarch, traveled to India as a young man and met 
with the so-called Gymnosophists.117 Secondly, this man is selected as lawgiver, argues in favor of his 
law code – which sometimes is said to be received from a god – and responds to a challenges to it. In 
the case of Solon, as Szegedy-Maszak notes, “After the seisachtheia, the cancellation of debts, Solon 
was assailed by both rich and poor alike. On perceiving the value of the measure, the people 
empowered Solon to complete his task, but once he had finished, he was barraged again by 
complaints from all sides.”118 Thirdly, the law code is established in the city, not just for the moment, 
but also with some provision stating that it is to be adhered to in the future. As the law code is 
established the lawgiver departs from the city.119 Herodotus put forward that Solon left Athens for 
10 years after his law code was established, a period of time that coincided with how long the 
Athenians were supposedly bound by the law code. (1.29.1.) Herodotus’ story – written much earlier 
than the other sources to the lives of lawgivers in the 5th century BCE – about Solon leaving Athens as 
well as his further travels, might have been what established this as a commonplace. Similar to Solon, 
Lycurgus is by Plutarch said to have likewise left his native city after this law code was established. 
Before he left, he supposedly made the Spartans swear an oath to uphold his law until he returned. 
“He then,” Szegedy-Maszak says, “made the promise, and the code, permanent, by never returning 
to Sparta,” because he committed suicide by fasting, according to Plutarch. Plutarch also makes 
 
117 See note 117.  
118 Szegedy-Maszak (1978) 205-206; Plutach, Life of Solon 16.3.  
119 Szegedy-Maszak (1978) 208. 
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reference to several traditions about where Lycurgus supposedly died, showing that he was not 
alone in making use of the biographical commonplaces of lawgivers.120  
 
Antoni Capizzi, in his La porta di Parmenide, makes use of the biographical accounts of legendary 
lawgivers in order to interpret Parmenides’ poem. One argument Capizzi presents in favor of his 
position is that there is a connection between, on the one hand, that the narrator-goddess in 
fragment B8 supposedly puts emphasis on the concepts of immobility and atrekeia121 and, on the 
other, Plutarch’s account of the on-going tradition of showing respect for Parmenides laws as well as 
that legendary lawgivers devised to keep their laws established in their cities. In speaking of 
immobility and atrekeia as a second important attribute focused on by Parmenides in B8, in addition 
to what he views as the principle of homoiotēs, Capizzi claims,  
La seconda serie di attributi, che esprimono immobilità e rispetto della tradizione, si connette 
invece col giuramento di fedeltà alle leggi di Parmenide attestatoci da Plutarco, e più in 
generale con gli accorgimenti escogitati da tutti i legislatori greci per rendere immutabili le 
proprie leggi: Licurgo si era fatto promettere che la costituzione spartana non sarebbe stata 
modificata fino al suo ritorno, lasciandosi poi morire di fame in esilio […].122 
Capizzi does not mention that it is Plutarch who is the source to also the second claim, that Lycurgus 
died of hunger in exile. Earlier in his book, Capizzi argues that Parmenides’ proem might have been 
inspired by Zaleucus of Epizephyrian Locri in Italy, who was another legendary lawgiver. According to 
Capizzi, “il discorso della dea a Parmenide […] ci fa pensare, come tale, che Parmenide abbia, nel 
proemio, preso a modello Zaleuco […].”123 Zaleucus was on one account, which Capizzi says is 
 
120 Szegedy-Maszak (1978) 208. Plutach, Life of Lycurgus, 29.  
121 I am unable to find the term atrekeia – meaning ‘precise truth’ or ‘certainty’ – used in the poem. It is also 
not mentioned in Coxon’s extensive glossary.  
122 Capizzi (1975) 64-65.  
123 Capizzi (1975) 48. 
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preserved by Aristotle, said to have received his law-code from Athena.124 Parmenides could, then, 
have been led to model his own account of his goddess after Zaleucus. In the first quotation from 
Capizzi, the direction of the argument is that because Lycurgus established his law code by starving 
himself to death and Parmenides was celebrated in Elea after his death, we can infer certain things 
about the meaning of fragment B8. In the second quotation, Capizzi views Zaleucus’ life as the model 
on the basis of which we can understand Parmenides’ poem. In either case, aspects of the biography 
of legendary lawgivers are used to explain the poem.  
 
The correspondence between the poem and the lives of legendary arguably goes further than the 
points of correspondence that Capizzi presents. Capizzi does not view these lives as instantiations of 
biographical commonplaces, so he does not look at the overall structure of these stories (which is 
what Szegedy-Maszak lays out) and the overall structure of the poem. The results by comparing the 
two shows that there are many commonalities between them, especially if we follow Plutarch’s 
interpretation of the poem.  
 
Parmenides’ poem begins with a proem that describes a young man’s journey to meet a goddess. 
Similar to that the legendary lawgivers’ in the first section of biographical topoi travel in order to seek 
out education, the young man’s journey has been characterized as a journey towards philosophical 
or divine insights and inspiration.125 When the young man reaches the goddess she presents to him – 
in B2 – what she claims is the only two possible ways or routes of inquiry. These are what I have 
referred to as the way of Being and the way of non-Being. In Plutarch’s interpretation of the poem, 
Parmenides, rather than following one of these two ways of inquiry, looks at entities as they are in-
between these two ways of inquiry. Similarly, the lawgivers were said to solve a dispute between two 
 
124 More precisely, this story is preserved to us by Clement of Alexandria in the Stromata 1.170.3, who refers to 
a work supposedly by Aristotle, The Constitution of the Locrians, which is only preserved in fragments. Cf. 
Szegedy-Maszak (1978) 205.  
125 Curd (2004) 20. 
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antagonistic factions in their cities. What solved the dispute in the city was the introduction of the 
lawgiver’s new law code that could reshape the lives of everyone in the polis; what solves the 
struggle between Being and non-Being in Parmenides’ poem, according to Plutarch, is the new label 
for what the goddess speaks of in the doxa, which has an intermediate ontological status between 
Being and non-Being. Furthermore, that the lawgiver is sometimes said to receive their law code 
from a god, 126 parallels, in Parmenides’ poem, that it is a goddess with a divine nature who instructs 
the young man.   
 
In the second section of biographical topoi, the lawgivers were said to spread and argue in favor of 
their law code, and successfully defend the code against a new challenge to it. According to 
Parmenides’ goddess, the second section of the poem, doxa, is presented so that “the knowledge of 
mortals can never drive past” the young man. (B8.60-61) This appeal to the young man to prepare for 
rhetorical conflict127 is similar to the conflict in the lives of the lawgivers because both are arrived at 
through a similar structure – from education and inspiration, to the resolution of a two-sided conflict, 
to the new possibility and reality of conflict – making the two strongly resemble each other as 
secondary battles that have to be fought after an initial battle is already won.   
 
The ending of Parmenides’ poem has not been preserved, so it is not possible to know to what extent 
the poem explicitly expressed the third and last section of the lawgivers’ biographical topoi. In 
Plutarch’s Lives, the lawgivers departed from their cities so that the law code they embodied could 
not be altered by the lawgivers’ own actions after it had been established.128 While in Parmenides 
 
126 Lycurgus (Strabo, Geography, 10.4.19; cf. Plutarch, Life of Lycurgus, 5.3) and Zaleucus (Clement of 
Alexandria, Stromata, 1.170.3) were suggested to have received their law codes from respectively Apollo and 
Athena. While Plutarch claims Minos, Zoroaster and Numa were all also said to have conversed with gods (Life 
of Numa, 4.6-8). Cf. Szegedy-Maszak (1978) n28-31. 
127 That this is a reference to rhetorical conflict is made clear in the use of ‘driving past’ (parelassē), which 
implies a struggle similar to that of a horse race, but with knowledge taking the place of the horses.  
128 A contrasting view is found in Szegedy-Maszak (1978) 208, as he appears to attempts to reach for a 
conclusion that is not supported by what he has previously argued: “Indeed it might even be said that the 
hidden hero of the legends is codified law itself; once the code is self-sustaining, the legislator becomes 
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poem the goddess claimed that Being is the same both now and in the future (B8.36),129 she also 
encouraged the young man to judge by logos her testing (elenchus) of the route of non-Being (B7.5-
6). The goddess asks the young man himself to attempt to evaluate, and thus attempt to do away 
with, what she had expressed, while maintaining that he would come to see that she is correct. Here, 
then, there can appear to be both a close connection, in their applicability into the future, and a 
point of dissonance, in how fragile they are to outside influence, between the law codes and the 
teaching in the philosophical poem as it is preserved to us. However, as Capizzi notes, if Parmenides’ 
was still being praised in Elea a long time after his death shows that would imply that he was an 
example of a lawgiver who did establish his laws successfully. Even if we cannot know whether the 
poem itself included some sort of provision that would secure its continued validity, Parmenides did 
somehow successfully secure his own continued status as a lawgiver, according to Plutarch.   
 
The structure of Parmenides poem, as expressed through Plutarch’s interpretation of it can, thus, be 
seen to correspond to the stories of legendary lawgivers. One way of interpreting these points of 
commonality is to maintain that Plutarch was himself influenced by what he knew about Parmenides’ 
biography when he presented his interpretation of the poem. As I have pointed out, Mansfeld argues 
that a common interpretive tool used by interpreters of texts around the time Plutarch lived was to 
first look at an author’s biography and then interpret the text in correspondence with that biography. 
Plutarch could possibly have responded to earlier writers who made the claim that Parmenides was a 
lawgiver and shaped his interpretation of the poem in response to that claim. That Parmenides was a 
lawgiver certainly meant much more for Plutarch than another biographical fact might have meant. 
 
superfluous. It is in this context that all of the details of the legends acquire their significance. They do not 
represent careless error or simple hagiography. Rather they are consistent and unified in that they contribute 
to the idea of the excellence of the laws.” But that the law was self-sustaining cannot be the case when, as 
Szegedy-Maszak himself points out, all the law codes are said to need to have a provision to ensure their own 
permanence, and the lawgiver was himself a threat to the laws. Furthermore, that the stories told about 
lawgivers are consistent and unified does not mean that they showed the excellence of the laws as ultimately 
unrelated to the life of the lawgiver who established them. Because it made a different whether the lawgivers 
left their cities, these legends still show that laws were viewed as dependent upon the paradigmatic figure of 
the lawgiver.  
129 It was also said to be “held by the chains of necessity” (8.30-31). Trans. Coxon (2009).  
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With the biographical fact that someone was a lawgiver, for Plutarch, followed his whole conception 
of what it was to codify law and what went into that process. In so far as Plutarch interpretation 
corresponds to this conception of how the lives of lawgivers were structured, it is possible to 
understand what is peculiar about Plutarch’s interpretation as having been influence by the 
biographical commonplaces of legendary lawgivers. In so far as he was viewing the poem through the 
lens of the supposed biographical fact about Parmenides, Plutarch would arguably have been led to 
attempt to make the poem correspond to what that biographical fact entailed for him. Because 
Parmenides was said to be a lawgiver – and because a writer’s written work and their life should 
correspond – it might have entailed that the poem should be understood as yet another biographical 
account of a legendary lawgiver.  
 
A significant aspect of Plutarch’s interpretation of Parmenides is the role he ascribes to the doxa. In 
reading the poem, Plutarch puts less emphasis on the clear distinction between the way of Being and 
the way of non-Being, and rather sees Parmenides as having gone beyond this pairing when he 
presented his account of mortal opinions in the doxa. This aspect of Plutarch’s interpretation 
corresponds, as I have noted, to the commonplace in the stories of legendary lawgivers, exemplified 
by the conflict Solon dealt with between debtors and creditors. Solon solution to the problem made 
neither side of the conflict completely satisfied, as Plutarch tells the story in Life of Solon 16.3. 
Plutarch’s intermediate being similarly is nether fully Being nor non-Being. Colotes’ interpretation 
presents a contrast that can highlight how it is Plutarch’s peculiar interpretation that corresponds to 
the biographical commonplaces of lawgiver. If the biographical commonplace was made to 
correspond to Colotes’ interpretation of Parmenides, it would heavily favor one of the sides in the 
two-sided conflict. Colotes’ claim that Parmenides is led to abolish everything because he posits the 
one being can arguably be understood to be about the two parts of Parmenides’ poem. If that is the 
case, then if his interpretation corresponded to the biographies of lawgivers, it could entail that, 
hypothetically in the specific case of Solon, that Solon heavily favored the creditors over the debtors 
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in the conflict between them. Rather than finding a middle ground position, Colotes viewed 
Parmenides as completely favoring the one to the detriment of everything else. What this 
comparison with Colotes’ interpretation shows, is that it is Plutarch’s peculiar interpretation that 
makes the poem arguably correspond to the biographical commonplaces of lawgivers.  
 
That Parmenides’ poem in Plutarch’s interpretation arguably corresponds to what is seemingly a set 
of commonplaces that was applied indiscriminately to lawgivers, can make Plutarch’s interpretation 
less believable. Regarding the biographical commonplaces themselves, the individual stories about 
the lives of lawgivers are arguably increasingly less believable the more they can be seen to 
correspond to the set of commonplaces. As I have noted that Lavery points out, the subject of 
Plutarch’s Lives were different people from different cultures, and it would make more sense to 
expect them to live individually distinct lives rather than all having lives that basically adhere to the 
same structure. Furthermore, the distance of the sources from the events they are speaking of 
(Parmenides lived later than the common subjects of lives of lawgivers), as well as that the interest in 
his group of people seemingly only started in the 4th century BCE, suggests that the stories might not 
be trustworthy.  
 
This seeming emergence of the writing down of biographical information of lawgivers coincides with 
another historical development dealing with the way the relationship between a writer and a text 
was understood. It gradually became an ideal, as I noted that Colotes and Plutarch holds to be 
important, that what one wrote should be attested in one’s life or character. However, there is some 
reason to see this ideal as not accepted immediately and uncritically. An early expression of the idea 
in question is found in Aristophanes’ Thesmophoriazusae 149-150, pointed out by Mansfeld, where 
Agathon comments, “the poet should have character traits corresponding to [those of the persons 
in] the dramatic works he has to compose,”130 which in the context of the play is clearly meant to be 
 
130 Mansfeld (1994) 188.  
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ridiculous. Agathon continues to say that, “thus, if he is placing women on the stage, he must 
contract all their habits in his own person.” In this early presentation of the ideal of the 
correspondence between writer and what he writes, it is presented as an arguably odd ideal, and not 
something Aristophanes necessarily himself commits himself to. Mansfeld goes on to mention that 
when a similar idea is apparently first attested (following the traditional ordering of Plato’s 
dialogues) by Plato in the Laches 188c-e, it is Laches who expresses it, not his interlocutor Socrates. 
These somewhat reluctant early attestations of the ideal of the likeness of ones character to ones 
writings suggest that the ideal – as it is found in Plutarch – was the result of a process of gradual 
development that should not without much reluctance be traced back to Parmenides.   
 
There is, then, some reason to see the commonalities between the lives of lawgivers as having 
influenced how Plutarch interpreted Parmenides’ poem, and applied to the poem in a way that was 
not clearly justified. That Plutarch saw Parmenides as a lawgiver could have influenced his 
interpretation because it is possible that Plutarch saw biography as an interpretive tool that the text 
should be understood in terms of, following the prolegomenon expressed by Cicero. An alternative 
way to account for the similarities between the structure of the poem (in Plutarch’s interpretation of 
it) and the biographical commonplaces is that the direction of influence, rather, went from the poem 
to the lives of lawgivers. Beyond what I have already referred to, modern scholars have shown 
extreme doubt about the truth of biographical claims made in the genera of ancient lives.131 In a 
study of the written lives of Greek poets, in the introduction to the first edition of her book, Mary 
Lefkowitz goes as far as to claim, “virtually all the material in all the lives is fictional.”132 One main 
reason Lefkowitz holds this position is that the biographical information in the lives appeared to have 
been deduced by inference from the written texts of the poets. The same can be said about the lives 
of philosophers.133 Thus, similar to how each poet’s own poetry, according to Lefkowitz, influenced 
 
131 Lefkowitz (1981); Momigliano (1971); Chitwood (2004). 
132 Lefkowitz (1981) viii.  
133 Mansfeld (1999) 34. 
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the content of their written biographies, the claim that Parmenides was a lawgiver could have been 
made on the basis of the structural similarities between his written work and these other stories 
about lawgivers.  
 
There are some reasons to favor the view that the direction of influence between the biographical 
commonplaces and Plutarch’s interpretation of Parmenides’ poem went from the former to the 
latter, rather than – as would be the case in one of the lives the poets – from the poem to the 
biographical fact. Most importantly, Plutarch is not the only source for the claim that Parmenides 
was a lawgiver to Elea. Regardless of if it was true or not, Plutarch could likely have found the claim 
that Parmenides was a lawgiver somewhere else, possibly in Speusippus. Furthermore, if 
Parmenides’ poem influenced how Plutarch viewed other lawgivers, then that influence would have 
had to be much more significant than if the biography influenced the poem. In giving the account of 
biographical commonplaces of lawgivers, Szegedy-Maszak is not just referring to Plutarch, even 
though he is an important source for him. The tradition of referring to the legendary lawgivers as a 
common group of people is found in 2.1274a of Aristotle’s Politics, and it is Herodotus who is the first 
source to Solon’s biography, which seemingly was a model for some of the later commonplaces 
between lawgivers. It is not clear that Parmenides’ poem itself influenced Plutarch’s conception of 
what it was to be a lawgiver. Potentially, someone else – like Speusippus – could have been 
influenced by Parmenides’ poem in the creation of the commonplaces of lawgivers, but I know of no 
evidence for such a claim.  
 
I have so far in this chapter laid out how Plutarch interprets Parmenides in response to Colotes, and 
the wider context surrounding Plutarch’s claim that Parmenides was a lawgiver. I have also pointed 
out that Plutarch appears to have believed in the ideal of the correspondence between an author’s 
written work and their life. Furthermore, Plutarch could have seen an author’s biography as an 
interpretive tool that could be applied to the author’s written work. Consequentially, I believe there 
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is some reason to see Plutarch’s interpretation of Parmenides as influenced by a set of questionable 
biographical commonplaces of lawgivers. 
 
Finally in this chapter, I will first present how the positions laid out by Plutarch and Colotes can be 
seen as antecedents to a modern debate that can resemble the one Plutarch took part in with 
Colotes. It is in that modern debate that Tor refers to Plutarch as an authority. In conclusion, I will 
attempt to give an account of another historical view of how the codification of Greek law took place 
in order to present an alternative to Plutarch’s position as well as to the modern readers who can be 




2. 6 – Colotes and Plutarch as antecedents to a modern debate 
 
Both Colotes’ and Plutarch’s interpretations can arguably be seen as antecedents to respective 
modern readings of Parmenides’ poem. Readings arguably akin to Colotes’, such as Owen’s,134 have 
in the past gathered support. According to Owen, the doxa was only a “didactical exercise,” and he 
maintains that even though the doxa makes cosmological claims, “Parmenides did not write as a 
cosmologist.”135 The doxa, which is seemingly about the world and cosmos we live in, in Owen’s 
interpretation, is not something Parmenides actually cared about more than as a rhetorical text that 
was supposed to shift its readers attention towards the aletheia.  
 
In opposition to Owen’s reading, however, also readings similar to Plutarch’s Platonist interpretation 
have recently become somewhat common. Some commentators have pointed out that parts of the 
 
134 Owen (1960). Cf. note XX in chapter 1 below.  
135 Owen (1960) 101.  
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cosmological and biological claims made in the doxa appear to have been the result of new 
discoveries previously not attested anywhere else.136 As can be noteworthy in the present context, 
the fragments of the poem that is preserved in Adversus Colotem and nowhere else, fragment B14, is 
one of the fragments that articulates relatively sophisticated astronomical insights. B14 reads, 
“Daylight into the night, a light from somewhere else, wandering around the earth.”137 The subject 
here is the moon, which is, Mourelatos notes, interestingly said to be wandering around rather than 
above the earth.138 Furthermore, as Popper and Graham also points out, Parmenides is showing 
through this fragment and B15 that he is aware that it is the sun that illuminates the moon.139  
 
In light of the negative value that the narrator-goddess can appear to assign to the doxa in B1.30 – as 
I pointed out as a problem for Plutarch’s interpretation above - it can seem problematic that 
Parmenides would include here what is seemingly the interesting results of scientific inquiry. How, it 
could be asked by those who offer an interpretation akin to Plutarch’s, could someone who 
apparently inquired into nature in order to make or lay out new discoveries believe that these 
findings are only deceptions or that they are to be abolished? Because this question is difficult to 
answer there might be reason for interpreters to put a greater emphasis on what the goddess does 
in the doxa rather than how she introduces the doxa; regardless of the value assigned to the doxa by 
the poem itself, the contents therein might be worth studying for interpreters today.  
 
 
136 According to Mourelatos (2013) 170, in contrast to how Parmenides’ doxa has been seen in the past, “it now 
appears more likely that its astronomical tenets either represent scientific discoveries made by Parmenides 
himself or reflect his own engaged grappling with quite recent discoveries made by others.” See also Popper 
(2012), Graham (2006) and Mansfeld (2015). Unlike the other three who focus on Parmenides’ astronomical 
insights, Mansfeld notes Parmenides’ apparent biological discoveries, looking at both A fragments, i.e. 
testimonia, and B fragments. Cf. also the discussion mentioned in chapter 0.1 above between Cordero (2011) 
and Kurfess (2016). Cordero passionately rejects the connection between Parmenides’ doxa and the Platonic 
concept of appearances, but still believes that Parmenides was committed to some of the proto-scientific 
accomplishments recounted in the doxa. Cordero’s unconventional solution is, as a result, to rearrange the 
fragments of the poem so that some of the cosmology is placed in the aletheia.  
137 Trans. Mourelatos (2013). 
138 Mourelatos (2013) 175. 
139 Popper (2012) 68; Graham (2006) 180-181.  
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It is in the context of this discussion about the role of the doxa in Parmenides’ poem that Shaul Tor 
refers to the authority of Plutarch, with the aim of supporting the view that the doxa should be 
viewed positively. Tor maintains that Plutarch’s Platonist reading of Parmenides is the best available 
interpretation because of, on the one hand, that it is able to account for the interpretive problem the 
doxa can present, and, on the other hand, because there is reason to view the interpretive position 
of ancient authors as superior to our own. According to Tor, as I noted in chapter 1, even though 
both modern readers and Plutarch are construing Parmenides in terms of their own “conceptual 
frameworks,”140 Plutarch is in a privileged position compared to modern readers because his reading 
shows the conceptual possibilities of Plato, Parmenides’ – from a modern perspective – close 
predecessor. Because of the historical situation Plato and Plutarch found themselves in, they would 
have been in a better position than we are to understand Parmenides, Tor suggests. This second part 
of Tor’s argument has arguably been made less convincing by the connections I have laid out above. 
The conceptual possibilities of Plutarch himself – not considering his relation to Plato – were 
seemingly limiting in so far as the questionable biographical commonplaces structured his 
interpretation.   
 
Like Plutarch, Tor sets out to explain what Parmenides did in the doxa. Plutarch argued that 
Parmenides pointed to certain entities with lesser ontological priority in the doxa, which can – in 
contrast to what Colotes maintained – Be linked to that Parmenides was taking an active part in 
society where entities of that kind can be found. One aspect of Plutarch’s account of Parmenides is 
that it is centered on explaining the doxa. Similarly, Tor frames his account of the doxa as an attempt 
to answer an aetiological question by asking why Parmenides would choose to write that section of 
the poem.141 At the same time, for Tor, the aletheia only presents an epistemological question and 
he never attempts to asks why Parmenides would choose to write that section. At the outset, Tor 
 
140 Tor (2017) 301.  
141 Tor (2017) 163-221.  
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views the aletheia through the lens of the ethical ideal of homoiōsis theoi (likeness to god) which 
stops any other inquiries into why Parmenides might have wanted to write the alēthēia: “we cannot 
explain how a mortal – Parmenides – was first able to register and evaluate such arguments without 
making reference to that mortal’s epistemically significant interaction with the divine.”142 By making 
it necessary to make such a reference to the divine, however, Tor is excluding any further inquiry into 
how Parmenides “was first able to register and evaluate such arguments” that does not view 
Parmenides as having been divinely inspired, which the lack of any inquiry into that point of 
beginning by Tor indicates.  
 
Plutarch himself viewed the human process of homoiōsis theoi as like being influenced by a virtuous 
paradigm. “God offers himself,” Plutarch says in On the Delays of the Divine Vengeance, “to all as a 
pattern of every excellence and in doing that he renders human virtue (which is in some way or other 
assimilation to him) accessible to all who can follow God.”143 As a supposedly successful lawgiver and 
philosopher, Parmenides too, like Plutarch’s God, served as a paradigm for virtue, as Plutarch 
understood him. Like Tor, Plutarch did not give an account of what Parmenides’ poem might have 
been written in response to. In Plutarch’s reading, the poem should not be understood as a response 
to a specific thinker, problem or question. Instead, as an expression of the virtuous paradigm that 
Parmenides himself supposedly exhibited, the poem was seemingly only to be understood as 





142 Tor (2017) 284.  




2.7 – Compulsory originality and the codification of law 
 
According to Moses Finley, the legendary lawgivers I have discussed in this chapter “invented freely 
in a sort of compulsory originality which characterized every aspect of archaic Greek life and 
culture.”144 In Finley’s view, exceptional archaic Greek individuals were themselves responsible for 
the largely unaided invention of everything from new political institutions to abstract philosophy. 
Like what is the case with the views expressed by Plutarch and Tor, following Finley’s position entails 
not attempting to look at what these legendary figures might have been influenced by or which 
specific issues they might have reacted against. The notion that there was one lawgiver who was 
responsible for writing a complete law code corresponds to both Finley’s suggestion about the free, 
compulsory originality under which these figures worked, as well as Plutarch’s and Tor’s view of 
Parmenides as divinely inspired and as inspired to give an expression of his virtuous life.  
 
In the case of what the legendary lawgivers achieved, there is some reason to believe that the stories 
that claim law codes were the product of the work of one incredible individual are not historically 
accurate. In arguing against both Finley’s and Plutarch’s view of the role of legendary lawgivers in the 
codification of Greek law, Karl-Joachim Hölkeskamp emphasizes that the literary tradition that speaks 
of legendary lawgivers is untrustworthy.145 However, the writers in this tradition also, Hölkeskamp 
 
144 Finley (1981) 100.  
145 Hölkeskamp (1992) 55, expressing some of the arguments I have presented, says, “But what do we really 
know about the early arbitrators and law-givers and about early Greek law and legislation in general? Literary 
sources are extremely scanty and naturally late, sometimes obscure and dubious, always difficult of access and 
evaluation - and most of the extant material is all the more problematic just because the early law-givers 
became towering figures who were, as it were, truly dear to the hearts of all Greeks in the heyday of the polis-
culture. Indeed, the universal theoretical interest in these figures as well as the widespread practical 
importance of nomos and nomothesia [legislation] must have influenced and sometimes utterly distorted what 
has come down to us about early lawgivers and legislation – the tradition is, in a way, a philosophical, historical 
and ideological smokescreen.” See also Hölkeskamp (1993) and Hölkeskamp (1999). Chapter 3 of the latter 
work deals individually with the process of codification of law in a large number of individual poleis, 
unfortunately not including Elea.   
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notes, “actually quoted and discussed, or at least mentioned in passing, individual laws and their 
contents in detail.”146 A fair number of these laws, he goes on to say, “can be shown to be old and 
probably authentic.”147 Other ancient laws are preserved through inscriptions. What is remarkable 
about them is that “the topic of all these laws are particular issues, concrete problems or offences, 
and that they seem to be extraordinarily narrowly defined.” According to Hölkeskamp, codification 
appears to have been a process that took place step by step through the enactment of individual 
laws, all apparently responding to specific transgressions and relying on what was previously 
unspoken norms.148 149  
 
If we are to believe that Hölkeskamp is correct in his analysis of the codification of Greek laws, 
Plutarch’s lives of legendary lawgivers fail to shed light on how the process of codification took place. 
Because of the close connection between Plutarch’s lives of lawgivers and his interpretation of 
Parmenides’ poem, there is, by analogy, reason to see Plutarch’s reading of Parmenides as making 
use of problematic conception of how law codes were shaped, as well as what shaped the work of an 
historical figure, in interpreting Parmenides. Plutarch’s seeming willingness to attempt to make an 
author’s biography and work correspond to one another can appear to have meant that he was 
unlikely to understand both the enactment of laws and the actions of someone like Parmenides as 
responses to problems that arose in specific situations. For Plutarch, the philosopher-lawgiver 
presented in his way of life the equivalent of a law code that others would be encouraged to follow 
 
146 Hölkeskamp (1992) 89. 
147 Hölkeskamp (1992) 89. 
148 Possibly because they were only applicable in specific situations, the content of the laws do not appear to 
have shaped the biographical narrative later authors told about the lawgivers who supposedly established law 
codes containing these laws. 
149 Critics of Hölkeskamp point out that only a small number of the inscriptions of laws, which is what 
Hölkeskamp uses as his sources, are preserved. And therefore, Gagarin (2002) 1619 argues, “a fuller record of 
the archaic evidence might reveal examples of just the sort of large-scale, and to some extent comprehensive, 
legislation Hölkeskamp seeks to deny.” Against this view, Hölkeskamp (1992) 90 maintains, “there is no hint 
whatever that these nomoi were dependent parts of general and systematic laws on inheritance, contract and 
penal law or fully-fledged comprehensive 'law codes'.” A second point of criticism against Hölkeskamp is that 
the main focus of early written laws was often legal procedure, rather than, as Hölkeskamp maintains, the 
specification of sanctions. (Osborne [2000]; Thomas [1995].) 
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by virtue of the exemplary life he led. The law code and the way of life of the philosopher were both, 
for Plutarch, expressions paradigms that could reshape an individual’s life. Because they were seen in 
terms of having lived a complete life from birth to death, what motivated a philosopher or lawgiver 
to live this way was either left unquestioned or seen as akin to divine inspiration.   
 
Hölkeskamp criticism of Plutarch’s conception of the codification of law can illustrate that – contrary 
to Finley’s assertion that those who influenced all aspects of life in archaic Greece were best 
characterized as driven by compulsory originality – in order to properly understand the process of 
codification, it can be helpful to be aware of the specific situations and concrete problems that 
compelled the establishment of these abstract ideas and institutions. Similarly, Plutarch’s reading of 
Parmenides can be criticized as a starting point for a modern interpretation in so far as it might lead 
interpreters in an unreasonable way away from the problems and question presented by past 




2.8 – Concluding remarks 
 
To the extent that I have shown any limits of Plutarch’s interpretation of Parmenides in this chapter, 
it has been related to how he made use of biographical commonplaces in order to interpret 
Parmenides’ poem. Any criticism I want to direct at viewing Parmenides’ poem through a Plutarchian 
lens is limited to how far his interpretation corresponds to that questionable framework of 
commonplaces. Because it seems to me to be some reason in favor of seeing Plutarch’s 
interpretation of Parmenides as shaped by his concept of what it meant to be a lawgiver, I do also 




While it is possible for a modern reader of Parmenides to appeal to Plutarch’s interpretation in 
support of their own reading, I do not think it is possible to attack the content of a modern reading of 
Parmenides that is similar to Plutarch’s just because Plutarch is a questionable authority to the 
meaning of the text. It is precisely Plutarch’s role as an authority that is questioned by the 
presentation of the connection between his biographical commonplaces and his interpretation of 
Parmenides’ poem. The positive content of interpretations like Mourelatos’ and Mansfeld’s, who 
want to direct attention towards the doxa, is not any less valid because their interpretations 
corresponds to Plutarch’s. However, seeing the limits of Plutarch’s interpretation can also call 
attention to if all the consequences of following his interpretation are commendable. One such 
consequence is arguably that a reader who follows Plutarch is less likely to see Parmenides as a 
thinker who potentially responded to a specific situation, a specific problem, or what might have 
been viewed as a specific philosophical transgression – such as the philosophically problematic 













3. Chapter Three – Parmenides’ Fragment B5 and Proclus’ 
Transmission of the Fragment 
 
[…] ξυνὸν δέ μοί ἐστιν, 
ὁππόϑεν ἄρξωμαι· τόϑι γὰρ πάλιν ἵξομαι αὖϑις 
[…] it is common for me  
from where I begin, for I will return there again.150  
 
Fragment B5 of Parmenides’ poem says, for the speaker – ostensibly the goddess-narrator – a certain 
place is common, which is a statement she explains by saying she will return there again. B5 is 
preserved to us by Proclus in a context that has led some commentators to question the authenticity 
of the fragment. Others have needed to translate the word xunon in the fragment in a strained way 
in order to make sense of the fragment. In this chapter it is my aim to lay out the background against 
which Proclus preserved the fragment by both focusing on his general reading of Parmenides and 
how he understood the immediate context in which he quoted the fragment. On the one hand, how 
Proclus preserved B5 has arguably presented problems for interpreters who have not adequately 
understood what he was doing when he was quoting the fragment. On the other hand, his 
interpretation can also arguably be of some help to the interpreter of the fragment who adequately 





150 B5. My translation.  
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3.1. Proclus’ view of Parmenides’ poem as completed – rather than corrected – by 
Plato 
 
One noteworthy aspect of Proclus’ interpretation of Parmenides is that he suggests that Parmenides’ 
poem should be understood as already indicating what is more fully expressed by Plato. Proclus 
notes that others have understood Plato to be correcting Parmenides, in contrast with his own 
understanding of the relationship between Parmenides and Plato. In the commentary on Plato’s 
dialogue, the Parmenides, Proclus says, 
[…] some have previously said in fact that whereas Parmenides bases his entire treatment on 
Being, Plato, after discovering that the One is superior to both Being and all existence, 
corrects Parmenides, presenting him as basing even his principle on the One. For just as 
Gorgias, Protagoras, and each of the other [philosophers] presents his own hypotheses 
better in Plato[’s writings] than in his own, so too Parmenides is a better philosopher in him 
(i.e., Plato) and more deeply initiated than he is seen [to be] on his own.151 
Here, Proclus is commenting on 137c–142a of the Parmenides, where the character Parmenides 
discusses the dialogue’s so-called First Hypothesis, “if One is One, then what can we deduce about 
it?,” which plays an important role in Proclus’ commentary on the Parmenides.152 What can appear 
to be appealing to Proclus about the discussion on the First Hypothesis is that the One is presented 
 
151 Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides 1032. Trans. Coxon (2009).  
152 The Parmenides ends the discussion of the First Hypothesis on a reluctant note, with Parmenides and his 
interlocutor, a young man named Aristotle, seemingly not committing themselves to what they have discussed. 
“Then can these things be true of the One?” Parmenides asks Aristotle, concluding the First Hypothesis-section 
of the dialogue, to which Aristotle responds, “I think not.” (142a6. Trans. Fowler [1925]) Despite these 
concluding remarks, which seemingly could lead an interpreter to see what Parmenides is there attempting to 
do as simply impossible, Proclus, similar to other Neoplatonists, apparently sees the section dealing with the 
First Hypothesis as the most important part of the dialogue; according to James Wm. Forrester (1977) 1, “for a 
philosopher of Neoplatonic inclinations, the First Hypothesis may well be the most important single text in the 
Platonic corpus.” In fact, Proclus’ commentary on the Parmenides itself ends after he has commented on the 
First Hypothesis, leaving out the large subsequent portion of the dialogue. What the negative answers Aristotle 
gives Parmenides at the end of the First Hypothesis entails for Proclus and the Neoplatonist, according to Gerd 
Van Riel (2017) 75, is that “this negation is not an absurdity but rather the final recognition of the insufficient 
nature of any kind of determination of the absolute one.” 
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as an ontologically superior entity, superior even to Being. A focus point for Neoplatonist interpreters 
of Plato like Proclus was that Plato sometimes expressed that the object of philosophy was both 
different in kind and superior to the objects of other types of inquiry. Illustratively, in the Republic, 
which Proclus in the context of the quotation above goes on to refer to, Plato presents Socrates as 
saying that the Good is “beyond being.”153 Epistemologically, Proclus appears to understand Plato to 
be expressing that knowledge of what is referred to as the Good and the One is acquired in a 
different way from how knowledge of other entities is acquired. Parmenides’ aim in the eyes of 
Proclus is seemingly to surpass the kind of inquiry that is directed at other entities in order to 
approach the ontologically superior One. The difference between what Proclus here refers to as what 
“some have previously said” about Plato correcting Parmenides, and his own position is that Proclus 
suggests that Parmenides’ poem also was written to indicate the superiority of the One, even 
though, as Proclus goes on to refer to others as saying, “Parmenides does not appear saying anything 
about the One itself in his poems (since it is ineffable).”154 Instead, even as he emphasizes and 
presents this competing view, Proclus does not understand Plato to have presented in his dialogue 
Parmenides as a different and better philosopher than what he is on his own. Proclus’ point is, 
rather, that Parmenides, from his inquires in the First Hypothesis as well as in his poem, “ascends to 
the One itself, which he (i.e., Plato) in the Republic calls unhypothetical,”155 even as the One by itself 
cannot directly be an object of inquiry. For Proclus, even though Parmenides’ poem can appear to 
express a position that is different from Plato’s, the poem should be understood as a part of this 
‘ascent’ toward the Platonic concept of the One, which is indicated by Parmenides, even as it is not 
an explicit object of inquiry.  
 
It is notable that Proclus refers to the alternative interpretation that views Plato as correcting 
Parmenides. According to this alternative interpretation, Parmenides was mainly concerned with 
 
153 Plato, Republic 509b8. 
154 Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides 1033. Trans. Coxon (2009). 
155 Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides 1033. Trans. Coxon (2009). 
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Being, or what is called to eon in Parmenides’ poem. On only the basis of Parmenides’ poem, without 
considering Plato’s writings, such a suggestion can be appealing. An example of a modern interpreter 
who challenges the notion that the One is a central concept in Parmenides’ poem is Richard 
McKirahan. In examining fragment B8 of the poem, which is where Parmenides presents the so-
called “signs” “along the way” of to eon, (B8.2) McKirahan notes that while Parmenides says that to 
eon is One, he notably seems to not present any arguments in favor of this aspect or attribute of to 
eon.156 In contrast, fragment B8 is itself remarkable because it not only presents several aspects of to 
eon, but it also repeatedly presents arguments in favor of that these attributes are applicable to to 
eon. As an example, an argument that is made in favor of these arguments to eon is ‘ungenerated’ is 
presented as a rhetorical question in B8.6, “For what birth will you investigate for it?” In fact, 
compared with what is preserved of the works of earlier Presocratic thinkers, Parmenides’ poem is 
distinguished in that it presents many arguments in favor of the claims that are made.157 In the 
context of fragment B8, as McKirahan notes, the attribute One and the related attribute “unique” are 
seemingly the only attributes not established by argument among those mentioned in the 
introductory list of attributes of to eon in B8.2-6.158 For McKirahan, the lack of arguments in favor of 
the attribute One being applicable to to eon suggests that it is possible that Parmenides might not 
have viewed this attribute as important. According to McKirahan, “If he considers the attribute 
especially important, it would be very odd for him to have constructed arguments for all the rest of 
the listed attributes and not to have proved this remaining one as well.”159  
 
However, even as he sees that there is some reason to be skeptical of claims about the centrality of 
the attribute One, McKirahan also states that “these considerations do not settle the historical 
 
156 McKirahan (2009) 215.  
157 McKirahan (2009) 189: “It is universally recognized that Parmenides’ introduction of argument into 
philosophy was of paramount importance.”  
158 McKirahan (2009) 215. 
159 McKirahan (2009) 215. 
76 
 
question of what Parmenides actually thought.”160 Because of its nature as a historical question, the 
problem of the meaning of B8 and the poem as a whole is only with difficulty discernible from the 
text we are in possession of. It is interesting that Parmenides did not provide any argument in favor 
of that to eon is One, but what do we really have reason to take from such a fact alone? Seemingly, 
Proclus could himself use the same argument as McKirahan to support his own position. If the One is 
to be approached differently than other objects of inquiry, as it should be in the eyes of Proclus, it 
could be argued that Parmenides consciously refrained from presenting arguments in favor of the 
attribute One because he viewed it to be of a different kind from the other attributes.  
 
Nevertheless, Proclus does not argue against those who hold a view similar to McKirahan’s primarily 
by looking at the poem itself. Instead, Proclus’ approach is to argue that Parmenides’ poem only 
indirectly expresses a position similar to Plato’s. Moreover, it is by reading the poem through Plato 
that he is able to interpret the poem as indicating that Platonic position. Because the poem is only 
indicating the Platonic concept of the One, as Proclus sees it, it can be problematic for an interpreter 
to understand the poem without first having read Plato. “It seems to me well said by the older 
[commentators],” Proclus says in his commentary on the Parmenides, “that Plato brought to 
completion the treatises of both Zeno and Parmenides […] elevating the theorizing of the latter to 
the very thing that really is One.”161 Proclus’ claim here that Plato completed Parmenides’ poem – 
using the verb teleioō – stands in contrast with the claim that Plato corrected Parmenides, which 
Proclus disagrees with. Proclus’ use of teleioō could imply that he understood Parmenides’ poem as 
always itself having tended toward Plato’s completion of it. However, from the perspective of an 
interpreter of Parmenides’ poem, it can be difficult to see Parmenides’ poem as incomplete without 
first having seen its completion by Plato.  
 
 
160 McKirahan (2009) 216.  
161 Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides 997. Trans. Coxon (2009). 
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Proclus understands Plato to have made Parmenides’ poem come to its completion; this shows that 
it is possible to understand Proclus’ interpretation of Plato and his Neoplatonist background as akin 
to the marble portrait of Metrodorus that is used as a model for the Velia Parmenides. Proclus saw 
the meaning of Parmenides’ poem as fully expressed by Plato rather than the poem itself. Similarly, 
the likeness of Metrodorus’ portrait stood in place of Parmenides’ own appearance for the sculptor 
who made the Velia Parmenides, according to Dillon. However, as I have noted, Kurfess expresses, 
with reference to Proclus, that the difficult interpretive situation modern readers of Parmenides’ 
poem find themselves in can give us increased reason to initially favor the views of ancient 
interpreters of the poem over our own interpretations. In an analogy to the sculptor of the Velia 
Parmenides, we as modern readers of the poem might want to look toward Proclus as our own 
Metrodorus portrait, hoping that Proclus captures the ‘likeness’ of Parmenides’ poem.  
 
At the same time, Proclus’ reading of Parmenides is itself a good example of the difficulty of applying 
an author like Proclus as an authority – or even as a resource – to the question of the meaning of 
Parmenides’ poem. In the specific case of interpretations of fragment B5 of the poem, which Proclus 
is our only source to, applying Proclus as an authority or resource without being aware of his view of 
how Parmenides was to be interpreted as indicating a Platonic position has only led modern 
commentators to have difficultly engaging with that fragment. In regard to fragment B5, the way this 
difficulty has most notably been manifested is that a large number of commentators have chosen to 
not translate the word xunon in the fragment as ‘common’, and rather choose to translate it as 
‘indifferent,’162 even though no other instances of the use of the word can be found where this is 
what is meant by xunon.163 The authenticity of the fragment has been questioned,164 and frequently 
 
162 Diels (1897), Kirk and Raven (1957), Taran (1965), Mansfeld (1964), Bormann (1971), Ballew (1974), Guthrie 
(1979), Bodnar (1985), Mourelatos (2008). 
163 See section 4 below.   
164 Jameson (1958).  
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in studies on Parmenides little discussion is devoted to B5.165 The reluctance often shown toward 
giving an interpretation of B5 – either by the explicit claim that it is spurious, or simply by it not being 
devoted much time in an interpretation of the poem – makes it stand out among the other 
fragments that are thought to be in the aletheia-section of Parmenides’ poem. The fragments in the 
aletheia are commonly interpreted meticulously and seen in relation to one another as constituent 
parts of a whole. However, B5 has often been interpreted only with difficultly in relation to the rest 
of the poem.166 Both the relative lack of attention given to it compared to other parts of the poem, as 
well as how unsympathetic interpretations of B5 have been to the Greek text of the poem 
(exemplified by the translation of xunon), highlight that fragment B5 has been seen as problematic by 
commentators.  
 
Francis Cornford’s reaction to how B5 is presented by Proclus is testimony to how the fragment has 
been seen as being problematic. Proclus presents B5 in his commentary on Plato’s Parmenides 
between two other quotations from Parmenides’ poem, both from fragment B8, specifically B8.25 
and B8.44. “Frag. 5 appears here in Proclus,” Cornford remarks, discussing how Proclus presents the 
fragment, “and this might indicate a gap.”167 It is Cornford’s suggestion that the way in which Proclus 
quotes B5 indicates a lacuna in B8 as it is quoted by Simplicius, who is our main source to B8, and 
that Proclus is showing us that B5 was placed in this lacuna. In suggesting that there is a lacuna in B8, 
Cornford is seemingly attempting to give justice to his view of the context in which fragment B5 is 
 
165 More recent longer works on Parmenides’ poem that only briefly mention fragment B5 are Curd (2004) 69, 
Robbiano (2006) 9, Mourelatos (2008) 157, Palmer (2009) 85n104 and Wedin (2014) 4n5 and Martin (2016) 
150.  While Austin (2007) and Tor (2017) are examples of a works on Parmenides that do not mention B5. 
However, Palmer and Curd both do question the translation of xunon as ‘indifferent’. There is, nevertheless, 
some scholarly literature on the fragment. The scholars who have most notably engaged with B5 in the last 50 
years are Bicknell (1979) and Bodnar (1985).  
166 Raven’s reading in Kirk and Raven (1957) goes arguably the furthest in the other direction by relating B5 to 
the rest of the poem. He understands B5 to be expressing that all parts of the aletheia are equal to one another 
in that they all convey the same point, over and over. This reading, however, is criticized by Bodnar (1985), 
Bicknell (1979), and Taran (1965).  
167 Cornford (1939) 41. In addition to B5, Cornford (1939) 41 also suggests that B4 should be placed in this 
lacuna. See also note 19 below.   
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presented by Proclus; if B5 is presented by Proclus in between two quotations from B8, then B5 itself 
should be understood as a part of B8, Cornford seems to maintain.  
 
However, Cornford’s claim is irreconcilable in that B8, in a possible contrast to B5, is preserved in a 
seemingly reliable way by Simplicius. Simplicius, indeed, shows that he can be seen as a reliable 
source to the text of Parmenides’ poem by being conscious of the problematic interpretive situation 
of his readers in relation to Parmenides. When presenting a commentary on book 1 of Aristotle’s 
Physics, Simplicius chooses to quote B8.1–52 of Parmenides’ poem. “Even if one might think it 
pedantic,” Simplicius says, introducing the quotation, “I would gladly transcribe in this commentary 
the verses of Parmenides on the one being, which aren’t numerous, both as evidence for what I have 
said and because of the scarcity of Parmenides’ treatise.”168 In commenting on this quotation by 
Simplicius, it can be noted that even though Simplicius claims lines 1–52 of fragment B8 “aren’t 
numerous,” it is the single longest preserved quotation from any Presocratic philosopher, providing 
Simplicius’ readers with what can be seen as a more direct perspective on the text of Parmenides’ 
poem than is normally achieved through any ancient quotation of the works of the Presocratics.169 
Partially, Simplicius chooses to quote from Parmenides because he has experienced the text of 
Parmenides’ poem to be rare, which shows that he was aware of the difficult situation interpreters of 
Parmenides could be in because of scarcity of evidence. Because of the length and apparent accuracy 
of Simiplicius’ quotation, as well as the fact that he presents the quotation seemingly with the 
intention of preserving Parmenides’ poem, Cornford’s claim that there is a lacuna in B8 where B5 
originally was located is problematic, which shows that using Proclus as an authority to how we are 
to understand B5 can itself be a problematic undertaking.  
 
 
168 Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, 145–146. Trans. Taran (1987).  
169 In highlighting the apparent accuracy of Simplicius’ quotation of B8 as contrasted with what Sextus 
Empiricus quotes from the fragment in Adversus Mathematicos, Mansfeld (1999) 39 notes, “Simplicius’ 
quotations enable us to see that the long continuous text of Parmenides, quoted by Sextus M. 7.111, is in fact a 
patchwork, combining passages from different sections of the poem and omitting crucial lines in the proem.”  
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There has, after Cornford’s suggestion about B5, been some debate about the authenticity of the 
fragment and the reliability of Proclus as a source to the works of the Presocratics. In sections 2 and 3 
below, I will consider the two related problems of, on the one hand, whether the fragment is 
authentic and, on the other, how our understanding of the fragment today can be aided by how 
Proclus presents the fragment. While there are few if any voices among commentators today who 
forcefully argue that the fragment is inauthentic, the reluctance commentators show toward 
interpreting B5 can be ascribed to some apparent uncertainties surrounding how the fragment is 
preserved. These uncertainties were themselves related, as the example of Cornford’s problematic 
view of the fragment itself can illustrate, to what I view as an insufficient awareness of the context in 
which Proclus presented the fragment. Notably, Proclus presented an unorthodox interpretation of 
Parmenides. Failing to adequately understand this context is, I argue, one reason why commentators 
either refrain from engaging with B5 or view it as an inauthentic fragment. Therefore, looking at the 
context in which B5 is preserved can open up further inquiries into the meaning of the fragment. 
Insofar as the context Proclus presents the fragment in is not investigated and laid out, readers of the 
fragment cannot easily attempt to differentiate between the meaning of the fragment and the 
context it is presented in, which may lead interpreters who question how Proclus makes use of the 




3.2 – The question of how interpreters should approach B5 
 
How Proclus quotes fragment B5 and our inability to corroborate his citation led G. Jameson to argue 
that B5 should be treated as suspect and that one should not develop an interpretation of the poem 
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around it.170 As I have noted, more recent interpreters of the poem who only marginally mention B5 
can be seen to be passively agreeing with Jameson in so far as they appear to only reluctantly find a 
place for B5 in their interpretations. Some of these interpreters also explicitly point at the 
uncertainty surrounding the fragment as a reason for why they refrain from engaging with it. 
Jameson himself refers to Olof Gigon, who in his account of the poem says, "Wir übergehen 28 B 5, 
das von geringerer Bedeutung und nicht sicher festzulegendem Sinne ist."171 More recently, Palmer 
has noted that while he views his own interpretation of the fragment to have some merit, “fr. 5 is so 
brief, enigmatic, and bereft of context that any interpretation of it can only be speculative […].”172 
Similarly, Sturt B. Martin expresses the opinion that to refuse to guess its meaning is “the most 
prudent way to deal with this fragment,” and he refers to Palmer as observing that “there is no 
context for this very brief fragment.”173 The claim that there is no context for B5, or that it is bereft of 
context, is imprecise. There is, of course, the context of how Proclus presents the fragment. Martin, 
in particular, comments on fragment B3 of the poem at length, which, like B5, is quoted as a single 
line by the authors who preserve it.174 Therefore, it can appear that he does not refer to the length of 
the fragment when he says its lack of context warrants him not to comment on it. Seemingly, both 
Palmer and Martin ignore the context in which Proclus presents the fragment. Neither mentions in 
their brief comments on the fragment if there is any reason for them choosing to ignore the context 
in Proclus’ commentary on the Parmenides.    
 
Unlike Gigon, Palmer, and Martin, Jameson explicitly points out that B5 seems out of place as it is 
quoted by Proclus. According to Jameson, in opposition to what Cornford suggests, the fact that B5 is 
quoted in between B8.25 and B8.44 indicates that Proclus could have quoted the fragment from 
 
170 Jameson (1958) 21. 
171 Gigon (1945) 257. 
172 Palmer (2009) 85n104.  
173 Martin (2016) 150. 
174 Clement of Alexandria, Plotinus and Proclus all quote B3. In section 3 below I refer to Proclus’ quotation of 
that fragment in his commentary on the Parmenides.  
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memory, and that the fragment is, thus, suspect. That Proclus could have quoted B5 from memory is 
a reasonable claim for which Jameson provides some evidence. Referring to E. R. Dodds, Jameson 
suggests that B5 could have been quoted from memory because Proclus elsewhere appears to quote 
from ancient authors from memory rather than from their original texts.175 In further emphasizing 
this point, Jameson also notes how Proclus quotes Empedocles’ fragment DK31 B52. Proclus 
introduces that fragment by saying “Empedocles somewhere says: […],”176 which, because of the 
explicit unspecificity, suggests to Jameson that Proclus was quoting the fragment from memory. 
Therefore, because of how B5 is presented and that Proclus is known to quote others from memory, 
Jameson maintains, “frg. 5 should be treated as suspect; it has no more authority behind it than 
Proclus’ memory and cannot be introductory to any argument of the Way of Truth as we know it.”   
 
Coxon, seemingly in support of a position similar to Jameson’s, points out that how Proclus presents 
a citation of B8.29 from Parmenides’ poem at four different times in the commentary on the 
Parmenides is illustrative of how Proclus made use the works of other philosophers. In these four 
quotations, Proclus uses two different forms of the verb mimnō, ‘I remain,’ neither of which is the 
one Simplicius makes use of in his quotation of the fragment. Proclus once quotes the fragment as 
“tauton en tautō mimnon,”177 using the participle of the verb, while in the three later instances 
where he quotes the same fragment he instead uses the present form mimnei.178 Simplicius, in his 
quotation of the fragment, instead has te menon in place of Proclus’ mimnon and mimnei.179 Coxon 
ascribes Proclus’ use of the form mimnei to a confusion with Xenophanes fragment DK21 B25, “aiei 
d’ en tautō mimnei,” which to Coxon indicates that Proclus made these quotations from memory. In 
 
175 Jameson (1958) 21. Jameson cites E. R. Dodds who shows that Proclus’ short citations from Plato are often 
inaccurate.  
176 Jameson (1958) 21; Proclus’ commentary on the Timaeus, II 8.  
177 Trans. Coxon (2009).  
178 The latter three citations are from pages 1134, 1152 and 1177 of Cousin’s edition of Proclus’ commentary on 
the Parmenides, while the first is on page 639.  
179 Coxon (2009) 6 translates the fragment using mimnon and te menon both as “remaining the same in the 
same state,” while with mimnei he translates “it remains the same in the same state.” The different verb forms 
used, thus, do not appear to change the sense of the fragment.  
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the case of the first quotation, however, where Proclus uses the word mimnon, the quotation 
“appears to come from an earlier commentary on Plato’s Parmenides and perhaps reproduces the 
version given in this source.”180 What Coxon’s suggestions can call attention to is that when Proclus 
quoted a part of Parmenides’ poem he could be quoting from memory, quoting directly from the 
poem itself or, alternatively, quoting directly from another secondary work. In the context of 
Jameson’ view that the fragment might be spurious, this third alternative is noteworthy. If Proclus 
quoted B5 from another secondary source – notwithstanding the inaccuracies that might be the 
consequence of transmission – Proclus would himself have been unaware of the context the 
fragment was presented in, even as he could have correctly quoted the fragment.  
 
That Proclus might have quoted B5 from an anthology of sayings of philosophers is a middle-ground 
position that is support by that, while Proclus can be seen as partially an untrustworthy source, as he 
is by Jameson, he can also be seen as trustworthy. On the one hand, there is some reason to believe 
that Proclus did in fact possess the text of Parmenides poem. He elsewhere both quotes longer 
sections of the poem and shows detailed knowledge of the aletheia.181 In light of his view of Proclus’ 
quotations from Parmenides’ poem, Mansfeld maintains that “Proclus undoubtedly had access to a 
copy of the text [of the poem].”182 The epic language of B5 that Proclus preserves, which I will return 
to later in discussing the meaning of xunon, itself supports that B5 in particular is a direct citation of 
the text of the poem. B5 has the epic forms hoppothen and xunon, rather than the attic hopothen 
and koinon. Proclus’ use of xunon rather than koinon in the fragment is especially noteworthy 
because he frequently uses koinos as a technical term. In quoting from memory, he could supposedly 
have been less likely to use the more unfamiliar dialect of epic poetry than if he were quoting directly 
from the text of the poem.  
 
180 Coxon (2009) 6.  
181 Specifically, Proclus quotation of B2 in his commentary on Plato’s Timaeus I, 345, 18–25 and his paraphrase 
of the aletheia in the commentary on Plato’s Parmenides 1077–8; cf. Bodnar (1985) 61n3.  




On the other hand, how Proclus quotes B5 supports that Proclus himself was either unaware of, or at 
least not primarily concerned with how that fragment fits into the poem as a whole. The impetus 
behind Jameson’s position, which he argues in favor of by framing Proclus as an unreliable source of 
verbatim quotations, is that Cornford’s suggestion – that B5 should be placed in B8 – seems to him to 
be wrong. Jameson is not making an unfounded assumption when he assumes that Simplicius is a 
more trustworthy source than Proclus. However, that Proclus seems to sometimes quote other 
authors from memory, which is what Jameson sets out to establish, does not mean that is the case. 
That B5 seemed out of place in B8 can, alternatively, be explained by that Proclus presented B5 in a 
way that did not reflect how it originally was presented by Parmenides. Furthermore, in how 
Simplicius introduces his quotation of B8, as I have quoted above, he mentions that at the time when 
he is writing – only a generation after Proclus – copies of the text of Parmenides’ poem had become 
rare, which is the reason why he sees fit to quote that long section from it. The rarity of the text of 
the poem makes it more likely that Proclus did not have a copy of the full text that preserved the 
context of B5. In a contrasting claim to what Mansfeld maintains, Taran says about B5, “it cannot be 
excluded that Proclus himself may have copied the fragment out of an anthology, for I see no 
evidence that he knew the whole of Parmenides’ poem.”183 As Diels pointed out, what he calls 
doxographical works were widely read in antiquity, and it was not unlikely that Proclus might have 
been in possession of a doxographical work that included quotations from Parmenides’ poem.184 
 
In the case of the question of to what extent Proclus directly quoted from the text of the poem, the 
balance of opinion and evidence appears to me to favor that Proclus could have directly quoted the 
text of B5, even though it is unclear if Proclus knew the context in which Parmenides presented the 
fragment. While the implicit reluctance of interpreters’ of Parmenides’ poem toward B5 is striking, 
 
183 Taran (1965) 51. 
184 Cf. chapter 3.2 below and Mansfeld (1999) 24. 
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that the authority of B5 is only rarely explicitly questioned – which it is not by commentators such as 
Curd, Mourelatos, and Tor – can arguably be seen as more noteworthy in the discussion of whether 
the fragment is spurious. However, Jameson’s position is not easily refuted by what is a relatively 
scarce set of evidence in favor of the fragment’s authenticity. Taran, who suggests in the quotation 
above that Proclus might have quoted the fragment from a doxographical work, argues that 
uncertainty about the meaning of the fragment – which is what he understands Jameson’s position 
to be motivated by – should not lead us to think that the fragment is inauthentic. According to Taran, 
“The fact that we cannot recover the reason for the statement contained in the fragment – i.e., the 
reason why the goddess will come back to any point from which she begins – is not a motive to 
doubt the authenticity of the fragment as Jameson does.”185 The uncertainties surrounding the 
fragment gives Jameson reason to view the fragment as inauthentic, while for Taran these 
uncertainties are themselves not seen as good enough a reason to view the fragment as inauthentic.  
 
Like Taran, Istvan Bodnar states that Proclus’ “construal of the text and its philosophical 
interpretation do not stand or fall together.”186 But Bodnar goes further than Taran by being more 
open to the possibility of forming an interpretation of the fragment and criticizes Taran’s reluctance 
toward deciding on an interpretation of B5. While presenting different interpretation of the 
fragment, Taran limits how he interprets the fragment to that “while some of these conjectures go 
beyond the evidence so that there is no good reason to support one against the others, other 
conjectures are based on premises that may be proven wrong.”187 For Taran, we are limited by how 
Proclus presents the fragment to only being able to disprove some unfounded interpretations of it. 
Bodnar has a different standard for how certain an interpretation needs be, and thus believes that 
“we are able to contrast and rank different interpretations of this fragment.”188 While I ultimately 
 
185 Taran (1965) 53. Regarding the interpretation Taran presents of the fragment, see section 4 below.  
186 Bodnar (1985) 63n23.  
187 Taran (1965) 51. 
188 Bodnar (1985) 57.  
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disagree with the interpretation Bodnar ranks the highest among the ones he considers, I find his 
willingness to form an opinion of the fragment despite uncertainties admirable, even more so than 
how Taran approaches the fragment. When dealing with the Presocratics, whose work is only known 
in fragments such as B5 and B8, it can appear to be limiting to have too high a standard for what kind 
of material should be the basis of an interpretation. In fact, viewing B5 in a context where it is 
contrasted with how B8 is preserved might not be very fruitful for interpreters of B5. B8, as the 
longest preserved quotation of any of the Presocratics, is itself not a typical fragment of the works of 
the Presocratics. The standard of evidence it might establish for other fragments might be unrealistic, 
which could potentially limit interpreters from approaching the available evidence. 
 
However, even if it can seem praiseworthy in this context to both not be too skeptical about B5 and 
to approach Proclus’ interpretation with suspicion, it is questionable to treat the text of the fragment 
and the context it is preserved in as two separate entities without careful attention to Proclus’ 
interpretation of it. Bodnar, in stating that Proclus’ “construal of the text and its philosophical 
interpretation do not stand or fall together,” makes a distinction between the context in which 
Proclus preserves the fragment – which he suggests ‘falls’ – and the fragment itself – which he, 
nevertheless, attempts to interpret. In light of the view that Proclus might have quoted the fragment 
from a doxographical work, Bodnar’s approach can be seen to be justified. However, this view about 
what Proclus knew about the fragment is not obviously correct, even if it might be the view that is 
most likely to be correct. Whether Proclus acted like the sculptor of the Velia Parmenides or if he is a 
reliable source to the meaning of Parmenides’ poem can appear to not be unambiguously indicated 
by the available evidence. Furthermore, the transmission of the fragment by Proclus can remain a 
problem regardless of whether we let it hinder us from approaching the fragment. Because the 
problematic way Proclus preserves the fragment can be seen as a reason for why interpreters are 
both implicitly and explicitly skeptical of B5, simply ignoring the context in which the fragment is 
preserved might not be an adequate basis for a response to those who do think the fragment 
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remains problematic. Therefore, approaching B5 through an account of how Proclus understood it, 
as I do below, might be warranted. Two further reasons in favor of my approach is that, first, even if 
we do not accept that his view of the fragment is correct, how Proclus presents the fragment is the 
one tool we can potentially use – outside of the text of the fragment itself and the wider context of 
Parmenides’ poem – to assist our own interpretation of B5. Second, explicating how Proclus 
understood the fragment can show which parts of modern interpretations are dependent on 
assumptions they have adopted from Proclus. As I note in section 5 below, Bodnar’s own 
interpretation of B5 is remarkably similar to how Proclus interprets the fragment, which can beg the 
question about to what extent someone like Bodnar could have been passively influenced by Proclus. 
By clarifying Proclus’ interpretation in order to see what it peculiar about it, it can potentially become 
possible to see which parts of the context he presents the fragment in are helpful – and potentially 
harmful – for an interpretation of the fragment. For these reasons I will now look at how Proclus 
presents fragment B5 and give further context to the quotation of the fragment by laying out some 




3.3 – How Proclus presents B5 and the philosophical background against which he 
presents it 
 
Proclus introduces his quotations of B8.25, B5, and B8.44 at page 708.9–11 of Cousin’s edition of his 
commentary on the Parmenides by saying, “Parmenides was looking at Being itself, that which is 
transcendent of all things and the highest of things-that-are, in which Being is primarily revealed – 
[and he did so] not as a person ignorant of the plurality of intelligibles.”189 In an apparent contrast to 
 
189 Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides 708. Trans. Coxon (2009). 
88 
 
Parmenides’ interest in the “highest of things-that are,” Proclus here maintains that Parmenides was 
also concerned with a multitude of intelligible entities. Proclus’ assertion can be understood to be 
directed against a different interpretation of Parmenides that only sees him as interested in what can 
alternatively, in Glenn Morrow’s and John Dillon’s translation of the passage, be called the 
“transcended summit” of Being. Proclus, as a Neoplatonic philosopher, was himself concerned with 
explaining reality.190 For him, all of the world was potentially an object for philosophical inquiry, not 
just abstract concepts or transcendent ideas that might appear to have no bearing on the reality we 
experience. Correspondingly, in introducing the three citations in question, Proclus’ claim is that 
Parmenides himself was of a like mind, which is a point Proclus argues in favor of while showing that 
he understands his position is not shared with every reader of the three quotations. In saying that 
Parmenides was not “ignorant of the plurality of intelligibles,” (oukh ōs agnoōn to plēthos tōn 
noētōn), Proclus uses the double negation of oukh and agnoōn, rather than the simple statement 
noōn. In doing so, Proclus emphasizes rhetorically that while it is possible to understand Parmenides 
as unconcerned with plurality, this is not the case. He then repeats this point at 709.1, concluding 
about Parmenides that “it is therefore far from true that he had to deny plurality because he posited 
the One Being.”   
 
As I pointed out in section 1, the reason why Proclus understood Parmenides to not be in 
disagreement with Plato was that he understood the two earlier thinkers to not be speaking about 
the same thing; according to Proclus, speaking about Plato’s One and Parmenides’ One Being, “the 
two men are looking at different Ones […].”191 The concept of the One Being presents the One as a 
part of Being. Parmenides himself in his poem does not use the term the One Being. It is, rather, 
Proclus’ term for what he understands Parmenides to be talking about. In introducing B8.25, B5, and 
B8.44, it is this One Being Proclus is referring to when he mentions the “highest of things-that-are,” 
 
190 “The primary motivation behind all Platonic philosophy, including Proclus’, is to explain reality.” Martijn and 
Gerson (2017) 48.  
191 Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides 1134. Trans. Coxon (2009). 
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or the highest of all beings. In Parmenides’ poem, in the eyes of Proclus, what was Parmenides’ 
object of concern was never ‘beyond being,’ which was instead how Proclus understood the Platonic 
concepts of the Good and the One.  
 
A difference between the things Proclus understood Parmenides and Plato, respectively, to be talking 
about is that Parmenides’ One Being, unlike Plato’s One, was by Proclus thought to be assigned the 
attribute of being in motion (kinēsis), like any other object among the multitude of intelligible 
entities. According to fragment B3 of Parmenides’ poem as Proclus quotes it, “it is the same there to 
think and to be.”192 As Pieter d’Hoine suggests, it is one of the “fundamental axioms of Greek 
thought,” Proclus interprets the meaning of B3 to be what can be seen as an expression of an idealist 
ontological position, entailing “That which is can be an object of thought, or, inversely, only that 
which is intelligible really exists.”193 Proclus quotes this fragment in order to argue that what 
Parmenides’ poem is about, i.e., the One Being, is in motion. Proclus also quotes B8.35–36 and B6.1 
to make the same point, which he more fully lays out by saying,  
by putting intellection in Being he clearly admits that some motion belongs to it, namely, 
intellectual [motion], which Plato knows as well, since he is the one who says that it is not 
even possible to conceive of intellect without motion. And so if according to Parmenides 
there is intellection in the One Being, there is motion as well since together with intellection 
there is certainly life, and every living thing is moved precisely in virtue of living.194 
In giving an account of Plato’s Sophist 248e–249d and the Neoplatonic view of the relationship 
between motion and intellect (nous), Eric D. Perl states that, for Plato, “the ‘motion’ attributed to 
intelligible being is […] the activity of intellectual apprehension.”195 With the perceived result of being 
 
192 Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides 1152. Trans. Morrow and Dillon (1992). Coxon translates 
Proclus’ quotation of the fragment as “There the same thing is for conceiving as is for Being,” which can 
arguably be said to be how Parmenides understood the text of the fragment. However, Proclus seems to have 
understood the connection between thinking and Being as stronger than what Coxon’s translation indicates.    
193 d’Hoine (2017) 99.  
194 Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides 1152-1153. Trans. Coxon (2009). 
195 Perl (2014) 135.  
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able to link his interpretation with Neoplatonism, Perl argues that “Plato understands intellectual 
apprehension as a ‘being with’ [sunousia] the forms,” rather than as an “objectifying ‘gaze’ of the 
soul upon intelligible ‘objects’ extrinsic to itself,” where he understands ‘forms’ as referring to the 
same as ‘Being.’196 In interpreting Parmenides as attributing motion to Being, Proclus appears to 
express a position that is similar to how Perl understands the relationship between motion and Being 
in Plato. By saying that intellection is together with – or happens at the same time as (hama) – life, 
Proclus is suggesting that intellection is the same as having the kind of affinity for an object, which is 
referred to as sunousia by Plato. The upshot of Perl’s interpretation, which is also what is suggested 
by Proclus, is that ‘intellectual apprehension’ is itself seen as the same as what is apprehended. In 
commenting on how he sees this view expressed by Plotinus, Perl says, “The forms […] are not inert 
‘objects’ but are the contents of living intelligence and as such are one with it in the unity of act and 
content, apprehension and the apprehended.” These moving acts of living intelligence is what 
Proclus, by quoting fragment B3, points out that Parmenides says is the same as Being, and 
consequently also the One Being.  
 
Proclus elsewhere197 argues that Being, life, and intellect forms a triad that constitutes “three 
different levels of reality between the One and the Soul […].”198 There is, for Proclus, a hierarchy 
between these three levels of reality in that, d’Hoine says, “Being ‘proceeds’ through the motion and 
rest associated with Life to Intellect.”199 Furthermore, that there are Beings without life and living 
things without intellect shows which of the three are the “higher causes,” because the more general 
of the three must be more important ontologically.200 But while there is such an hierarchy, there is 
also a continuity between the different levels, which can be used to gain knowledge of the structure 
of reality. As Proclus points out in the quotation above, it is possible to establish that there is intellect 
 
196 Perl (2014) 147. 
197 Proclus, Platonic Theology III 6, 26.   
198 d’Hoine (2017) 99. 
199 d’Hoine (2017) 100. 
200 d’Hoine (2017) 100; Proclus, Elements of Theology § 101, 90. 
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and motion in Being by signaling that there is life in Being, where the ‘lesser cause’ is established as 
an element of the ‘higher.’  
 
In contrast to how he sees Parmenides’ One Being, the One, according to Proclus, “is above Intellect 
and all intellective existence.”201 The One, unlike what Parmenides is talking about, is not in motion 
because it does not take part in ‘intellective existence.’ The view that Parmenides was himself talking 
about an object that was not in motion is an attractive position, and one that even Proclus points out 
is partially correct. Immediately after Proclus points out that Parmenides’ One Being is in motion, he 
also makes what can be a more obvious point for a reader of the poem, namely that Parmenides in 
fragment B8 “declares that the One Being is unmoved, calling it “unshaken” and “remaining” and of 
its own nature ‘unmoved.’”202 In the Sophist 248e–249d, where Plato’s character, Eleatic Stranger, 
talks about how motion and the intellect relates to Being, the Eleatic Stranger is not laying out – like 
Proclus – what he seems to understand to be the orthodox interpretation of Parmenides’ poem. 
Instead, he is presenting what he, at 241d of that dialogue, is afraid might be called a ‘patricide’ of 
Parmenides, who he views as an intellectual father-figure. Therefore, when Proclus is pointing 
toward the connection made between motion, intellect, and Being, which are reluctantly presented 
in the Sophist as something that is expressed by Parmenides, he is rejecting the worry that the Eleatic 
Stranger expresses by not viewing what he does in the Sophist as a ‘patricide.’ However, as Proclus 
shows by frequently referring to the views of other commentators who disagree with him, seeing the 
Eleatic Stranger’s worry as unfounded can be seen as problematic. Through the characterizations of 
what Parmenides says about what Proclus calls the One Being in fragment B8 – exemplified by the 
three attributes of to eon referenced by Proclus – ‘unshaken,’ ‘remaining’ and ‘unmoved’ – it can 
seem as though Parmenides only emphasizes that what he is talking about is not in motion.  
 
 
201 Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides 1084. Trans. Coxon (2009). 
202 Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides 1153. Trans. Coxon (2009). 
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The background against which Proclus reconciles what are the seemingly contradictory notions that 
Parmenides both understood Being as unmoved and as in motion is that Proclus further 
characterized the motion of the intellect as ‘immobile motion’ (kinēsis akinētos).203 This 
characterization, which itself can be seen as a problematic description, points toward what Proclus 
called the ‘double nature’ of the acts of the intellect. In the Parmenides, Plato had problematized the 
relationship between, on the one hand, the intelligible and immaterial forms and, on the other, 
sensible and material entities in which the forms are thought to be present or in which they 
participate.204 Proclus understood this relationship in terms of an account of the twofoldness of the 
intellect. In line with Proclus’ view that the apprehended and intellectual apprehension is the same, 
“the act of Intellect has a double nature, the first is intellective, unified with the real beings and 
indivisible; it exists together with the intelligible aspect of the intellect itself, or rather: it is both the 
intelligible itself and the intellect.” Furthermore,  
The other [act] is directed toward the external and to things that have capacity to participate 
in Intellect. In fact, the Intellect makes them also intellective, shining as it were the light of its 
own intellection and passing it on to the other things.205  
What can be seen as particular about the view Proclus expresses – which is referred to by d’Hoine as 
a “notorious principle of Neoplatonic metaphysics”206 – is that he views the otherwise immobile 
intellect as effecting other entities, rather than positing a further ontologically foundational entity 
that is mobile with an affectual nature. d’Hoine notes that Proclus can be understood to express a 
reading of 29e1–3 of the Timaeus, “where it is said that the Demiurge, being good and therefore 
lacking envy, wishes the entire creation to resemble him as closely as possible.”207 The intellect as 
Proclus understands it similarly has the effect of making other entities resemble it and making them 
take part in itself. Consequentially, Proclus understands the immaterial forms to be intelligible 
 
203 Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus II 251.5. Trans. Tarrant (2017)   
204 131a4–e4. Cf. also Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s view of the forms in Metaphysics A 9, 991a20–B9.  
205 Proclus, Platonic Theology V 18, 64–65. Trans. Saffrey and Westerink. Quoted in d’Hoine (2017).  
206 d’Hoine (2017) 107.  
207 d’Hoine (2017) 107. 
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models that themselves emanate – “shining […] the lights of its own intellection” – to the material 
and sensible.  
 
Returning to the immediate context of Proclus’ quotation of B5, at page 707 of Cousin’s edition of 
the commentary on the Parmenides Proclus says, as an example, that ‘man’ has a double nature, 
“one transcendent and one participated […].” Proclus goes on to explain, 
 For the things that exist in other, i.e. the common terms and the terms that are 
participated, must have prior to them that which belongs to itself—in a word, the 
unparticipated. On the other hand, the transcendent Form which exists in itself, because it is 
the cause of many things, unites and binds together the plurality; and again the common 
character in the many is a bond of union among them. This is why Man himself is one thing, 
another is the man in the particulars; the former is eternal, but the latter in part mortal and 
in part not.208 
In this quotation, Proclus shows how he understands the relationship between the forms and entities 
such as ‘man’ by avoiding to claim that the “common character in the many” is itself what is here 
translated as a “transcendent form.” The common character in the many is, rather, an image of the 
form that is passed on to it by the form itself. Moreover, because of its double nature, an entity such 
as ‘man in the particular’ is in part not like the form ‘man’ because the form is not found as a part of 
that entity – the form shows its own likeness in any particular man, but it is not itself present in any 
one man. Insofar as any particular entity is affected by the form, it is eternal, but it is still not the 




208 Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides 707. Trans. Coxon (2009).  
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I have noted that Proclus introduces fragments B8.22, B5, and B8.44 by claiming that Parmenides 
was not “ignorant of the plurality of intelligibles.”209 What Proclus is referring to with that claim is 
that the forms emanate into material entities. This interpretation, however, has often not been seen 
as the obvious meaning of any of the three citations. B8.25 states that “what-is draws near to what-
is” (eon gar eonti pelazei), and B8.44 says that to eon, is “equal in weight from the center” 
(messothen isopalēs), while Proclus quotes B5 as, in my modified version of Coxon’s translation, “[…] 
it is common for me \ from where I begin, for I will return there again” (xunon de moi estin \ 
oppothen arxōmai; todi gar palin ixomai authis). “All these phrases show that he,” Proclus says of 
Parmenides, “posits many intellectual beings and an order among them of first, middle, and last, and 
an inexpressible unity.”210 The images of the forms, as I have pointed out that Proclus believes, are 
still themselves thought to be intellectual beings. They are, however, still only images of the forms. 
There is thus a hierarchy among intellectual beings. Especially B8.44 seems to resist such an 
interpretation, because to eon is said to be isopalēs, equal in weight. It is the equal nature of to eon 
that would thus appear to be what Parmenides stresses, rather than any hierarchical order among 
intellectual beings. Similarly, B8.25 can appear to be stressing the uniformity of to eon when it is 
stated that it draws near to itself. As for B5, the most common interpretation of it holds that it 
expresses that two different places are either the same as each other or that the difference between 
them is insignificant.211 There can, therefore, appear not to be any implicit order among what the 
fragment speaks of as a beginning and return.  
 
In these alternatives to Proclus’ interpretation, however, one aspect of the different fragments has 
been deemphasized, namely that they all deal with directions of movement. In B8.25, to eon is not 
simply said to be in the same location as itself, it rather moves toward itself. In B8.44 it is “from the 
 
209 Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides 708. Trans. Morrow and Dillon (1992). 
210 Proclus, Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides 708. Trans. Morrow and Dillon (1992). 
211 Diels (1897), Jameson (1958), Kirk and Raven (1957), Taran (1965), Bicknell (1979), Holscher (1986), Cordero 
(2004), and Coxon (2009). Bodnar (1985), who supports his interpretation on Barnes and Owen, is an 
interesting exception because the points of similarity between his interpretation and Proclus’ interpretation. 
95 
 
center” (messothen) that to eon is said to be equal in weight. And B5 speaks of movement away from 
(and possibly back to) a point of beginning. That to eon is characterized by these directions of 
movement in the quotations could imply that Parmenides, like Proclus, understands what he is 
talking about as in ‘immobile motion’ by itself remaining motionless while affecting other entities. 
Proclus emphasizes the mobility of everything but the One itself, so in claiming that Parmenides’ 
poem is not about the One he argues that what Parmenides is talking about is in motion.  
 
Karsten makes what I understand as an interesting suggestion about how B5 should be interpreted 
by stating that 707.15 in the above quotation from Proclus’ commentary on the Parmenides can be 
understood as Proclus’ paraphrase of fragment B5.212 707.15 is the line that reads, “the common 
character in the many is a bond of union among them.” Karsten himself notes that knowledge of the 
Neoplatonic tradition and Proclus – which I have attempted to lay out and that Karsten says he 
himself possesses – is needed in order to understand Proclus’ supposed paraphrase.213 According to 
Karsten, Proclus’ interpretation of B5 centers on the meaning of the word xunon, which is here 
translated as “common.” This word is a key word in Proclus’ interpretation of B5, like it is in all other 
interpretations of the fragment. One parallel between 707.15 and B5 that supports the one being a 
paraphrase of the other is the use of the word koinos in 707.15. Koinos is here translated as ‘common 
character.’ B5 mentions one or multiple places that are xunos to the speaker from where the speaker 
begins. Because that place/those places are xunos, B5 explains, the speaker will again return to a 
place. In speaking in general about B5 it is necessary to be vague about the places of beginning and 
return. How many of them there are and if they are the same place or not hinges on which 
interpretation of the fragment one subscribes to. But if B5 is understood as a paraphrase of 707.15, 
 
212 Karsten (1835) 75. 
213 Karsten (1835) 75–76: “Ista interpretatio profecto tam ingeniosa est tamque subtilis, ut Neo-platonico 
paene acumine opus sit ad eam intelligendam et explicandam.” Karsten ultimately believes Parmenides in B5 is 
expressing hesitation about where he should start his inquiry.  
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the meaning of the fragment could be that from where the speaker begins and the place to which 
they return would share a common character as a ‘bond of union’ between them.  
 
Regardless of whether Karsten is correct in that 707.15 was meant as a paraphrase of B5, 707.15 
does show how Proclus used the term in his dialect that corresponds to Parmenides’ xunon. Karsten’s 
suggestion, however, is not itself unreasonable. That Proclus quoted B5 to show that Parmenides 
wanted to say something about the common character of separate entities is plausible. B5 speaks of 
two points that are linked together somehow, and the characterization of the first point that appears 
to link it together with the second is given by the word xunon, which Proclus could reasonably have 
understood as having the same meaning as koinos. Therefore, the common point could be seen as 
what the bond of union between the two points consists in. The further implications, as my 
exposition of Proclus’ view shows, that they are bound together, i.e., that they are affected by the 
same form, is not because the common character itself binds them together. What they have in 
common – what is koinos – could be that they both are images of a form. That form is itself in motion 
through movements that come from its center and through movements that draws entities toward 
itself, as B8.25 and B8.44 can be understood to express. I will in what follows accept that 707.15 is a 
paraphrase of B5 as a working hypothesis because it is plausible and because it – interestingly – links 
Proclus’ interpretation with Bodnar’s modern interpretation. According to Bodnar, if we accept 
707.15 as a paraphrase of B5 it would mean “Proclus’ exegesis is parallel to my reconstruction.”214 
Whether Bodnar’s interpretation is correct in regard to both Proclus and Parmenides is a question I 
will return to in section 5 below.   
 
In accepting 707.15 as an accurate paraphrase of Parmenides’ fragment B5 (and not just as what 
Proclus himself believed), there are some interpretive concessions we must make to how B5 should 
be interpreted.  
 
214 Bodnar (1985) 61.  
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(1) First, we must accept that xunos should in fact be translated as “common character,” making 
the sense of the beginning of the fragment “from where I begin has a common character.” 
Proclus understood this common character to be shared by different entities in so far as the 
same form emanated into them.   
 
(2) Second, which is implied by the first point, the fragment can be understood as speaking of 
multiple points of beginning, all sharing the common character in question, in the sense 
expressed in point 1. In regard to the discussion of how many points of beginning there are, a 
consequence of what seems to be how Proclus understood B5 is that Parmenides was there 
speaking of the multitude of entities that are images of a form. What is peculiar about one 
specific point of beginning is thus not what is being emphasized. Because of the unclear 
function of the subjunctive verb arxōmai, the text of the fragment is ambiguous in regard to 
the question of if it refers to one beginning or several. 215 Proclus’ interpretation suggests 
there can be several points of beginning.  
 
(3) Third, the place of return that the fragment mentions could be seen as distinct from where 
the speaker begins. Even though it can be natural to assume that a point of return refers 
back to an earlier mentioned point of beginning, in accepting Proclus’ interpretation, we can 
be led to assume that the point of return is only the same as the point of beginning in that 
they both are images of the same form.  
 
(4) Fourth, the speaker’s role in the fragment is marginal. The fragment says, “from where I 
begin is common for me.” This use of the verb in the first-person and the dative first-person 
 
215 Understanding arxōmai either with an iterative or generalizing function would imply that there are multiple 
points from where the speaker begins. “[…] I always begin […]” or “[…] I again and again begin […]” both posits 
multiple points of beginning. If it is interpreted instead as simply indicating the future (“[…] I will begin […]”), 
then the fragment states that there is only one point from where the speaker will be beginning. Cf. Bodnar 
(1985) 63n20; Bicknell (1979) 9.  
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personal pronoun has no bearing on what can appear to be Proclus’ interpretation as I 
understand it. In how Proclus presents B5 it would appear to make no difference if the 
fragment was an impersonal statement.  
 
(5) Fifth, because Proclus quotes them together, we must accept that B5, B8.25, and B8.44 all 
are making a similar point. Because of Simplicius, we do know the context of B8.44 and B8.25 
and, considering that context of those fragments in the poem, Proclus’ interpretation can be 
seen as questionable. The directions of movement that these quotations can seem to 
mention is not being emphasized by that context. Especially the line immediately before 
B8.25, “it is all full of being,”216 seemingly goes against Proclus’ claim that Parmenides is 
speaking about entities that have a share of Being to a greater and lesser degree, i.e., images 
of the forms have a lesser share of Being than the forms themselves. By accepting Proclus’ 
interpretation, we would have to reject these worries.   
 
(6) Sixth, we must understand B5 as a widening of the concept of to eon as it is presented by 
Parmenides elsewhere. In reacting to how Proclus presents B5, Taran notes,  
Proclus quoted this fragment together with [B8.25 and B8.44] to show that 
Parmenides, besides the conception of the One, was aware of the principle of to 
plēthos tōn noētōn [the plurality of intelligibles]. Therefore there can be no doubt 
that Proclus considered this fragment to refer to Being; whether this is correct I am 
inclined to doubt because of the content and of the kind of context in which the 
quotation occurs.217 
Similar to this quotation and the further claims Taran makes about the fragment (which I 
have quoted above), Bicknell says that Proclus “almost certainly found the lines, which he 
 
216 B8.24. Trans. Coxon (2009).  
217 Taran (1965) 51.  
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mistakenly referred to Being, in an anthology.”218 By saying that Proclus understood the 
fragment to refer to Being, both Taran and Bicknell are making imprecise claims. Proclus is 
not suggesting that B5 should be understood as B8.25 and B8.44 are normally understood – 
namely as making claims about to eon that are similar to the other claims made in B8. Rather, 
Proclus’ interpretation entails that all three quotations show that Parmenides’ Being is also in 
motion and that the intelligible emanates into the material and sensible.  
 
(7) Finally, we are led by Proclus to refrain from seeing Parmenides as being in conflict with 
Plato. By viewing the subject of Parmenides’ poem in motion and as inclusive of plurality, 
Proclus is presenting arguments in favor of his overarching view of seeing Parmenides’ poem 
in harmony with how he interprets Plato. If we are to accept how Proclus presented B5 as 
reflecting the meaning of the fragment in Parmenides’ poem, there is increased reason to 
understand Parmenides as not making claims about an entity like the One. By supposedly 
understanding to eon to be in motion, Parmenides could have posited that there is a more 
ontologically basic entity beyond what is being talked about that he is unable to explicitly 
address. In the above quotation it is inaccurate of Taran to indicate that Proclus understood 
Parmenides to have conceived of the One. As I have pointed out, Proclus’ interpretation of 
Parmenides stands in explicit opposition to interpretations of Parmenides that sees him as 
having primarily attempted to talk about what Proclus understood Plato to ultimately be 
concerned with, namely the One. 
 
By articulating this set of assumptions, I have attempted to make these different aspects of Proclus’ 
interpretation of fragment B5 conspicuous. The reluctance shown by commentators toward B5 can 
partially be attributed to the difficult context in which Proclus preserves the fragment, as well as the 
tendency to uncritically accept or reject Proclus aspects of interpretation. Even though I have 
 
218 Bicknell (1979) 10n3.  
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presented these points separately, viewing different aspects of Proclus’ interpretation as separate 
from each other can be problematic. These points show the importance of the context that the 
fragment is presented in for its interpretation. It is possible, but – as I have mentioned – not 
necessarily true, that Proclus’ interpretation was inspired by him knowing the context of B5 in 
Parmenides’ poem. Therefore, as point 5 states, Proclus appears to have understood the meaning of 
B5 as expressed in the context of the two citations from B8. However, we also need to be conscious 
of point 6, namely that contrary to what some commentators I will mention in the next section 
appear to believe, Proclus is not straightforwardly suggesting that B5 should be understood as a part 
of B8. He is instead suggesting that these three quotations widen the concept of to eon, in contrast 
to how it more commonly is understood. Point one, two and three are similarly related to one 
another as consequences of Proclus’ theory of participation in the forms. Furthermore, regarding 
point 4, that Proclus seemingly ignores the narrative elements of B5 can also reflect that he might 
not have been concerned with looking at the whole poem when he quoted the B5. That he ignores 
these narrative elements can indicate that we have less reason to attempt to find evidence for how 
the fragment was positioned in the poem from the context Proclus presents it in.  
 
Finally, by looking in detail at Proclus’ reading of the fragment and the context he presents it in, we 
can see that the different interpretive choices Proclus makes do not fully make sense without 
reference to his interpretation as a whole. Proclus acted as an editor when he chose B5 to express his 
own interpretation of Parmenides (and an aspect of his own philosophical position). These editorial 
decisions regarding how to present the fragment only makes sense within the context of his 
interpretation, which aimed at presenting Parmenides as presenting an incomplete position that was 
in agreement with Plato. In using Proclus as a source for a modern interpretation of Parmenides’ 
fragment B5, the possible advantages and limits of his interpretive position can be appreciated and 
understood only while keeping in mind that all the individual elements of how he presented the 
fragment supported his Neoplatonic reading of Parmenides. Taking one of these aspects of his 
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interpretation and applying it to a modern reading without reference to how Proclus understood the 
claim is, therefore, questionable. At the same time, it is also possible that Proclus both expressed his 
own position and gave us some evidence that can be used in order to establish the meaning of the 
fragment. Specifically, regarding the meaning of xunon, the meaning of the word ostensibly 
presented by Proclus can seem to correspond to how Parmenides might have used the word.  
 
 
3.4 – A xunon beginning of an inquiry into what has no beginning 
 
While few commentators have subscribed to Proclus’ interpretation of B5, several have selected 
pieces of the context in which he presents the fragment in order to support their interpretations, 
seemingly without being aware of the full context. Consequentially, these interpretations can be 
seen as problematic. The way this problematic aspect has presented itself in their readings is 
primarily through the widespread translation of xunon as ‘indifferent’. Starting with Diels, 
interpreters of the fragment have not agreed with either Proclus understanding or the dictionary 
definition of xunon.219 In fact, according to Karl Bormann’s representative opinion, translating xunon 
as ‘common’ in fragment B5 is “unparmenideisch”.220 Taking their lead from Proclus, these 
commentators believe that the subject of B5 is to eon.221 Even though they do not follow Cornford’s 
problematic suggestion that there was a lacuna in B8 in which B5 should be placed, they seemingly 
take that Proclus’ places the fragment in between B8.25 and B8.44 as indicating the wider context of 
B8 is what explicates the meaning of B5. However, they do not follow Proclus’ Neoplatonic 
interpretation of any of the three quotations at 708.15 in his commentary on the Parmenides. 
Consequently, without their controversial interpretation of the meaning of xunon, what is expressed 
 
219 Diels (1897) 67.  
220 Bormann (1971) 180.   




in B5 can appear to stand in stark contrast to what Parmenides asserts in B8. Specifically, the speaker 
of B5 can appear to give a positive attribute to a beginning – an archē – while the goddess-narrator in 
B8 claims that to eon is anarchon, i.e. without archē.  
 
Before engaging with these commentators and how they make use of Proclus, I will first present my 
own account of the meaning of the word xunon in order to attempt to bring out the problems with 
the accounts that translate it as ‘indifferent’ or as another phrase with the same meaning. As I have 
pointed out, the question of the meaning of xunon is arguably an important aspect of any 
interpretation of fragment B5. While the meaning of the word is generally said to be simply 
‘common’, looking at how it is used elsewhere by both Parmenides and others can shed light on what 
is meant by it. Presenting examples of how a word is used in order to bring out its meaning, which I 
do here, is itself problematic. The examples themselves are potentially ambiguous, and they cannot 
cover all uses of the word. I will, nevertheless, provide some examples of the use of xunos from the 
Iliad, Parmenides’ poem, and Proclus’ interpretation in order to attempt to point to what can seem 
to be one important meaning of the word. At the same time, those who follow Diels’ in translating 
xunon as ‘indifferent’ can be said to not be justified in doing so. Diels supports his translation with 
reference to Heraclitus’ fragment DK22 B103 and no other uses of the word. Based on the meaning 
of the word in that fragment alone we cannot conclude that the meaning of xunon was ‘indifferent’.  
 
Three examples of the use of xunon in the Iliad are as follows.  
 
gaia d’eti xunē pantōn kai makron Olumpos (15.193)  
The earth and high Olympus remain yet common to us all. 
xunon Enualios (18.309)  




Xunon de kakon poleessi titheisi (16.262) 
A common evil they [wasps] make for many. 222 
 
In these quotations, what is xunon is something many all stand in a similar relationship to. The earth 
and Olympus, war, and the evil inflicted by wasps are all things that people indiscriminately are 
affected by or stand in a relation to, regardless of who they are or what they are doing. Similarly, 
xunon in fragment B10 of Parmenides’ poem is attributed to aithēr. Just like with earth, the aithēr 
too can be characterized as xunon because everyone stands in the same relation to it. These things 
are xunon to these groups of people not because these people are characterized in a specific way. 
Wasps do not differentiate between people; the quotation above continues: “And the wasps, if so be 
some wayfaring man ran as he passed by rouse them involuntarily, fly forth one and all in the valor of 
their hearts, and fight each in defense of his young”. The wayfaring man does not have any qualifying 
feature that leads the wasps to attack him. He is attacked because the wasps are a xunon kakon, an 
evil that has no regard for who they are attacking. That the wasps do not discriminate between 
different people, however, does not mean that a passerby should be indifferent to them. They 
influence everyone in the same way, but they still have a great effect on people that it is wise to be 
wary of. What is xunon, which these examples indicate, is arguably something that affects 
indiscriminately, or something one stands in a relation to beyond one’s own control.  
 
Similarly, for Proclus the common element in the many is present in them because the same form 
radiates or emanates into them. Proclus’ conception of how the forms participate in entities can, 
thus, possibly illustrate the meaning of xunon in the fragment. The meaning is ‘common,’ not 
because it refers to several entities or places that have the same internal characteristics, but rather, 
because these stand in the same relation to something they are affected by. The aspect of these 
 
222 Homer, The Iliad. Trans. Murray (1924).  
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entities that binds them together, in the eyes of Proclus, is not a unifying characteristic that each of 
them themselves possess that make them the same as each other.   
 
In a possible contrast to how xunos is presented in the above quotations, Heraclitus fragment B103 
reads, “On the circumference of a circle the beginning [archē] and end are common [xunon].” It is 
apparent why Diels related this fragment to B5. Both speak of an archē and both label that archē 
xunon. However, that Diels takes this fragment as evidence in favor of translating xunon as 
‘indifferent’ is not justifiable based on how the word is used in this fragment alone. If xunon is 
translated as ‘indifferent’ the fragment would be claiming that it is arbitrary where a beginning and 
end is on a circle. This is a possible claim that Heraclitus could have made. However, it is not the only 
way to interpret the fragment. Alternatively, if xunon is understood in the sense of the quotations 
from the Iliad and Parmenides’ fragment B10, then the meaning of the fragment would be that the 
beginning and end of a circle stands in an indiscriminate relationship to the whole circumference of 
the circle. The beginning and end of a circle would then affect its circumference equally, like the 
wasps in the Iliad 16.262. At one time one point on the circumference is affected in a way so it is the 
beginning, at another time the same point might be the end. Both of these interpretations are, in my 
opinion, possible based on the internal meaning of the fragment itself. But considering that 
‘indifferent’ is elsewhere never the meaning of xunon, it is safe to say that we do not have any 
reason to understand it that way in DK22 B103, and therefore, also not in Parmenides’ fragment B5.  
 
Interpretations that, nevertheless, understand the meaning of xunon to be akin to ‘indifferent’ do so 
because they otherwise see the meaning of the fragment as problematic in the context in which 
Proclus presents it. The reason why translating xunon in the arguably more natural way I have 
presented above is sometimes avoided is that B5 can appear to be out of place in B8. One attribute 
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of to eon that is mentioned in B8.27 is that it is anarchon, meaning ‘without archē’.223 The verb-form 
archōmai of the noun archē is what is translated as ‘I begin’ in B5. If B5 is to be understood in the 
context of B8, it can appear problematic that the goddess is referring to her own archē while she at 
the same time, in B8.27, claims that Being has no archē. It is in response to that problem that xunon 
is translated as ‘indifferent’. With xunon translated as ‘indifferent’, B5 fits better into the context of 
B8 because the fragment does not, then, positively mention an archē. Rather – in apparent 
agreement with B8.27 – B5 says that the goddess’ archē is indifferent to her.  
 
I have noted above that we need to see B5, B8.25 and B8.44 as expressing Proclus’ own 
interpretation. Therefore, to believe that Proclus’ simply indicated that we should use our 
understanding of B8 to make sense of B5 would be arguably misguided. The commentators who do 
use the wider context of their interpretations of B8 to make sense of B5 are the ones who choose a 
translation like ‘indifferent’ for xunon. One such commentator is Coxon, who suggests, “the only 
explicit evidence for the context of the fragment relates it to the nature of to eon and the simile of 
the sphere in fr. 8.”224 The simile of the sphere is found in B8.43, a line before to eon is said to be 
equal in weight from the middle in B8.44, quoted by Proclus. By referring to B8.43, Coxon makes 
reference to a fragment that Proclus does not quote in order to establish the meaning of B5. 
Correspondingly, without explicitly referencing the simile of the sphere,225 Diels claims that B5 
illustrates Parmenides’ “runden Weltsystem”.226 Raven, furthermore, points to the phrase alêtheiês 
eukukleos (well-rounded truth) in fragment B1.29 in favor of a similar – and particularly speculative – 
reading of B5 which holds that the fragment states that “every attribute of reality can be deduced 
 
223 Kahn (1960) 235-236 notes that archē is a term that has the basic double meaning of both “to rule” and “to 
go first, to begin.” 
224 Coxon (2009) 286. 
225 Diels (1897) 67 could potentially have reached this conclusion without considering in detail the context of 
B8.44. The right translation of xunon seemed to him even superficially to be ‘indifferent’ (translating tauton, the 
same). “Oberflächlicher Betrachtung muss es scheinen als ob xunon die sonst freilich nicht nachweisbare 
Bedeutung von tauton habe.” He does, nevertheless, state that B5 is about to eon. 
226 Diels (1897) 67. 
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from every other.”227 In order for B5 to express circularity, which is what these interpreters believe it 
does, the point of return in the fragment must be interpreted as the same point as the point of 
beginning. Regarding the inquiry the goddess can appear to give an account of in B5, these 
interpreters present the view that the goddess believes that any point where she begins her inquiry 
is somewhere she will eventually return, which supposedly makes it indifferent where that point of 
beginning is. Here, then, these readings disagree with Proclus. They do, however, at the same time 
appear to think it is obvious that B5 should be read together with the other fragments Proclus 
presents alongside it, even going so far as to read the context of another parts of B8 that what 
Proclus quoted into B5.  
 
Through B5, B8.25 and B8.44, Proclus is not pointing to the circularity of Parmenides’ Being. Instead, 
he is attempting to show that Parmenides understood that there was a multitude of intelligible 
entities that stood in a hierarchical relationship with the forms and the One Being. What specifically 
Proclus pointed to in the three quotations was that Parmenides saw Being as in motion. In claiming 
that B5 is about to eon and is expressing its circularity, as I have noted, commentators such as Diels 
and Raven offer a problematic translation of xunon in order to make sense of the fragment in the 
context they present it.  
 
In contrast, Bodnar’s interpretation of B5 is much closer to how Proclus presented the fragment. 
Written in 1985, Bodnar’s article on B5 is the last significant contribution to the debate surrounding 
the meaning of the fragment.228 Bodnar explicitly states that if we follow Karsten’s suggestion of 
understanding 707.15 as a paraphrase of B5, then “Proclus’ exegesis is parallel to my 
 
227 Kirk and Raven (1957) 268; Jameson (1958) 22; and Bicknell (1979) 9 choose to read eupetheos instead of 
eukukleos, and Bicknell suggests, “whoever was responsible for the importation of eukukleos into B1.29 was 
seduced” by the similarly of the context there to B8.43. 
228 A more recent article on B5, Bogaczyk-Vormayr (2016), only repeats the idea that the fragment expresses a 
circular conception of the goddess’ inquiry.  
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reconstruction.”229 However, Bodnar’s interpretation also does not completely correspond to how 
Proclus present the fragment. In pointing to what makes his own and Proclus’ interpretations similar, 
Bodnar states, “B5 singles out the unifying characteristic of all, and so constitutes the metaphysical 
entity Being.”230 Bodnar understands this claim as parallel to Owen’s interpretation of the poem, as 
slightly modified by Barnes.231 Bodnar points to how they understand fragment B2, which they take 
to indicate that Parmenides’ poem is about the existence of entities. “The first and most 
fundamental characteristic,” Bodnar says, explaining Owen’s and Barnes’ interpretation, of any 
object of inquiry “will be that it exists.”232 Here, however, Bodnar, Owen and Barnes’ position is not 
the same as Proclus’. Proclus’ reason for quoting B5 is not to show what unifies entities insofar as 
they exist. He also does not point to a characteristic that entities themselves possess as individual 
entities, but rather to how they are affected by the forms.  
 
The consequence of interpreting B5 in light of how Owen and Barnes understands B2 is expressed by 
Bodnar thus: “Construing B2 in this way allows us to say that it is indifferent whence (which object of 
inquiry) we embark on our inquiry, we will always arrive back to the same conclusion, viz . that it 
exists.”233 Bodnar’s interpretation, therefore, preserves the translation of xunon as ‘indifferent’ while 
it at the same time avoids viewing B5 as presenting a circular picture of reality, like Diels and those 
who follow his interpretation. The reason why Bodnar himself does not want to commit himself to 
the view that B5 presents a circular image is that if one is bound to return to ones starting point it, in 
fact, becomes far from arbitrary where one begins; “It is anything but indifferent to me whether I 
start off as e.g. a beggar or millionaire.”234 Interestingly, Bodnar sees preserving the translation Diels 
offered of xunon as an argument in favor of his own alternative interpretation. It, unlike Diels’ 
 
229 Bodnar (1985) 61.  
230 Bodnar (1985) 61. 
231 Owen (1960) 94-95; Barnes (1979) 157. The interpretation Bodnar presents centers for Owen and Barnes on 
the question of the subjectless esti in B2. Cf. chapter 1 below.  
232 Bodnar (1985) 61. 
233 Bodnar (1985) 61. 
234 Bodnar (1985) 58.  
108 
 
interpretation, makes better sense of the fragment if we accept ‘indifferent’ as the translation of 
xunon, he argues here.  
 
Two further targets for Bodnar are Uvo Hölscher and Peter Bicknell, who both argue, in contrast to 
how Proclus presents the fragment, that we should understand B5 as referring to a single starting 
point. Hölscher is, nevertheless, still committed to the translation of xunon as ‘indifferent’. 
Furthermore, the starting point referenced to in the fragment is, according to Hölscher, the first way 
of inquiry that the Goddess presents, namely the alēthēia, which he suggests she returns to at the 
end of the poem.235 In response, Bodnar claims that Hölscher’s interpretation, which views the poem 
as beginning and ending at the same point, also does not do justice to that point being 
‘indifferent’.236 Bicknell, however, points out what I have noted and what Curd and Palmer also 
suggest,237 namely that ‘indifferent’ is a “strained” translation of xunon. His alternative translation of 
xunon is “a basic point”, referring to – similar to Hölscher’s view – “the fundamentality of the master 
argument.”238 Bodnar does not criticize Bicknell’s position other than by pointing to that he prefers 
the readings of the subjunctive archōmai that has the connotations of repeated action, unlike 
Bicknell who understand the subjunctive as expressing one future action – one future beginning.239 
 
Bodnar’s interpretation does not, in his view, hinge on the meaning of xunon. After having criticized 
others for not following Diels’ translation of the word, he ultimately points out that the translation 
he has presented thus far is not supported by the evidence at our disposal. However, he argues that 
his translation can be substituted with the more natural ‘commonly/universally present’ without 
changing the meaning of the fragment. Following what he thinks is Proclus’ example, he glosses 
 
235 Hölscher (2014) 68-69. The first edition of Hölscher’s book is from 1969.  
236 Bodnar (1985) 58. 
237 See note X above.  
238 Bicknell (1979) 9. 
239 Bodnar (1985) 63n20; Bicknell (1979) 10n15.  
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xunon as “’general’, ‘commonly/universally present’.”240 This is seemingly not how Proclus presented 
the term in B5. Proclus did arguably not think that what is common or universal is present in all 
entities, but rather that they take part in the common or universal in a relational way, insofar as they 
are affected by the forms. Bodnar’s interpretation of B5 is finally that the goddess expresses that 
every point from where she can begin her inquiry exists, because existence is commonly present 
among them all, and therefore, it is indifferent from where she should start.  
 
That xunon refers to something that is present everywhere is not as clearly a mistranslation as 
‘indifferent’. Some of the quotations that I quoted from the Iliad as well as Parmenides fragment B10 
can be understood as also possibly having that meaning. The earth is commonly present in the sense 
that it is always there. Similarly, the aithēr is something that is always present. Other examples more 
clearly only fit the relational meaning of xunon. The god of war is not always present, but he does not 
discriminate between different people. And wasps similarly affect everyone equally, but they are 
thankfully not universally present. If we are to refer to Proclus in this context, having in mind the 
background of how he understood the relationship between forms and the multitude of other 
entities, it is more clear that he uses xunon in the relational sense rather than as referring to what is 
commonly present throughout the multitude of entities. A common point between Bodnar’s 
interpretation and the interpretations of those who follow Diels is that they both base their 
understanding of the fragment on Proclus, but they do so in a limited way that arguably misconstrues 
how Proclus himself presented B5.  
 
Finally, for interpreters of B5 it can be important – if we disagree with Osborne’s approach to the 
Presocratics – to see to what extent Proclus himself presented his own interpretation though his 
quotation of B5 rather than how Parmenides understood the fragment.  As I have noted, Bodnar 
himself is not committed to the view that Proclus presents the correct interpretation of the 
 
240 Bodnar (1985) 61.  
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fragment, even though he sees his own interpretation as corresponding to Proclus’.241 Similarly, all 
other interpreters of B5 do not aim at giving an account of how Proclus understood the fragment, 
but only make use of his interpretation in order to present their own. However, if they had 
considered Proclus’ position more closely, they might have found reason to reconsider the basis for 
their own positions. Those who understand B5 as expressing a circular image would arguably benefit 
from seeing the peculiarities of how Proclus relates B5 to the two other fragments from B8. To the 
extent that their reading of B8 does not fit with Proclus’, they might consider whether B5, as Proclus 
presents it, should not be understood in the context of how they understand B8. Regarding Bodnar, 
that he understands the meaning of xunon as ‘indifferent’ (even when he changes the translation to 
‘universally present’ the meaning is still ‘indifferent’) might be influenced by seeing that he is 
arguably not correct in stating that Proclus understood the word the same way as him.  
 
How Proclus presents B5 shows the difficulties that can come with making use of an ancient source 
to form an interpretation of an even more ancient text. When making use of Proclus as a source to 
the meaning of Parmenides’ poem, it is seemingly necessary to understand – to the best of one’s 
abilities – both the whole of Parmenides’ poem itself and the complete context in which Proclus 
understood the poem. A risk one runs by inadequately understanding the context in how 
Parmenides’ fragment was preserved is that misunderstanding the context can also lead one to 
misunderstanding the poem.  
 
Nevertheless – from the perspective of an historian – it is also possible to fault Proclus for making 
use of Parmenides’ poem only for his own purposes. To say that Proclus presented B5 in a way that 
lucidly expressed Parmenides’ intended meaning is clearly wrong. Regarding the question of what 
the narrator’s point of beginning is in B5, it is possible that Proclus did not present the fragment in 
the correct context. Like Hölscher and Bicknell both suggests, B5 might have been an introductory 
 
241 Bodnar (1985) 63n23.  
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part of the poem that indicated the source from which the rest of the goddess’ speech would follow. 
Daniel Graham argues against understanding the word archē is it used by the Presocratics with the 
connotations given to it be Aristotle, which is that it is at the same time a point of beginning and a 
power that is continually present in what follows from that beginning. In regard to the Milesian 
Presocratic thinkers, in Metaphysics I Aristotle argues that they understood the term as an 
underlying principle that was present in all things, “the substance continuing but changing in its 
attributes.”242 Graham’s point, arguing against applying Aristotle’s notion to the thinking of the 
Presocratics, is that the archē can simply be understood as meaning ‘starting point’ where, in the 
case of the accounts of the Milesians, everything began, but it was not something that continued to 
have power over what it set in motion. For Thales, on Graham’s account, water does not continue to 
be present in everything even though everything has its source in water. 243  
 
Graham’s interpretation of the meaning of archē stands in clear opposition to how Bodnar interprets 
the word in B5, which is that the goddess says where she begins is ‘universally present’. 
Understanding archōmai as having that meaning in B5 does not as clearly go against Proclus’ 
interpretation, because he arguably understood the subject of B5 as being affected by what is 
referred to as a beginning. What we can criticize Proclus for is that he did present the goddess as the 
subject of B5. That the fragment is in the first person clearly indicates that it is the goddess-narrator 
who is the subject, but – as I have noted – that is not something reflected in how Proclus presents 
the fragment.  
 
That the fragment speaks of a return as well as a beginning means that the point of beginning cannot 
simply be a source in the sense Graham understand the term. The goddess says that the place where 
from she begins is xunon because she will again return there. Therefore, that point of origin does 
 
242 Aristotle, Metaphysics 983B10. Trans. Tredennick (1933). 
243 Graham (2006) 31n12.  
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seem to have some power over her. Nevertheless, we still do not need to understand the beginning 
as being present throughout her further inquiry. The goddess’ beginning can be understood as 
something she is repeatedly affected by. Not as something she reaches through her routes of 
thinking (or something she, through her force of will, plans out and sets into motion), but something 
that leads her on her way. The goddess would then be led back to the point where she began, not 
because she is on a circular path that ends where she started out, but rather because that point of 
origin is so important that it repeatedly presents itself to her, over and over again.  
 
This is my own interpretation of the fragment, which is primarily supported by my account of the 
meaning of the word xunon and Graham’s account of the meaning of archē. To the extent that the 
correct meaning of these two words is reflected in the interpretation, is has – in my opinion – some 
value as an interpretation. Proclus’ presentation of the fragment both supports and is in conflict with 
my interpretation. How Proclus presents the meaning of xunon supports it, while it is not supported 
by that he does not present the role of the goddess in the context where he quotes the fragment.   
 
3.5 – Concluding remarks  
 
In drawing a line back to chapter 1, I want to conclude this chapter with a reference to a position 
Mansfeld expresses in an article on the proems of the poems of the Presocratics. In his view, which is 
similar to the viewed I referred to Miller and Mourelatos as having expressed about the proem of 
Parmenides’ poem, the proems are seemingly intentionally unclear. One example Mansfeld points to 
is the beginning of Empedocles’ poem.244 According to Mansfeld, “Empedocles purposely made a 
riddle his starting-point, in order to create an atmosphere of suspense and to incite curiosity.”245 
Similarly, it might have been the case that the starting point referred to in B5 was never made clear 
 
244 Empedocles’ poem begins thus: “Hear first the four roots of all things: bright Zeus and life-bringing Hera and 
Aidoneus and Nestis, whose tears are the source of mortal streams.” Trans. Wright (1981).  
245 Mansfeld (1995) 227.  
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by Parmenides. Mansfeld points out that the text we possess that we know is from the beginning of 
Parmenides’ poem is notably obscure. One example he notes is the passage at the very end of the 
proem, which ends with the phrase pantos panta perōnta. (B1.32) This striking phrase is also, as I 
referred to in chapter 0.2 above, difficult to interpret. This very first sentence in the poem that is 
explicitly philosophical is also one of the more obscure in the whole poem. Similarly, while the esti is 
subjectless in fragment B2, it is spoken of less obscurely later in the poem in fragment B6.  
 
If B5 was the goddess’ reference to her own beginning, it would arguably have been presented in the 
poem soon after the proem, in the middle of these other obscure passages. It is possible that just like 
we do not know what the goddess’ point of beginning is, because of how Parmenides had presented 
his ideas, neither did the ancient readers of the poem. What this idea can indicate is that it is not 
certain that Parmenides’ poem is so problematic and difficult to interpret primarily because of the 
evidence we possess. Alternatively, also Proclus could have been unsure about the context in which 
B5 was originally presented in the poem – even if he did possess the full poem – so that he presented 
fragment out of its original context might be understandable. Therefore, to attempt to avoid the 
problems the poem can present to us today – by trying to get a more secure interpretive footing by 
appealing to the authority of authors like Proclus – might be misguided.   
 
As B5 is preserved to us it can potentially present the problem of where the goddess’ point of 
beginning was. It does not as clearly present that problem as long as we understand her point of 
beginning as ‘indifferent’ to her, or as ‘universally present’. To the extent that the readings that 
translate xunon thus is supported with reference to how Proclus preserves the fragment, Proclus can 
be seen to be a part of the reason for why commentators today do not attempt to explicitly ask 
where the goddess’ point of beginning might have been. At the same time, however, the readings 
that do not see B5 as emphasizing that the goddess is speaking of an important starting point are 
motivated by misreadings of Proclus rather than the full context in which he presented B5. His view 
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of Parmenides as having expressed an incomplete Platonic position is itself problematic because of 
the very notion that someone would knowingly express an incomplete philosophical position. It has 
evidentially also been problematic that readers are not aware of what his position consists in.  
 
Viewing Parmenides’ poem through a Proclean lens is an interesting endeavor. On the one hand, 
understanding his Neoplatonic background is necessary in order to approach his quotations from the 
poem, as Karsten already pointed out in 1835. On the other hand, considering how he presents the 
meaning of the word xunon, it might be beneficial for modern readers to attempt to read specifically 
fragment B5 in a similar manner as Proclus did. Ultimately, one does not have to subscribe to his 
whole interpretation in order to give an account of the background against which Proclus presented 
the fragments, which is necessary in order to avoid pitfalls such as what Diels arguably fell into. 
However, even if that background is laid out completely and transparently and we knew as much as 



















The aim of this master’s thesis was to consider how and to what extent reading Parmenides’ poem 
through Plutarchian and Proclean lenses can be helpful or harmful for interpreters who seek to 
uncover the meaning of the poem today. I have here, in the two chapters dealing with Plutarch and 
Proclus, found two different, but related answers to these questions.  
 
In chapter one I first gave an account of modern research into Parmenides’ poem on the basis of the 
view that interpreters have come to see the classic problems associated with the poem as 
increasingly problematic. One reaction against these increasingly problematic issues, which I 
presented there, is to adopt interpretations from ancient authors who might have been less 
restricted when reading the poem than what modern readers currently arguably are. I indicated that 
my own approach in each of the two following chapters was to both lay out the context in which 
what we know about Parmenides is preserved and attempt to consider what the consequences 
might be of looking at the poem through that context.  
 
The chapter on Plutarch and his claim that Parmenides was a lawgiver showed that there is some 
reason for interpreters to support their interpretations only reluctantly on how Plutarch understood 
Parmenides’ poem. However, this claim was only said to be valid to the extent that Plutarch’s 
interpretation of Parmenides can be linked to the network of biographical commonplaces that he 
made use of when writing biographies of lawgivers. That chapter, thus, showed a specific way in 
which understanding Parmenides through the context of a thinker who seemingly preserved 
information about him and his poem can potentially be harmful to a modern interpreter of 




The chapter on Proclus and how he preserved fragment B5 showed that how Proclus preserved B5 
has seemingly made the fragment difficult to approach for interpreters. However, even though 
Proclus exhibits a contentious view of Parmenides and his poem, many issues with how interpreters 
today view fragment B5 can be ascribed to them not adequately understanding the context in which 
Proclus presented the fragment. One such issue is the interpreters of the fragment who follow Diels, 
and another issue is that interpreters disregard the fragment because they see the context it is 
presented in as convoluted. The chapter concluded that while there are aspects of Proclus’ 
interpretation that are questionable, specifically how he appears to have understood the meaning of 
the word xunon in the fragment can be worthwhile to consider for interpreters who disagree with 
him.  
 
Contrasting the latter two chapters with each other can show that there is not just one way to relate 
to the ancient sources we have to Parmenides’ poem. Even though Proclus and Plutarch are broadly 
similar by both presenting Platonist philosophical positions, how we can use and understand the 
context in which they present Parmenides’ poem is dissimilar. Nevertheless, to what extent the two 
are similar and dissimilar sources to Parmenides, and what is peculiar about each of them, is first 
shown by looking at the context in which they preserve and present information about the poem, 
which is what I have given an account of in this master’s thesis. The peculiarities of each of them 
regarding what they related about Parmenides is found in either case by considering the background 
against which and the context in which they preserved information about Parmenides and his poem.  
 
 
A common theme between the two chapters is that both the context of Plutarch claim that 
Parmenides was a lawgiver and the context in which Proclus presents fragment B5, might lead 
readers to not approach the specific problem of what Parmenides might have been reacting to when 
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he wrote his poem. For Plutarch, because he arguably viewed Parmenides’ poem as an expression of 
a network of biographical commonplaces, there is seemingly no room for asking what the poem 
might have been written in response to. Regarding Proclus, misreadings of how he presents the 
poem has led interpreters to think that the narrator-goddess in fragment B5 says that where she 
begins is indifferent to her. Because Proclus himself deemphasized the role of the speaker of B5, he is 
also arguably a reason why readers do not question what the point of beginning in the fragment 
might refer to, which they might otherwise have done.  
 
Reading Parmenides through Proclean and Plutarchian lenses might, therefore, make readers less 
likely to approach the problem of what Parmenides’ poem might have been a reaction to. However, 
the question of whether looking towards Proclus and Plutarch is helpful or harmful for readers of 
Parmenides is also a question of intent. Under the circumstances that one understands Plutarch as 
an authority to Parmenides’ poem, that might hinder one’s interpretation. But reading these ancient 
interpreters with an eye for what their perspectives might contribute to modern discussions is not 
thereby excluded as a possibility. Plutarch’s view of the doxa in the poem is interesting and 
noteworthy, even though it is arguably not possible to appeal to him as an authority in order to point 
out that those who share his view are correct.  
 
What I myself perceive as one virtue of this master’s thesis is that I have indicated that there is a 
connection between Plutarch’s network of biographical commonplaces and the structure of 
Parmenides’ poem on his interpretation, which has not to my knowledge been pointed out before. 
Its validity, therefore, is much more questionable than it would otherwise be, which I have tried to 
indicate by pointing out how my conclusions about how Plutarch reads Parmenides are always reliant 
on whether or not there is such a connection between the poem and how Plutarch viewed legendary 
lawgivers. A second point that I view as a virtue is that I have tried to approach fragment B5 despite 
all the problems surrounding it. Any conclusion regarding a fragment like B5 will have to be 
118 
 
uncertain, but there is still, in my opinion, value in trying to approach such a fragment. Uncertainty, 
which some readers of the poem are more afraid of than others, is difficult to avoid when dealing 
with a text like Parmenides’ poem.  
 
There are so many other problems and questions that seem worthwhile to me to approach when it 
comes to the issues I have brought up here. One such problem is the nature of the relationship 
between the different thinkers in the tradition that preserved Parmenides’ poem, and specifically 
between Plutarch and Proclus. I have here not at length compared the two, which could possibly 
further shine light on how each of them stands in relation to Parmenides. Another issue is Plato’s 
role in how the poem is understood and preserved in antiquity. Furthermore, despite my conclusions 
about it, fragment B5 still presents an intriguing problem to me in light of the suggestion that it is not 
just perplexing because of how it is preserved. Finally, a related problem, which is again related to 
the problem I have repeated mentioned through this master’s thesis, is the problem of what that 
point of beginning that B5 speaks of might possibly be. Considering what I have uncovered about 
Plutarch’s and Proclus’ readings of Parmenides, I do not think there is reason to in the future avoid 
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